PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Winter 1985–86

Raymond L. Garthoff — American-Soviet Relations in Perspective

Gideon Rafael — American-Soviet Interests in the Middle East

Paul E. Peterson — The New Politics of Deficits

Gary C. Jacobson — Party Organization and Campaign Resources in 1982

Michael Rubner — President Reagan, the War Powers Resolution, and Grenada

Jane M. O. Sharp — Arms Control and Alliance Commitments

Peter H. Argersinger — New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age

Book Reviews

Title Page and Index to Volume 100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
Columbia University

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

IRA KATZNELSON
New School for Social Research

LAWRENCE KRAUSE
The Brookings Institution

EVERETT CARLL LADD
University of Connecticut

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
The Lehrman Institute

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
The Urban Institution

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin-Madison

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

LEONARD SILK
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $25.00 a year. Three years, $58.00. Students, $16.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $35.00 a year. Foreign postage, $6.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 100 Number 4 Winter 1985–86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Managing Editor
TILLY FRIEDMAN-LICHTSCHEIN

Manuscript Editor
JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notice to Members of the Academy

In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Friday, January 10, 1986, at 3:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the executive director's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-7885.

Correct preparation of manuscripts expedites production and therefore contributors must observe the following requirements: Submit manuscripts in triplicate, all copy double-spaced including main text, quotations, and footnotes. Place tables, graphs, and numbered footnotes on separate pages at end of manuscript. Include an abstract of 100 to 200 words that specifies the article's main theme or conclusions. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index.* Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci,* the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Urban Affairs Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life.* Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index,* and *Book Review Digest.* A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $6.25. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $10.00. Additional copies, $1.50 each. Complete issue, $0.20 a page with a $20.00 minimum charge. All prices are subject to change.

Copyright © 1985 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 100
Number 4
Winter 1985–86

Contents

American-Soviet Relations in Perspective
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF 541

Divergence and Convergence of American-Soviet Interests in the Middle East: An Israeli Viewpoint GIDEON RAFAEL 561

The New Politics of Deficits PAUL E. PETERSON 575

Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans and Democrats in 1982 GARY C. JACOBSON 603

The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada MICHAEL RUBNER 627

Arms Control and Alliance Commitments JANE M. O. SHARP 649

New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age
PETER H. ARGERSINGER 669

Book Reviews 689

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 730

Title Page and Index to Volume 100 733

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 — LORD BELOFF 689

Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship — KENNETH W. THOMPSON 690

Epstein, The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective — GEORGE L. SHERRY 691

Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About it — INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. 693

Durch, ed., National Interests and the Military Use of Space — THOMAS H. KARAS 694

Laird, and **Herspring,** The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms — CLIFFORD KUPCHAN 695

Saivetz and **Woodby,** Soviet-Third World Relations — ROBERT WESSON 697

Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy — KENNETH N. WALTZ 698

de Rose, European Security and France — LEONARD V. SMITH 699

Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in the Soviet Empire, From Yalta to Solidarity — ROBERT F. BYRNES 700

Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy — PETER H. JUVILER 701

Porter, The U.S.–U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement — BARBARA INSEL 703

Foltz and **Bienen,** eds., Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations — I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN 704

Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa — CRAWFORD YOUNG 705

Hargrove and **Nelson,** Presidents, Politics, and Policy — I. M. DESTLER 707

Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy — JOSEPH COOPER 708

Champagne, Congressman Sam Rayburn — JANICE C. MAY 709

Cotter et al., Party Organization in American Politics — FRANK J. SORAUF 710

Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law — LANE V. SUNDERLAND 712

Palmer and **Sawhill,** eds., The Reagan Record — BERNARD E. ANDERSON 713

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lampman, Social Welfare Spending: Accounting for Changes from 1950 to 1978 — CHARLES MURRAY — 714

Maddox and **Lilie,** Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Reassessing the Political Spectrum — ROBERT LEKACHMAN — 716

DeHoog, Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, Political, and Organizational Perspectives — ALFRED J. KAHN — 716

Flammang, ed., Political Women: Current Roles in State and Local Government — ROBERTA S. SIGEL — 717

Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family — LESLIE J. CALMAN — 719

Deakin, Straight Stuff: The Reporters, the White House and the Truth — MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN — 720

Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation — STANLEY C. BRUBAKER — 721

Bensel, Sectionalism in American Political Development, 1880–1980 — MARTIN SHEFTER — 722

Bridges, A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics — KENNETH A. SCHERZER — 724

Davis and **Helfand,** The Uncertain Balance: Governmental Regulators in the Political Process — SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN — 725

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF reflects on American relations with the Soviet Union. He gives particular attention to lessons for the future that can be drawn from studying the détente of the 1970s and its decline.

GIDEON RAFAEL analyzes the traditional American and Soviet attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He highlights not only the disagreements of the two superpowers but also the various occasions on which they had a convergence of interests and moved quickly to settle particular disputes.

PAUL E. PETERSON identifies the causes of the unprecedented large budget deficits experienced by the United States in recent years and analyzes the dangers this "politics of deficits" poses to the nation's political and economic stability.

GARY C. JACOBSON examines the pattern of campaign contributions in 1980 and 1982 to Republican and Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. He argues that the Republicans' centralized campaign finance system produced a more efficient distribution of resources, giving them a distinct electoral advantage over the fragmented Democrats.

MICHAEL RUBNER examines the extent to which the Reagan administration complied with the 1973 War Powers Resolution when it dispatched U.S. troops to Grenada in October 1983. He concludes that the decision to invade violated both the letter and spirit of the law and offers several suggestions for enhancing congressional participation in future decisions involving deployment of American forces abroad.

JANE M. O. SHARP explores the problems of trying to pursue nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union while maintaining NATO's capability to deter a Soviet attack on western Europe. She argues that reducing reliance on the nuclear component of NATO's deterrent does not require compensatory increases in conventional military forces.

PETER H. ARGERSINGER criticizes the view that minimizes the incidence of fraud in late nineteenth-century American elections. He introduces many new sources revealing election fraud, analyzes the factors that permitted it, and suggests the need to modify prevailing interpretations of the period's political history.

With the appearance of the Garthoff and Rafael articles, *PSQ* inaugurates the policy of occasionally publishing pieces by senior scholars and statesmen that argue a point of view based primarily on their long-term personal experience and insights and that for differing reasons may lack the usual full scholarly documentation.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

With this issue, the *Political Science Quarterly* completes its hundredth year of continuous publication. *PSQ* will commemorate its centennial in 1986 with commissioned articles on how the American government has over the years provided for the nation's "general welfare" and "common defense." D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American-Soviet Relations in Perspective

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

American-Soviet relations stand in need of a redefinition of goals and means. Anyone who in the heyday of détente a decade ago may have forgotten or misjudged the continuation of competition and of an adversarial relationship has been sharply reminded of it since Afghanistan. The fragility of the structure of cooperation erected early in the 1970s was evident in its collapse at the end of the decade. The absence of mutual trust is, in the mid-1980s, stark and clear. Dispelling illusions about détente can be useful. What is not useful—indeed is dangerous—is to resurrect in their place cold war myths and misperceptions. It is also not useful for each superpower to try to hold the other to a standard of international behavior that it does not itself always observe. A misreading by one side of the motivation and intentions of the other, and action on that basis, is akin to Don Quixote's charge against windmills of imagined threatening and evil strength. But the danger is much greater than misapplied chivalry and energy. It is the risk of giving substance to a sharper and deeper conflict than would have been justified by a sound understanding and sober evaluation of real conflicts of interest and the real requirements for competition—and, equally important, of the opportunities still available to realize areas of cooperation in serving mutual interests, including, above all, survival in a nuclear world.

The imperative of coexistence and the reality of competition remain. So do the problems of reconciling them. Thoughtful study of the experience of the 1970s is of the highest importance in order to learn as much as possible about

---

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has had over thirty-five years of experience in the study and practice of American-Soviet relations. This article draws on the research done for his recently published, 1,200-page major study, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the requirements and conditions for—and limitations on—cooperation, and about the nature and forms of competition. That knowledge can contribute to the design of policies and a policy process for the future that can help to work toward a world order that, while short of the ideal or preference of any one ideology or nation, will nevertheless preserve the essential peace. Without that peace, no idea or people in our day can survive.

Focusing on the Problem

The essential requirements are political wisdom and courage on the part of the leaders of the two superpowers. While the sources of political understanding and bases for political action are many and complex, among them is a further need for analytical understanding of the situation. While that alone is not sufficient, consistent and coherent action is not likely without it. Evidently, there is need for improved understanding both in Moscow and Washington. The problems in reaching better understanding of realities, and in bringing such action to bear on policy and on the conduct of relations, differ in the two societies, but are great in both cases. In this article my principal focus will be on American policy. While clearer understanding is necessary in both countries, any improvement in either is to the good.

American studies of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are usually, perhaps necessarily, undertaken by students of Soviet affairs. While expertise on the Soviet Union is essential, its emphasis has tended to lead to an overconcentration on Soviet motives, objectives, and actions in what is a complex reciprocal interacting relationship. For example, such studies customarily identify the subject as "Soviet-American relations," unconsciously attributing the focal role to the Soviet Union and usually overstating Soviet initiative. The United States is unconsciously and implicitly assigned a more reactive role. This approach can distort the analysis. Soviet policy in general, and in its relationship to the United States in particular, is often reactive. In addition, from the Soviet perspective, the American role is much more active and initiatory. Moreover, in describing a relationship between adversaries, attribution of the initiative often carries connotations of a more activist role and offensive design, so that even the wording may imply more than is realized. While there is no completely neutral solution, it is important to bear the point in mind.

In framing U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, it is necessary not only to examine both American and Soviet objectives and courses of action, but also what may be termed courses of interaction. Reactions of the Soviet leaders to any U.S. action obviously should be considered, although in reality they are not always weighed. But far too little attention is paid to a further chain of interactions. Similarly, effects on other countries, including unintended effects, should be anticipated to the extent possible. The perceptions of an adversary and of others should be part of such evaluations. Finally, the extent of unity and consistency of one's own objectives and policy course, and of the course of interaction with the other side, should be calculated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The interactions of U.S. and Soviet policy have overlapped with complex interactions in East-West European relations, in the triangle of relations involving China, and in many situations and some conflicts born of local developments around the world. In short, it is necessary to think in terms of developing a strategy of U.S. policy in terms of the interplay of U.S. and Soviet strategies in a broad context of world politics.

Regrettably, the record indicates a progressive decline in such strategic policy making in the United States from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. While the Nixon-Kissinger leadership showed lamentable miscalculation in a number of cases, it did proceed from an understanding of the need for a policy strategy. It exaggerated its own ability to control and manage events, but at least it sought to do so in pursuit of a purposeful strategy. The Carter administration vacillated notoriously, and moved from a pursuit of détente to confrontation. While the Reagan administration certainly has had aims, it has had a much less coherent strategy. Moreover, by misconstruing many aspects of both Soviet policy and world politics, it has had much less success in meeting its own aims than it could have had. It has also failed to set and reach other aims that would have been in the interest of the United States.

One necessary condition is to discard illusory aims of either a comprehensive settlement of differences and achievement of a complete accommodation of U.S. and Soviet interests—a goal sometimes misattributed to détente—or U.S. victory in a contest with the Soviet Union, an aspiration of some proponents of confrontation. The real question is how best to manage the relationship of mixed competition and cooperation between rivals.

It is not easy to deal with the dialectical relationship between competition and cooperation. This relationship is a reality, but it is difficult to articulate in terms that command the necessary public support. It is also, for that and other reasons, very difficult to manage without competition getting out of hand and leading to confrontation. Yet that undesirable outcome is not necessary.

The Failure of Détente

The détente of the 1970s did not succeed, in the view of most Americans, because of Soviet actions that contravened what the United States understood détente to mean. Either the Soviet leaders abused détente, or if they did act in accordance with it, détente itself was flawed. Americans have blamed both the Soviet Union and détente itself for a mounting series of disquieting developments.

In the Soviet view, the joint détente effort of the 1970s has been willfully abandoned by the United States. The leaders of the United States have, since the late 1970s, preferred to seek advantages from a policy of confrontation, renewed an American quest for military superiority, and been unwilling to accept strategic and political parity. And the Soviet leaders intend to do all they consider necessary not to permit the United States again to gain a strategic advantage over them. In the avowed Soviet view, however, détente remains an objective, con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinues to be Soviet policy, and can be a common policy again if and when the United States returns to it.

This difference in perspective—like so many differences in American and Soviet perspective and perception—makes it difficult for Americans and Soviets even to conduct parallel assessments of the détente effort of the 1970s in order to diagnose the causes of its failure. Indeed, such assessments are scarcely deemed necessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each side, the actions of the other are virtually taken for granted as having been responsible for the breakdown of détente. The present climate of mutual hostility and suspicion does not encourage detached and dispassionate consideration.

There is a misleading, even dangerous, tendency in the United States by both advocates and opponents of efforts to improve relations to consider détente an entity in its own right and to assume that there is a single policy of détente. This tendency leads to judgments that "détente was tried and failed," or that "détente was betrayed," or that "détente was never really tried." Such oversimplified approaches only mislead.

Americans have feared that the United States was providing more than its share of cooperation, while the Soviet Union was more vigorously devoting itself to competition. This view is one-sided. So, too, on the other hand, is the Soviet belief that American leaders have consciously chosen to abandon détente for confrontation and that American disenchantment with détente was not seriously influenced by Soviet actions. There is much that can be learned and applied to present problems, and future efforts to deal with them, from reflection on the causes of the failure of the American-Soviet détente of the 1970s.

Differences in Basic Conceptions

Foremost among the causes of the ultimate failure of détente in the 1970s was a fatal difference in the conception of its basic role by the two sides. The American leaders saw it (in Henry Kissinger's words) as a way of "managing the emergence of Soviet power" into world politics in an age of nuclear parity. The Soviet leaders envisaged it as a way of managing the transition of the United States from its former superiority to a more modest role in world politics in an age of nuclear parity. Thus each saw itself as the manager of a transition of the other. Moreover, both had diverging images of the world order, and although that fact was well enough understood, its implications were not. Thus, underlying the attempts by each of the two powers to manage the adjustment of the other to a changing correlation of forces in the world there were even more basic parallel attempts by both to modify the fundamental world order—in different directions.

The Soviet leaders, conditioned by their Marxist-Leninist ideology, believe that a certain historical movement will ultimately lead to the replacement of capitalism (imperialism) in the world by socialism (communism). But this transition must now occur in a world made incalculably more dangerous by massive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arsenals of nuclear weapons. Peaceful coexistence and détente are seen as offering a path to neutralize this danger by ruling out war between states, permitting historical change to occur, as the Soviets believe it must, through fundamental indigenous social-economic-political processes. While Marxist-Leninists do not shun the use of military force or any other instrument of power if it is expedient, they do not see military power as the fundamental moving force of history. On the contrary, they see it as a possible ultimate recourse of the doomed capitalist class ruling the imperialist citadels of the West. There is, therefore, no ideological barrier to or reservation about pursuing a policy of détente aimed at preventing nuclear war. Quite the contrary, détente represents a policy aimed at providing stability to a world order that allows progressive revolutionary historical change. This ideological propensity reinforces pragmatic recognition of the need to avoid nuclear war.

The American leadership and people, not holding a deterministic ideology, have been much less sure of themselves and of the trend of history. Insofar as they hold an ideology for a global order, it is one of pluralism, which does not assume the whole world will choose an American-style democratic and free enterprise system. The world order is seen as one that should provide stability and at least protect the democratic option for peoples. Occasionally there have been crusades to extirpate communism in the world; a fringe represented today by Norman Podhoretz, for example, who criticizes the Reagan administration for failing wholeheartedly to rally a new assault on communism and against the Soviet Union. But the dominant American aim has been to contain and deter Soviet or Soviet-controlled communist expansion and to promote a pluralistic and free world order. What has varied and what periodically has been at issue is the relative weight to be placed, on the one hand, on containment achieved by building positions of counterposing power, and on the other, on cooperation pursued by seeking common ground for mutual efforts to reduce tension and accommodate the differing interests of the two sides. There have been varied judgments in both countries about whether objective circumstances at any given time permit the latter approach or require the former, and, therefore, about whether détente is feasible or confrontation is necessary.

When Nixon and Kissinger developed a strategy of détente to replace confrontation, the underlying expectation was that as the Soviet Union became more and more extensively engaged in an organic network of relations with the existing world order it would gradually become reconciled to that order. Ideological expectations of global revolutionary change would become attenuated and philosophical, rather than actively political. Avoidance of the risks of nuclear war was essential; hence there was acceptance of peaceful coexistence and of efforts at strategic arms limitation and other negotiations.

The common American and Soviet recognition of the need to avert war was, and is, of fundamental significance. But there remained radically different visions of the course world history would follow and, therefore, of the pattern of world politics. This divergence in world views naturally affected the policies of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the two powers. The difference was well known in a general way; its implications for the two superpowers' respective actions, and, therefore, for their mutual relations and for détente, were not, however, sufficiently understood. This gap led to unrealistic expectations that were not met and that undermined confidence in détente.

American perceptions of a Soviet drive for world domination are rooted in the U.S. image of the ideological expectations of the Soviets for the future. The United States sees a relentless, inexorable Soviet drive for world communism under the leadership and control of Moscow, and military means as the most—some would say only—successful Soviet instrument. The Soviet leaders in turn see, since the late 1970s, a reborn American pursuit of military superiority as the basis for a policy of intimidation. (In U.S. terms, an aggressive use of "escalation dominance.") The ultimate aim is world domination in a Pax Americana. Rather than attribute to Americans an underlying ideological expectation for the future, they see a nostalgia for the past, an atavistic reaching back for a time when imperialism ruled the world and, more proximately, for a time when the United States had nuclear superiority. In the Soviet view, the United States did carry out a policy of intimidation (for example, compelling the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the territory of an ally, Cuba, in 1962).

We have not even begun to analyze critically the underlying postulates of either the American or the Soviet conceptions. For example, consider the Soviet proposition that "the class struggle" and "national liberation struggle" are not and cannot be affected by détente. With the exception of a minuscule minority that accepts the Soviet line uncritically, most Americans see that proposition as communist mumbo-jumbo being used as a transparently self-serving argument to excuse pursuit of Soviet interests. In fact, a Soviet leader considers that proposition to be a self-evident truth: détente is a policy, while the class struggle is an objective phenomenon in the historical process that cannot be abolished by policy decision, even if the Soviet leaders wanted to do so. While there is a self-serving dimension to the Soviet proposition, it is not cynical artifice. To the contrary, it is sincerely believed. On a logical plane, to whatever extent the Soviet premise is true, it is crystal clear that any inevitable historical process cannot be stopped by some agreement between the two states.

It is, fortunately, not necessary to assume a prior meeting of the minds of the leaders of the two powers on ideological conceptions as a prerequisite to agreements based on calculated mutual advantage. While ideological conditioning and belief do influence policy, they do not determine it. Questions about the historical process can and should be left to history. The critical question is not whether there is a global class struggle or national liberation struggle, as defined by Marxism-Leninism, but what the Soviet leadership is going to do about it. While the Soviet leadership accepts a moral commitment to aid the world revolutionary process, it is also ideologically obliged to do so only in ways that do not weaken or risk the attainments of socialism in the USSR. Moreover, the ideology also holds that world revolutionary processes are indigenous. Revolution cannot

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be exported. Neither can counterrevolution. But both can be aided by external forces. Here the Soviet prescription naturally stresses the ultimate failure, but present danger, of an imperialist export of counterrevolution (for example, American support to the authorities in El Salvador, its destabilizing actions against Nicaragua, and the invasion of Grenada). While the Soviet Union expresses support of genuine revolutions and national liberation movements, it is careful and selective in what support it provides, as ideologically sanctioned prudence requires.

In approaching the question of what is a proper and consistent code of conduct with respect to Soviet—and American—behavior in the Third World, each side needs to understand the perspective of the other. Each, naturally, will retain its own view of the historical process, as well as of its own national interests. Differences of concrete interests will remain to be reconciled, but failure to understand each other's viewpoint seriously compounds the problem.

Failure to Use Collaborative Measures

A second cause of the collapse of détente was the failure to make greater use of collaborative measures to meet the requirements of security. National military power is bound to remain a foundation of national security in the foreseeable future. But it need not be the first, or usual, or sole, recourse. The American-Soviet détente involved efforts to prevent and manage crises, and to regulate the military balance through arms control and arms limitation. In the final analysis, however, those efforts—while useful and potentially significant—were almost entirely dependent on the political relationship, and in large measure withered with it.

The effort to achieve strategic arms limitations treaties (SALT) marked the first, and the most daring, attempt to follow a collaborative approach in meeting military security requirements. It involved an unprecedented joint consideration of ways to control the most vital (or fatal) element of national power—the arsenals of strategic nuclear weaponry. Early successes held great promise, but also showed the limits of the readiness of both superpowers to take this path. SALT also generated problems of its own and provided a focal point for objection by those who did not wish to see either regulated military parity or political détente. The final lesson of the failure to ratify SALT II was that arms control cannot stand alone nor sustain a political détente that does not support itself. Even the early successes of SALT I, which contributed to an upsurge of détente and were worthwhile on their own merits, became a bone of contention as détente came under fire.

The widely held American view that SALT tried to do too much is, in my view, a misjudgment: the real flaw was the failure of SALT to do enough. There were remarkable initial successes in the agreement on parity as an objective, on stability of the strategic arms relationship as a necessary condition, and on the control imposed on strategic defensive competition in antiballistic missile (ABM)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

systems. But there was insufficient political will (and perhaps political authority) to bite the bullet and ban or sharply limit multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—the key to controlling the strategic offensive arms race. Both sides share the blame for this failure, but especially the United States, which led a new round of the arms competition when it could safely have held back (in view of the ABM Treaty) long enough to make a real effort to ban MIRVs. The failure to control MIRVs was ultimately the key to the essential failure in the 1970s to stabilize the military dimension of parity, and it contributed indirectly to the overall fall of détente.

Too little attention has been paid to the efforts in the 1970s to devise a regime of crisis management and crisis avoidance. Paradoxically, the relatively more successful steps in this direction are rarely remembered because they do not seize attention as do political frictions. The agreements of 1971 on averting war by accident or miscalculation and on upgrading the hot line, the agreement of 1972 on avoiding incidents at sea between the U.S. and Soviet navies, and the agreement of 1973 on prevention of nuclear war have played a positive role. In addition, there were multilateral confidence-building measures in the European security framework. The one instance sometimes charged to have been a failure of collaboration was in fact, if anything, a success: the defusing of the pseudocrisis between the two superpowers in October 1973 at the climax of the fourth Arab-Israeli war.

Failure to Define a Code of Conduct

A third cause of the failure of American-Soviet détente in the 1970s was the inability of the superpowers to transform the recognition of strategic parity into a common political standard to govern their competitive actions in the world. The divergent conceptions of détente and of the world order underlay this failure, but these were compounded by other factors. One was the unreadiness of the United States, in conceding nominal strategic parity, also to concede political parity. Another was a reciprocated hubris in which each superpower applied a one-sided double standard in perceiving and judging the behavior of the other. The basic principles of mutual relations and a code of conduct were never thrashed out with the necessary frank discussion of differing views, a failure that gave rise to a facade of agreement that not only affected public, but to some extent even leadership, expectations. Expectations based on wishful thinking about the effects of the historical process, or based on overconfidence about a country's managerial abilities to discipline the behavior of the other side, were doomed to failure. Paradoxically, these inflated expectations coexisted on both sides with underlying excessive and projected fears and imputations of aggressive hostility, which resurfaced when the expectations were not met. That this process influenced wider political constituencies (a much wider body politic in the United States) only compounded a situation that affected the leadership as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Divergent Perceptions and Double Standards

The United States applied a double standard to Soviet behavior in occupying Afghanistan in 1979 (and earlier to a series of Soviet moves in the Third World). President Jimmy Carter's pained confession of having learned more about Soviet intentions from Afghanistan than from anything else only illustrated the fact. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not justified by the standards of a world order endorsed by the community of nations and in principle by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States. But this fact does not alter (although it effectively obscured) that in practice the United States and the Soviet Union each apply fundamentally different standards to their own behavior than they do to that of the rival superpower and others. There also was an important failure in the case of Afghanistan (as well as in many other cases) by both the United States and the Soviet Union to recognize the perceptions, and motivations, and security interests, of the other side, whether accepting them or not.

The dominant American perception of the motive behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was that it was an egregious example of aggressive expansionism, unprovoked, unless perhaps by a temptation that arose from declining American military power. The Soviets were seen as unaffected by détente unless they were using that policy to cover expansionist moves. The occupation of Afghanistan was seen as dangerous to American interests because it represented a steppingstone for Soviet advancement toward a vital western interest—assured access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet leaders, given their perception of events, saw the attribution to them of offensive purposes and threats to the Persian Gulf region, stressed in the prevailing American perception, not merely as incorrect, but as not representing a real assessment by the American leadership, and indeed as a hostile act. Their view seemed to be borne out by the official American response, which included not only a new containment strategy (the Carter Doctrine) and quasi alliance with China, but also the dismantling of virtually the entire set of American-Soviet relations developed over a decade of détente. The Soviet leaders concluded that this reaction represented the preferred American policy. The American administration was using Afghanistan as a pretext for doing what it desired: to mobilize American and, to some extent, world opinion in support of an intensified arms race and an anti-Soviet political line of confrontation. This interpretation fitted the Soviet evaluation of the trend in American policy. It also conveniently removed the Soviet action in Afghanistan as a cause of the collapse of détente.

In the Soviet perception, it was the United States that was acting in a manner inconsistent with the implicit code of conduct of détente. The United States was not recognizing vital Soviet interests in its security sphere, as the Soviets had done when, after the western-supported overthrow of leftist regimes in Chile and Portugal, their criticism of American action had not been permitted to interfere

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with state relations. On the contrary, the United States was directly challenging them and unnecessarily converting the Afghanistan affair into a broad global political challenge, while discarding the achievements of détente. In the Soviet perception, moreover, the United States was ignoring Soviet parity as a superpower and applying a double standard. In 1965 the United States had, for example, introduced its own military forces and changed the leadership in the Dominican Republic—a country on the American periphery and in the American political, economic, and security sphere. How, the Soviets might have asked, is the Monroe Doctrine essentially different from the Brezhnev Doctrine? While voicing criticism, the Soviet Union had not made that or other comparable American actions, including intervention in Vietnam, a touchstone of Soviet-American relations. Indeed, it had not done so even on the occasion of the American escalation in bombing Hanoi and mining Haiphong in May 1972. Those events had not been permitted to derail the first Brezhnev-Nixon summit meeting and the signing of SALT I. Now the United States was putting the signed SALT II Treaty on the shelf and cutting economic, consular, and even cultural and sports relations, and in addition was mounting a strident propaganda campaign and pressing its allies and others to join in a wide range of anti-Soviet actions.

Indeed, the United States was applying a double standard to Soviet actions not only as compared with U.S. actions, but as compared with China as well. After all, only months before the United States had, while nominally expressing disapproval, done nothing when China invaded neighboring communist Vietnam. The United States even proceeded with a planned visit to China by its secretary of treasury, who while there signed an agreement for broadened bilateral economic relations that provided most-favored-nation status, which continued to be denied to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet perception in this case is little understood in the United States. For their part, the Soviets have failed to recognize American perceptions in this whole episode. The example of Afghanistan also illustrates Soviet difficulty in recognizing that western actions are often reactions to things the Soviets have done, rather than part of a hostile design that would have led to those same actions under any circumstances. The reverse is also true: the West has difficulty recognizing Soviet perceptions of a threat (one that it does not see itself) as the cause of some Soviet actions. Further, the West does not recognize that the Soviets often do not perceive sufficiently the reactive motive for western countermeasures.

The consistent failure of each side to sense and recognize the different perspectives and perceptions of the other has been strongly detrimental to the development of their relations, compounding their real differences. The dangers of the failure of each side to recognize the effects of its own misperceptions are also too little appreciated, as are the dangers of its failure to perceive the implications of differing perceptions. Frequently during the 1970s and 1980s it has been unconsciously assumed that the other side was bound to see something in a certain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way. That belief has led to serious errors or distortions in assessing the intentions and motivations of the other side. Rather than recognize a differing perception, judging it to be a valid alternative perception or misperception, both sides typically ascribe a different and usually malevolent purpose to each other. This tendency has, for example, characterized the assessments each has made of the military programs of the other, as well as of many of the political moves. Even when an attempt is made to take account of different ways of thinking, each side usually applies stereotypes of "communist" or "imperialist" modes of calculation to the other side, but in a superficial way that stresses the expansionist or aggressive image of the adversary. The result is usually no more than to provide a self-satisfying illusion that the perceptual factor has been taken into account.

Competition Under Détente

In the United States, many in the 1970s saw a cumulative series of Soviet interventions involving military means, often with proxies—Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Afghanistan—that they believed formed a pattern of Soviet expansion and aggrandizement inconsistent with détente or were at least induced by a weakness of U.S. will and military power. Hence the need to rebuild that power and reassert that will; and hence the heightened suspicion of détente.

In fact, the history of diplomatic, political, and interventionist activity during the last decade is much more extensive and complex—and much less one-sided. Certainly from the Soviet perspective, not only has the Soviet role been more limited and more justified than the United States would concede, but the American role has been more active and less benign. For example, in Soviet eyes, during the decade of the 1970s the U.S. policy toward China moved from triangular diplomacy to active alignment on an anti-Soviet platform. The United States came to offer military assistance to China and established intelligence collection facilities in China directed at the Soviet Union. The United States coordinated hostile activities, for example in Afghanistan, with China. And it encouraged China to invade Vietnam and to arm the Cambodian forces of Pol Pot.

In the Middle East, the United States arranged the defection of Anwar Sadat's Egypt—and of the Sudan, Somalia, and to some degree Iraq. It effectively squeezed the Soviet Union out of a role in the Middle East peace process, despite repeated assurances that it would not do so. The United States used the Iranian hostage crisis to mobilize a major new military presence in Southwest Asia, which it subsequently maintained. In Africa, U.S. allies and proxies repeatedly and blatantly intervened with military force—Portugal before 1974; France in numerous cases; France, Belgium, Morocco, and Egypt in Zaire; Zaire, South Africa and others in Angola in 1975, albeit unsuccessfully. Using covert operations, the United States assisted in the overthrow of an elected Marxist, Salvador Allende in Chile and, with European assistance, of the Marxist-support Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves in Portugal. America was silent when Indonesia suppressed the revolt of formerly Portuguese Timor. A number of Southeast Asian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mountain peoples were used as American proxies in that region. In South Vietnam, the United States used South Korean and Thai proxy troops, and Australian, Philippine, and other support contingents, along with its own armed forces. It encouraged anti-Soviet activity in Poland and Afghanistan, in the latter case with covert military assistance to the rebels and with Pakistani assistance and Egyptian arms paid for by Saudi Arabia. More recently, the United States has orchestrated covert operations against Sandinista Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa Rica. And the United States itself invaded Grenada and established a friendly nonsocialist regime there.

The deteric•ation of relations during the latter half of the 1970s not only reflected some of these developments but also contributed to them. For the most part the actions of the two powers stemmed not from Soviet or American initiatives, but as responses to local events.

There also were conscious policies of assertive competition by *both* powers throughout the period of nominal détente. Recall, for example, the U.S. policy initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the first summit meeting in Moscow in 1972, the summit that launched détente. President Richard Nixon flew directly from the Soviet Union to Iran. One purpose of his visit was to establish the Shah as, in effect, American proconsul in the region, in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine. The Shah was promised virtually any American arms he wanted. A contributory reason for the Shah's deputation that was not apparent was to follow through on some conversations with the Chinese and to signal to them U.S. intention to build regional positions of strength around the Soviet Union, détente notwithstanding. In addition, while in Teheran the President accepted the Shah's proposal to arm covertly the Iraqi Kurds. (Iraq had just signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.) Thus the Kurds became proxies of the United States, Iran, and Israel, which joined in providing support in order to tie the Iraqi army down. And there was a later chapter to this American initiative: the Shah persuaded and induced President Mohammad Daoud of Afghanistan in 1975–78 to move away from his previous close alignment with the Soviet Union, to improve relations with Pakistan, and to crack down on Afghan leftists. It was Daoud's arrest of Nur Mohammed Taraki, Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin, and others in April 1978—not some plot concocted in Moscow—that led the Khalq military faction to mount a coup and depose him, turning the government over to the People's Democratic Party and setting in train the developments within Afghanistan that culminated in the Soviet intervention.

From Iran, President Nixon flew to Poland, where he was greeted by stirring public acclaim, demonstratively showing not only that the United States would support more or less nonaligned communist regimes (Nixon had visited Romania in 1969 and Yugoslavia in 1970, as well as China in 1972), but also that no part of the Soviet alliance was offbounds to American interest under détente.

As a direct result of the U.S. handling of the Middle East question at the détente summit meeting, Sadat—who was already secretly in touch with the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States—six weeks later expelled the 20,000 Soviet military advisers (and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft) from Egypt.

Only a few months later, in September 1972, China and Japan—with American encouragement—renewed diplomatic relations. And in December new armed clashes occurred on the Sino-Soviet border.

Further, upon President Nixon's return to Washington from the summit he not only urged ratification of the SALT I agreements, but also an increase in strategic arms. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird even conditioned his support for SALT on congressional approval of new military programs, which he justified as necessary so as to be able to negotiate "from a position of strength," wittingly or not invoking a key symbol of the cold war.

It is not the purpose of this brief recapitulation of some examples of vigorous American competitive activity to argue either that the Soviet perception of American responsibility for the decline and fall of détente is justified, or that the United States was wrong to compete with the Soviet Union. Individual actions have been wise or unwise on their merits, and good or bad in their consequences—as is true of various Soviet actions. But Americans need to recognize that not only the Soviet Union but also the United States was "waging détente" in the 1970s—and Americans are not justified in concluding that the Soviet Union was violating some agreed, clear, and impartial standard to which the United States in practice adheres. With respect to a Soviet readership, this same point about the application of a double standard would equally need to be recognized.

Both sides have in fact sought advantages. Surely Nixon and Kissinger, and Brezhnev and Gromyko, never believed that the other side, or that *either* side, would fail to seek advantages at the expense of the other just because they had agreed, in a document on Basic Principles on Mutual Relations, that "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives" (those objectives being "reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit").

Moreover, on the whole, since 1972 the leaders of the United States have probably been at least as inclined as those of the Soviet Union to ignore the further elaboration of that same basic principle—"The recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality." Some Americans, including leaders, have spoken and acted as though the Soviet Union had *no* legitimate security interests. Under the confrontational approach of the Reagan administration, the very legitimacy of the Soviet system has been repeatedly challenged by the President himself, at least during the years 1981–83.

While both sides throughout the decade recognized their continuing competitive and even adversarial relationship (although the image of that relationship was distorted), they publicly muted this fact—until serious differences emerged. Then both sanctimoniously accused the other of violating an agreed code of conduct. Especially in the United States, this disjunction between private ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preciation by its leadership of the political competition, and failure to acknowledge it publicly, contributed to later disillusionment with the détente process itself. In the Soviet Union it has been easier to continue to advocate détente while blaming the other side for renewing tensions.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have acted in ways contrary to the spirit and letter of a code of conduct for détente as set forth in the Basic Principles to which both committed themselves in 1972. Each has seen its own actions as compatible with pursuit of a *realistic* policy of détente. Each, however, has sought to hold the other side to its own *idealized* view of détente. As a result, each has been disappointed in and critical of the actions of the other. The Soviet leaders, however, adjusted their expectations more realistically, seeing no better alternative than to continue an imperfect détente. This was the Soviet judgment even though the United States was seen as taking advantage of détente in the continuing competition, and even though détente proved less of a restraint on the United States than the Soviets had hoped and expected. Hence the Soviets advocated détente even after the U.S. repudiated it in January 1980 and elected Ronald Reagan. In the United States, on the other hand, dissatisfaction with the failure of détente to restrain Soviet behavior as expected, and to provide as much leverage on Soviet internal affairs as some had hoped it would, eroded public support for détente. Moreover, it was believed that some other course, containment (under Carter from 1978 on, above all in 1980) or even a declared policy of confrontation (under the Reagan administration from 1981 through 1983), was a possible and preferable alternative. In practice, containment, alone or laced with confrontation, proved—as had an idealized détente—not to be "the answer," or even a viable policy.

The Interplay of Strategies

Both sides have showed themselves guilty of strategic myopia. For example, both have sought marginal military advantages that have had not only the predictable effects of prompting counterbalancing actions by the other side, but also had adverse and unintended negative impact on political relations.

One broad and significant example of a different kind also illustrates this point well. Too little attention has been paid, on both sides, to the important interrelationships that derive from the interplay of their political strategies. The Carter and Reagan administrations have seen rapprochement with China as contributing to the containment of the Soviet Union, and, therefore, as reinforcement in restraining Soviet policy. They have failed to consider whether the tightening noose of a grand encirclement (the United States, NATO, China, Japan), as seen in Moscow, may have impelled the Soviet Union towards more active measures to prevent that encirclement (as in Afghanistan and potentially in Iran) and to leapfrogging to accomplish a counter-encirclement (as in Vietnam against China, and in Syria, South Yemen, and Ethiopia in the Middle East). The Soviet Union in turn has underestimated the extent to which actions it may have re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

garded as defensive and counter-encircling (largely the same list) have in fact—and not just in propaganda—been perceived in the West and China as offensive moves and thus contributed to the development of the very coalition of encirclement that they were intended to counter.

One important change in the American strategy of global competition exacerbated this inattention to the interplay of strategies. The transition from Henry Kissinger and a strategy of détente in the period from 1969 to 1976 to that of Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1978–79 (continued in the post-détente strategies since 1980) was characterized by a shift from a contest of maneuver in a system with two predominant powers to a positional conflict of two sides. Relations with China can illustrate. Kissinger avoided aligning the United States with either the Soviet Union or China against the other and secured a balancing position in triangular diplomacy. Under this approach, the United States could improve relations with both powers and improve its overall position in the process. After 1978 the United States shifted to a relationship with China designed to place pressure on the Soviet Union by aligning China with the United States in a coalition the latter would dominate. Thereafter, if the United States improved relations with either power, it would make its relations with the other worse. Moreover, the Chinese, once freed of the fear of American-Soviet alignment, reasserted their own independence from alignment with the United States and to an extent gained the balancing position in a reordered triangle.

The Arms Race and the Military Balance

A fourth cause of the decline in confidence in détente in the 1970s was the view widely held on both sides that the other side was seeking and acquiring military capabilities in excess of what it needed for deterrence and defense, and, therefore, was not adhering to détente. This is a complex question. For example, the limits under SALT reduced some previously important areas of concern and uncertainties in projecting the military balance—notably with respect to ABMs. But another effect was that the rather complex real strategic balance was artificially simplified in the general understanding (and not just that of the general public) to certain highlighted indexes, thereby increasing sensitivity to a symbolic arithmetical "balance." And national means of intelligence, which are given high credibility when it comes to identifying a threat, are regarded with a more jaundiced eye when called upon to monitor and verify compliance with an arms limitation agreement.

In any event, during the latter half of the 1970s, concern mounted in the United States over why the Soviet Union was engaged in what has been termed a relentless continuing arms build-up. At the same time U.S. military programs were justified as meeting that build-up. In turn, the Soviet Union saw the American build-up as designed to restore the United States to a position of superiority.

Throughout the preceding two decades of cold war and cold peace, the United States had maintained a clear strategic nuclear superiority. As the Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued to build its strategic forces, despite earlier agreed strategic arms limitations, new fears and suspicions arose in the United States. Unfortunately, the actual consolidation of parity in the latter 1970s was not in synchronization with the political acceptance and public impression of parity in the early 1970s. What the Soviets saw as finally closing the gap through programs of weapons deployment, which they saw as fully consonant both with the terms of the SALT agreement and with achievement of parity, many in the United States saw as a Soviet pursuit of advantages that violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of SALT and that threatened to go beyond parity to superiority. The real inconsistency was between the continuing Soviet deployments and the American public's expectation derived from SALT. The interim freeze of 1972 had set a level with respect to the deployment of forces, including some construction under way that had not yet been completed by the Soviet Union. In addition, it had limited only the level of strategic missile launchers, not of warheads, and the Soviets, who were behind in terms of arming their strategic missile force with MIRVs, sought to catch up in the years following. If the Soviet strategic deployments had occurred more nearly at the time of American deployment, and both countries had agreed to accept parity and stop at the same time (and not merely at the same level), the public perception would have been quite different.

While a desire to influence public opinion played a part in inflating presentations of the military threat posed by the other side, there were real build-ups on both sides. In part, then, perceptions on both sides of a hostile arms build-up were genuine. But both sides were unduly alarmist in exaggerating the military capabilities—and in imputing aggressive intentions—of the other.

A U.S. misestimate of the pace of Soviet military outlays in the period from 1977 to 1983 also contributed to the exaggerated impression of a relentless Soviet build-up. The fact of a deliberate cut in Soviet military expenditure from an annual real increase of 4-5 percent in the first half of the 1970s to only 2 percent from 1976 until 1983, with a stagnation at zero percent annual increase in military procurement for those seven years, was not recognized until 1983. While the Soviet military program continued at a high level, the significance of this Soviet reduction in the growth of military outlays was missed. And from the Soviet standpoint, the U.S. public insistence that there was a continuous Soviet increase, and use of that allegation to justify a real American and NATO build-up in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was perceived as reflecting a malevolent design rather than a mistaken intelligence assessment.

The Soviet Union did not serve its own best interests or the interests of détente by continuing to be so secretive about its military forces and programs. The case of the U.S. misestimate of Soviet military spending is one clear illustration. To cite but one other significant example, the argument of the USSR that its SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile deployment represented only modernization of a long-standing theater missile force, and timely indication that it would replace a like number of older, larger-yield weapons, might have convinced some in the West who were uncertain and fearful as to the purpose behind the Soviet deployment. A strategic dialogue before NATO decided on a counterdeployment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might have permitted some preventive arms control without the heightened tension and less promising ex facto attempt at arms limitations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

The INF deployments and the failed attempt at INF arms control in the late 1970s and early 1980s illustrate the close connection between arms control and political as well as military relationships. The INF situation became a major political issue between East and West, and also within the West. What the Soviet leaders had intended to be military modernization was perceived instead as a political-military challenge, and it spurred a western counteraction. The NATO counteraction, which in turn was intended to reassure western opinion and to insure deterrence, instead was perceived in Moscow as an American threat that tied West Europe more closely into U.S. designs to regain overall military superiority with which to intimidate the Soviet Union. This perception of the American purpose led the Soviet leaders to attempt to head off the NATO deployment altogether—and when that attempt failed, to mount demonstrative military countermeasures through new deployments. The NATO alliance maintained the consensus to proceed with deployment, defeating the Soviet attempts to head it off. But it was a pyrrhic victory, as the issue weakened the basic social-political support for the alliance, while the resulting renewed Soviet build-up did not allay the concerns that had led to the NATO deployment. Neither side added to its security, only to the strain on political relations.

Conclusions

The essence of détente, as a practical proposition, was an agreement on mutual accommodation to a political competition in which each side would limit its actions in important (but, unfortunately, not well-defined) ways in recognition of the common shared interest in avoiding the risks of uncontrolled confrontation. Détente called for political adjustments, both negotiated and unilateral. It did not involve a classical division of the world into spheres of hegemonic geopolitical interests. Rather, it was a compact calling for self-restraint on each side in recognition of the interests of the other to the extent necessary to prevent sharp confrontation. While this general concept and approach were accepted by both sides, regrettably each side had differing conceptions of the proper restraint it—and the other side—should assume. This discrepancy led to reciprocal feelings of having been let down by the other side. From the outset there was insufficient recognition of the need for more frank exchanges of views and collaboration in dealing with differences of interest. With time, these efforts collapsed. Both sides showed that they were not ready to accommodate the interests of the other. An additional complicating factor was the inability of the U.S. leadership to manage and control its own policy. But more important, on both sides there was a serious inability to perceive the viewpoint and interests of the other. This gap grew, rather than lessened, with time and experience. As a consequence, trust—which was never very great—declined.

Naiveté has been charged to advocates of détente. But while some may have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had unrealistic aims and expectations, the American leaders and practitioners of détente (Nixon, Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Cyrus Vance) were not as naive as were the critics and challengers who preferred to remain blind both to the strength and vigor of U.S. global competition and to the limits on Soviet power and policy. The critics of détente have seen both American and Soviet power and the exercise of that power from opposite ends of a telescope—a greatly exaggerated image of relentless Soviet build-up and use of power in a single-minded offensive expansionist policy and a grossly distorted image of U.S. passivity and impotence in the world.

There has also been a strong tendency on both sides to attribute to the other side exaggerated strength, control over events, and consistency both in purpose and in implementation of policy. What makes this irony dangerous is that each side acts on its perceptions of the intentions and power of its adversary in ways that tend to make these perceptions self-fulfilling prophecies.

Both powers have also been reluctant to acknowledge, even to recognize, failures of their own political systems. Instead, they have been only too ready to project responsibility onto the other side. Thus, for example, Soviet claims of American responsibility for internal opposition in Afghanistan and Poland serve (among other purposes) as an alibi for failures of Soviet-style socialism. American charges of Cuban and Soviet responsibility for revolution in Central America are similarly more convenient than acknowledging failures of reactionary "capitalist" regimes to provide for needed peaceful change. In addition to reflecting genuine fears based on perceived vulnerabilities, it is simply easier to project hostile intervention than to admit failures to facilitate or permit peaceful change within respective areas of predominant influence.

Thus, apart from differing conceptions of détente, there have been very important differences in perceptions not only of the motivations of the other side, but of the very reality of world politics. Détente, if it is revived (probably without that name), must be recognized as one complex basis for a competitive relationship, not as an alternative to competition. That has been the reality, and the fact must be recognized.

As we look to the future, the problem of managing the continuing global geopolitical competition between the Soviet Union and the United States remains a central issue. Whether a code of conduct, or rules of the game, can be agreed upon is a question. But some increased reciprocal understanding and genuine reciprocity and restraint is required, whether agreed principles are formulated or not. So is the need to work together in crisis avoidance and crisis management. Another major need is to resume the process of arms control. Regrettably the prospect is very clouded. Both sides need to be more prepared to meet the legitimate security requirements of the other in mutually advantageous agreements involving mutual sacrifices of military forces and options. At the present juncture, the picture is especially grim because of a quixotic quest by President Reagan for a miracle cure through his Star Wars strategic defense initiative and his failure to recognize its prejudicial impact on arms control, not only on further

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreements but on maintaining existing arms limitations, and to appreciate the possible value of arms control.

This review may seem to close on a pessimistic note. Indeed, at the present juncture it would be misleading to be optimistic. Yet the basic foundations are there for possible serious steps to mitigate the American-Soviet confrontation and rivalry. And we can learn from the history of the recent past if we study it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Divergence and Convergence of American-Soviet Interests in the Middle East: An Israeli Viewpoint

GIDEON RAFAEL

The Middle East has been an area of big power contests from time immemorial. Its written history and archeological discoveries bear ample witness to the wars between the empires of the North and the South. The prophets of Israel were not only imbued with ethical pathos, but no less with political wisdom. They exhorted the rulers and the nation to beware of big power entanglement. "Out of the North evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land," predicted Jeremiah (Jer. 1:14) in a warning still worth heeding.

The contemporary geostrategic facts in the Middle East are not much different. Israel continues to lie on that narrow strip of land along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean that had always been the only landbridge between Asia and Africa, at times facilitating the peaceful flow of people, commerce, and ideas, and at other times serving as a battleground for contending armies. Egypt continues to live by the great river, the lifeline of the country's multimillenarian civilization. Ancient Babylon and Persia, both superpowers in their time, fought over the control of the Euphrates valley, as do Iraq and Iran today. Gone are the great empires of antiquity. Disintegration befell the Ottoman regime. The rule of France and Britain, its successor in the Middle East, was short-lived. But long-lasting are the region's endemic rivalries.

GIDEON RAFAEL served 30 years in the Israeli foreign service. Among the positions he held were Director-General of the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ambassador to Belgium and the European Economic Community, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He is also the author of *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The introduction of Soviet and American power into the area during World War II added a global dimension to the regional conflicts. The United States is a relatively recent arrival on the political and military scene of the Middle East. Russia's political ambitions in the Middle East are of longer standing. Its drive into the area dates back to the rule of Catherine the Great and proceeded in two directions, toward the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution retarded the Russian thrust into the Middle East. In the period between the two World Wars, the Soviet Union was primarily preoccupied with its struggle against outside intervention, consolidation of the revolution in its vast domain, and the promotion of communism abroad through party channels; it had neither an immediate interest nor the necessary strength to challenge the Anglo-French predominance in the Middle East.

The outbreak of World War II evoked renewed active Russian interest in the area, as revealed in the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of 1940, which maintained "that the area south of Baku and Batum in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."[1] At the end of the war, after the Soviet Union had allied itself with the western world in its life-and-death struggle against Hitler, Soviet forces did not withdraw from the northern provinces of Iran. Stalin's reluctance to withdraw from Irannian Azerbaijan triggered the first postwar crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East. President Harry Truman's determined insistence, reinforced by open pressure in the Security Council, persuaded the Soviet government to evacuate its forces in 1946 from Iranian Azerbaijan, which remains to this day a coveted target of Soviet ambitions.[2]

Simultaneous with its unsuccessful attempt to remain in northern Iran, the Soviet Union advanced its Mediterranean claims. It demanded that Turkey lift restrictions on naval passage as laid down in the Montreux Convention of 1936 and cede to the USSR the easternmost areas of Kars and Ardahan. At the same time, the USSR asked to participate in the planned trusteeship administration of Libya; it had to wait for nearly a quarter of a century to establish its presence in that country.

In its attempt to gain a foothold in the Middle East and the Mediterranean during the years 1945–53, the Soviet Union initially paid little attention to the Arab states. Although it had opened its first diplomatic mission in Cairo during World War II, it concentrated more on watching the activities of its western allies than on gaining influence in the Arab world. In those years, Moscow thought little of the Arab potential as an instrument for the subversion of western power in the area, especially since Arab leaders, prominently among them the Grand

[1] For a fuller discussion, see U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 247–54, 258–9.

[2] See the account by Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday/Signet, 1965) 2 vols., I:418–9, 522–23, 574, II:115–9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mufti of Jerusalem, had manifested pronounced sympathies for and collaboration with Nazi Germany.[3]

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was impressed with the resolve and spirit of the Jewish people fighting with the Allies against Hitler's armies in the Middle East and Europe and against the British administration in Palestine. In 1947 Britain, exhausted by war and incapable of mustering enough strength to subdue the Jewish struggle for independence, asked the United Nations to decide on the future of Palestine.

Whether the USSR's support for Israel's independence was planned in advance to keep the region in a state of constant turmoil is open to question. But what can be assumed with certainty is that it backed Israel in 1947 in the belief that it would expedite the demise of British power in the Middle East. Still, the Soviet declarations of sympathy with the sufferings of the Jewish people, as expressed by the then Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrei Gromyko, had a genuine ring, echoing the feelings of a nation that itself had endured untold sufferings at the hands of the same Nazi enemy.

Be that as it may, the policies of the two superpowers, which pursued different and even contrary objectives in the Middle East, converged in their joint support of the United Nations' decision of 29 November 1947 to recognize Jewish and Arab rights to sovereign statehood in a partitioned Palestine. This Soviet-American consensus was their first and last joint postwar action on any major political issue in the Middle East. Having jointly sponsored the United Nations resolution, they felt bound to defend it together, if not militarily, then at least diplomatically. After the 1948 Arab attack on Israel, the joint Soviet-American action was speedy and effective; within one year all parties to the fighting concluded comprehensive armistice agreements confirmed by the UN Security Council as the end of belligerence and prelude to peace. In particular, the Soviet representative did not mince words in condemning the Arab attack on Israel: "This is not the first time that the Arab States, which organized the invasion of Palestine have ignored a decision of the Security Council . . . It is not in the interest of the United Nations . . . to tolerate such a situation, where the decisions of the Council, designed to put an end to warfare—and the Palestine events can only be described as warfare—are being flouted."[4]

The more European power in the Middle East waned, the more the United States and the Soviet Union became involved in the area, their policies increasingly diverging. While the United States aimed at the preservation of traditional western influence and interests in the region, the Soviet Union tried, commensurate with its growing strength, to challenge U.S. predominance. In the process it discovered the usefulness of Arab discontent as a trailblazer for the expansion of Soviet influence.

[3] For a wider discussion, see Walter Laqueur, ed., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Penguin, 1984).

[4] See Security Council Documents, 29 May 1948, 309th meeting, 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since Turkey's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) extended the area covered by the pact to the southern borders of the Soviet Union, Soviet strategy in the early post-Stalin period devoted ever-growing attention to Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, which were unprotected by the pact. Regardless whether Soviet objectives were aggressive or defensive, they were designed to weaken NATO's southeastern flank. John Foster Dulles, a U.S. Secretary of State who never watched Soviet moves with equanimity, reacted by shoring up NATO's rear in the Middle East. Together with Britain, the United States promoted the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 between Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom.

Nikita Khrushchev countered with a bold move. The USSR leapfrogged over Dulles's northern tier straight into Egypt, the Middle East's southern rear and front gate to Africa. The Soviets paid landing fees with massive arms deliveries and promises of substantive economic aid.[5]

For the next two decades, Egypt's connection with the Soviet Union had a determining influence on its own fortunes, the direction of the Arab-Israel conflict, and the solidity of the western positions in the Middle East. In 1956 it emboldened Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to abrogate unilaterally the Suez Canal Convention;[6] it fanned existing tensions into open conflagration; it spurred Egypt to intervene militarily in the Arabian peninsula; it undermined the Baghdad Pact; it accelerated the arms race in the area; and it was a decisive factor in the eruption of three wars between Egypt and Israel.

Fifteen months after the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the conclusion of the so called "Czech arms deal," the pressures that had been building up exploded in October and November 1956. France and Britain landed troops in the Suez area, and Israel conquered Sinai. Moscow threatened Paris and London with missiles and warned Israel that it was jeopardizing its own existence.

The United States, unyieldingly opposed to the action of Britain and France, in diplomatic collaboration with the Soviet Union compelled them to cease fire and withdraw.[7] The Suez Canal came under the uncontested national control of Egypt, and Nasser, defeated in battle, became the triumphant political victor. Winston Churchill, retired from British government office, warned President Dwight Eisenhower in an impassioned private letter that if "the growing misunderstanding and frustration on both sides of the Atlantic [were] allowed to develop . . . we must expect to see the Middle East and the North African coastline [come] under Soviet control and Western Europe placed at the mercy of the Russians."[8]

[5] For a fuller discussion, see Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy/A Personal Memoir* (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), 45–7.

[6] For a fuller discussion, see Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1971), 140–97.

[7] For a fuller discussion, see Istvan S. Pogany, *The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 60–84.

[8] Unpublished letter from Winston Churchill to Dwight Eisenhower, 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The somber futuristic picture that Churchill had painted with a wide sweep looked a decade later like a work of realism. The cooperation of the United States in the United Nations with the Soviet Union against its Atlantic allies produced a crisis of confidence, marring the relations between London, Paris, and Washington for a long time to come.

In 1967, Nasser reinstated the maritime blockade of Eilat, Israel's only port on the Red Sea. War was the consequence. In the course of six days of fighting, Israel retook Sinai and Gaza, occupied the West Bank after defeating the attacking Jordanian army, and also occupied the Golan Heights, from where Syrian artillery had pounded Israeli villages in the plain for nearly two decades. When the Israeli forces had reached the Suez Canal and were advancing on the road to Damascus, Moscow turned from rhetorical broadsides to verbal threats. Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin warned President Lyndon Johnson that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily unless the United States immediately stopped the advance of the Israeli forces in Syria. Kosygin claimed that the fighting in Syria, which bordered the Soviet Union, affected the vital interests of the peoples of the USSR. President Johnson was less impressed by Kosygin's military threat than by its political consequences, in case the fighting ended after its public pronouncement. Johnson urged Israel to announce instantly that the government of Israel had ordered its forces to observe a complete cease-fire.

The harsh Soviet threat and the friendly but determined American pressure, both conveyed through diplomatic channels, caught up with Israel after it had achieved its major military objectives at the end of six days of fighting. Unlike 1956–57, the United States this time resisted the Soviet demand for unconditional withdrawal and insisted on linking the military provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242 to a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

In the absence of progress on the diplomatic front, Egypt and Syria prepared for a new round of fighting, while Israel lulled itself into a belief in the durability of the status quo. Misinterpreting Anwar el-Sadat's intention in evicting the Soviet military adviser corps in 1972, Israel felt strengthened in its assumption.[9] Sadat, however, had evicted the Soviets to avoid a confrontation of American and Soviet armed forces on Egyptian soil in the war for which he was preparing.

On Yom Kippur day 1973, the armies of Egypt and Syria simultaneously attacked Israel. After initial setbacks the Israeli army advanced beyond the lines it had held before the beginning of the hostilities. In the absence of an agreement by the warring states to end the fighting, and without consulting them, the Soviet government invited Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for urgent deliberations in Moscow. The outcome of their discussions was the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 338, ordering an instantaneous cease-fire and the immediate opening of direct peace negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices. Moscow's concern was to save its Arab allies from a resounding defeat.

[9] For a wider discussion, see Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 228–37; Rafael, *Destination Peace*, 276–9; *Newsweek*, 25 March 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kissinger's considerations, however, seemed to be more complex. He aspired to snatch from the jaws of war a victory for peace, assuming that both sides were sobered by the recognition of the limitations of their power.

However, when the fighting did not stop immediately in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, a severe crisis between Moscow and Washington broke out. The Soviet Union readied airborne troops for intervention against the still-battling Israeli forces. The United States, although in the grip of the Watergate crisis, reacted by raising the state of alert of the American armed forces to a nuclear stage one.[10] At the same time it pressed Israel to halt all military movements.

As with all other previous Arab-Israel wars, the Yom Kippur War ended by joint action of the two superpowers at the point when they were facing the danger of confrontation. On 26 October 1973, the day after the fighting had finally ceased, President Nixon stated in a press conference that the United States and the Soviet Union had different objectives in the Middle East, but agreed that it was not in their interest to have a confrontation which might lead to a nuclear confrontation. With the growing scope and severity of the wars, the risks of superpower involvement increased constantly.

Israel's military intervention in Lebanon in June 1982, to which Washington initially reacted mildly and which Moscow watched with relative restraint, soon reached the superpower plateau when the Israeli army administered heavy blows on land and in the air to the Soviet-equipped Syrian forces stationed in eastern Lebanon. On 9 June Leonid Brezhnev intervened sharply with Ronald Reagan, warning him that further Israeli attacks "would have global implications," the Soviet code phrase for a threat of active intervention.[11] Without engaging the Soviet government with further arguments, Reagan hastened to convey the text of the Soviet warning to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, adding his own summons to halt the fighting immediately and unconditionally. The Israeli government was stupefied by this harsh United States demand, since it had acted in the belief of Washington's benign understanding. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt to gain reprieve, Begin complied.

It was the first cease-fire in the more than thirty years of Arab-Israel conflict established by an ukase decreed in Moscow and unreservedly endorsed by Washington. But soon the Israeli forces renewed their advance, climaxing in the occupation of Beirut by the Israeli army and the landing of American Marines in Lebanon. The Soviet Union, which had watched the collapse of the cease-fire with unusual equanimity, manifested pronounced restlessness when United States forces arrived in an area designated by it as situated in the proximity of the USSR's southern borders. In its historical memory of the British, French, and American military intervention in 1919, the countries of the Levant figured as a western staging area. In this zone Moscow would now not spare any effort

[10] See the account by Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 581–91.

[11] Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 339–40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to frustrate by subversion or coercion a permanent presence of western and especially United States armed forces, even if their strength was of no military significance. To this end it employed its well-proven weapon of action by proxy. It rearmed Syria and sympathized with terrorist actions launched from territory under Syrian control against United States installations in the Beirut area. These operations carried out with deadly precision, sophisticated equipment, and suicidal audacity, causing heavy losses to the United States and allied military and civilian personnel, effected the eventual withdrawal of the United States Marines from Lebanon in Fall 1983.

In June 1985, Israel, which had overextended its military intervention, underestimated the complexities of the Lebanese political situation and encountered growing hostile actions, and completed evacuating its forces, making way for Syria to assume the role of the sole arbiter of Lebanon's fortunes. While the political balance sheet of the Yom Kippur War showed considerable gains for the United States, the Soviet Union and Syria reaped significant benefits from the war in Lebanon.

Although formally not terminated by a Security Council resolution jointly supported by the United States and the USSR, the Lebanon war confirmed the established pattern of superpower comportment in Middle Eastern armed conflicts. When fighting breaks out, the superpowers watch its progress carefully and cautiously. As soon as it threatens to ignite a wider conflagration, they intervene decisively. All five major Arab-Israel wars, as well as the War of Attrition in 1969–70, were terminated by a cease-fire agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union and imposed on the warring parties by joint action inside and outside the United Nations. The state of Soviet-U.S. relations at the time and the degree of their respective commitments to the fighting sides, determined the thrust and intensity of their diplomatic action but not its ultimate outcome. Throughout the thirty-seven years of the Arab-Israel conflict, the estimated time of a resolute joint Soviet-American action has engaged the closest attention of the military planners on both sides. Strategists and field commanders have conducted their campaigns with an eye on the ticking of the United Nations clock. They have accelerated the advance or slowed down the retreat of their forces in synchronization with the movement of the hands of that clock.

Yet the danger of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East is not confined only to the Arab-Israel conflict. There are numerous situations, beginning with the Soviet reluctance to withdraw from Northern Iran in 1946 and extending to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. In the intervening years, the U.S. sent armed forces to Lebanon in 1958 to protect its independence. In 1970, a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) uprising, led by Yasir Arafat, threatened King Hussein's rule in Jordan. When Syrian armored forces trained and equipped by the Soviet Union entered Jordan in support of Arafat, the King appealed to Israel to attack the Syrians, while Washington cautioned Moscow to exercise restraint and direct Syria to withdraw its forces instantly. To make its démarche more persuasive, the United States moved naval units of its Sixth Fleet closer to the eastern shores of the Mediterra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nean, readied air transports stationed in NATO bases in Turkey and Germany, and supported Jordanian requests for Israel's assistance. This multiple American prescription saved Jordan, defeated Arafat, persuaded Syria to desist from military adventures, and warned the Soviet Union of the inherent dangers of supporting Syria in such adventures.

In their contest in the Middle East, the superpowers have evolved an unwritten code of conduct. The Soviet Union advances as long as the going is good. When it encounters determined American resistance, it either tries to consolidate its newly gained positions or limits its direct involvement. Soviet daring has grown over the years commensurately with its increased global strength and self-reliance. But the risks incurred have grown as well. In cases where Soviet policy had overreached itself and created a direct threat to vital western interests in the area, the United States has met the challenge. Just as the two powers have succeeded in terminating all full scale Arab-Israel wars by joint action, they have managed to avoid all serious confrontations in the area by mutual withdrawal from the brink, but without an explicit accommodation of their basic interests.

This lack of positive understanding and constructive cooperation in the settlement of existing conflicts is due to Soviet-American divergence on basic goals—political aspirations, strategic conceptions, economic interests, their perception of the rights and wrongs of the parties to the conflict and their moral and political obligations to them. While the United States' policy is basically oriented to the preservation of the existing order in the region, the Soviet Union is actively engaged in an attempt to enlarge its area of influence and power bases in the Middle East. Where it still lacks the strength to supplant the positions of the western allies, the Soviet Union tries to deny them the benefits they derive from them. In the early 1970s, the USSR intensified its attempts to disrupt the traditional relations between oil producers and consumers, urging the first to unite and trying to divide the latter. It prodded the Middle East oil producers to raise the price of their product and eventually to impose an oil embargo. Soviet media hailed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) success in achieving steep price rises and inveigled them into reducing their production.

In the wake of Britain's withdrawal from its positions and obligations east of Suez, the Soviet Union established a wide arc of bridgeheads, chiefly in Syria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya. The main strategic objectives of this Soviet "southern tier" are: to gain the capacity of interference with the free flow of western maritime traffic, and in particular oil shipments from the main Middle East production centers to the principal consumption areas in Western Europe; to cast a menacing shadow over the Arabian peninsula; to establish bases for the ever-sharpening contest for the raw materials of the African continent; and to reach South East Asia, in particular the southern approaches of China via an alternate route through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. By improving its airlift capacity, strengthening its naval presence, and prepositioning armaments in Syria and Libya, the Soviet Union has in recent years greatly increased its potential of penetration of these areas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Still, in implementing its grand design, the USSR proceeds with caution not always matched with subtlety. It tends to take advantage of existing or erupting regional conflicts, rather than to create them. It prefers the benefit of opportunity and proxy to the risk of direct action.

Edward Crankshaw, one of Britain's foremost analysts of the Soviet Union, succinctly described the Soviet power play in his last book: "Although Moscow would make mischief on every possible occasion and find it hard to resist every opportunity for easy expansion and subversion, there was next to no danger of the Kremlin launching a formal war and it could always be stopped by a firm and clear declaration of the line it must not cross—backed by sufficient force to make that declaration credible."[12]

While Soviet policy thrives on unsettled regional relationships, the United States focuses on the settlement of conflicts. Although the United States has a number of friends in the region linked to it by trade and dependent on it for the supply of armaments, it has only two true allies in the Middle East: Turkey, bound by the NATO pact, and Israel, bound by a long-standing American commitment to its independence and security. The fact that both its allies are involved in disputes with their neighbors hampers America's freedom of choice and action in the region. Its treaty fidelity is the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Its support of Israel's security and sovereignty is universally regarded today as the test of the credibility of America's solemn commitments. The United States is watched by the East with close attention and by the West with awesome respect. It can be assumed that Soviet political realism does not ignore it and Israeli sagacity will not abuse it.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union at every opportunity reiterate their devotion to the principle of peaceful settlement of international conflicts, their basic attitudes differ on the substance of the settlement and also on the utility of replacing unrest with stability. This, more than anything else, impairs Soviet-U.S. ability to cooperate on balanced and constructive solutions. In the Arab-Israel conflict, for instance, the Soviet position is completely identified with the uncompromising policy of the Arab states. The USSR supports the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242, which calls for the total evacuation of all territories occupied by Israel in the course of the fighting in 1967. The Soviet Union, which as a result of its victory in World War II acquired 272,500 square miles with a population two and a half times as large as that of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq combined, defends in the Middle East the "principle of nonacquisition of territory by war,"[13] completely oblivious of the fact that the Arab states, with the recent exception of Egypt, have been waging war against Israel for the last thirty-seven years in flagrant violation of their obligations under the UN Charter.

[12] Edward Crankshaw, *Putting Up With the Russians: Commentary and Criticism, 1947-1984.* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984).

[13] Pogany, *Security Council*, 104–5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The process of Soviet-Israeli alienation, which began in the early 1950s, when the Soviet Union progressively aligned itself with the Arab States against Israel, has culminated since the Six Day War in a number of crises that affect not only Israel but also the relations between the superpowers. The Soviet military presence in Syria has created a particularly hazardous situation with Soviet military personnel and installations confronting Israeli forces deployed on the Golan Heights.

The fact that the Soviet strategic border with Israel runs somewhere in the vicinity of Kuneitra, a town on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, enjoins both governments to consider their moves with utmost prudence. The imbalance prevailing in Soviet-Middle East relations in extending Soviet friendship and support exclusively for the Arab side increases the regional tensions, and deprives the Soviet Union of any significant diplomatic influence on the political developments in the Arab-Israel conflict.

The fact that Moscow boycotts Israel diplomatically, defames it publicly, attacks it relentlessly in all international organizations, offends it by harassing Soviet Jewry, and pains it by its refusal to let Soviet Jews go freely to Israel, impairs gravely the capacity of the Soviet Union to play a constructive role in the peace process.

The resumption of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and Israel is not only an indispensable requisite for the normalization and restoration of their relations, but no less a necessary safety valve for reducing dangerous tensions in the area. Such a dialogue could help prepare the ground for the Soviet Union to make positive contributions to the advance of peace and stability in the Middle East, reduce the dangers of superpower confrontation, and alleviate the plight of Soviet Jewry.

While Moscow engages in political sparring, Washington's record indicates that it will continue its endeavors to promote the peace process. The helpful role played in the attainment of peace between Egypt and Israel justifies the belief in additional successes for American peace diplomacy in the Middle East.

Soviet-American divergence in the Middle East and elsewhere is widespread and deep-seated. Are there issues and spheres where their interests converge? The management of crises from reaching the danger point of possible superpower confrontation is one of the areas where their mutual apprehensions could generate common action.

For their own sakes and for the avoidance of wider conflagrations in the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union would do well to adjust their moves at an early stage of a conflict, in order to avoid a situation where its extension might cause a superpower confrontation. In the declaration of principles adopted at the Moscow Summit Conference in May 1972, the two powers committed themselves "to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and security. . . ."[14] The implementation of this principle by the elaboration of consulting procedures should figure prominently on the American-Soviet agenda.

While the two powers have failed in the field of peacemaking, they have managed in a number of situations to coordinate their positions in matters of peacekeeping. The presence of United Nations forces and observer teams in Pakistan, Cyprus, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and other trouble spots proves that they can reach agreement in this field.

But not always. For instance, the Soviet Union refused to agree to the stationing of UN forces in the demilitarized zones of Sinai, as provided in the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, which it denounced in no less vehement terms than the most radical members of the Arab rejectionist front. It also opposed the extension of the deployment of United Nations forces in Lebanon for the prevention of civil strife in the areas evacuated by Israel. The Soviet objection seems to have been prompted more by its deference to Syria's disinclination to share power in its Lebanese protectorate than by reasons of its own. Moscow adheres to its practice of providing a rent-a-veto service to its client states, even in cases where it is not fully convinced of the logic and necessity of the request. This form of political assistance is less expensive and more gainful than the granting of economic aid. However, in cases where the risks of conflict are higher than the gains derived from its continuation, the United States and the Soviet Union are able to reach agreement on UN peacekeeping operations. The perfection of their cooperation in this area deserves a place on the agenda of their dialogue.

The preservation of Lebanon's independence requires a considerable measure of international cooperation and goodwill. The cycle of recurrent crises in this unhappy land endangers not only its very existence, but also the maintenance of international peace. The constant danger it presents as a source of international complications should induce the United States and the Soviet Union to consult on the preservation of its independence and the restoration of its internal peace. It might be useful for them to explore together with Lebanon's neighbors the possibility of guaranteeing the country's independence and nonintervention in its internal affairs. Such consultations might examine the feasibility of granting Lebanon a status of neutrality, perhaps similar to that concluded between Austria and the four occupation powers in 1955. This could shield Lebanon from the conflicting aspirations of its neighbors and the rivalries of the big powers.

However, Lebanon is not a decisive theater in the Middle East power struggle. The center is located in the Persian Gulf. The conduct and outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq are likely to have a much more far-reaching effect on the destinies of the Middle East and the relationship between the superpowers than any other of the numerous conflicts in the area. All efforts made by the Arab

[14] "Texts of Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration and of Joint Communique at End of Visit," *New York Times*, 30 May 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Islamic states to bring the war to an end have so far been unsuccessful. The United States and the USSR have remained on the sidelines, realizing that any imprudent open involvement on one side or the other could bring them into a conflict fraught with fearful consequences. Unable to quench the conflagration, they try to contain it. Their policies, although not coordinated, but apparently adjusted by tacit understanding, indicate their resolve to deny decisive victory to one of the parties. They wait for the war to end from mutual exhaustion or downfall of one or both regimes. In the absence of an explicit understanding, this balanced wait-and-see policy practiced by Moscow and Washington indicates their converging interest in disallowing third parties to create crises of uncontrollable magnitude and management.

The unbridled arms race in the Middle East is another issue of concern not only for the acquiring, but also for the supplying states. The Soviet Union and the United States, both heavily engaged in the Middle East arms trade, are aware of its inherent danger. In the period between 1973 to 1983 the Arab states alone purchased from the United States and Europe arms in the amount of 19 billion U.S. dollars and from the Soviet Union and its allies 27 billion U.S. dollars. The arms-purchasing states, including Israel, are increasingly accumulating mountains of debts higher than the stockpile of arms they are hoarding. Whether the debt pile will collapse before the stockpile blows up, is a matter of conjecture.

The idea of curbing the Middle East arms race has been discussed on numerous occasions and in various forums. When UN Resolution 242 was tabled in 1967, the original U.S. draft included a provision for joint measures to regulate the arms trade in the Middle East.[15] The Soviet draft resolution also contained a paragraph on the same subject. Both, however, were deleted from the final British text in order to accommodate the Arab states, which felt the need to replenish their arsenals depleted in the Six Day War.

Odd as it may appear, all the agreements concluded between Israel and the Arab states, beginning with the armistice accords of 1949 up to the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, contain provisions for the reduction of armaments, limitation of forces, demilitarized zones, and third-party verification and supervision. These agreements reflect a well-balanced mix of military prudence and political perspicacity. The experience gained in the application of these limitations can be of considerable value for the discussion of agreements on arms control in the Middle East. Since the bulk of heavy and sophisticated weapons used or stored in the Middle East is of foreign origin, the possibility of an agreement on the regulation of the arms trade should be explored in the first instance by the exporting rather than the importing states. However, the latter at present refuse to reason together on any subject. The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control may offer a suitable occasion and forum for their consultation on measures to curb the ever increasing risks of the Middle East arms race.

But dangerous as the uninhibited arms race is, there is another peril of

[15] See Pogany, *Security Council*, 102–4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cataclysmic dimensions looming on the not-too-distant horizon: the use of nuclear weapons in Middle Eastern conflicts. It would be psychologically, politically, and practically erroneous, if not disastrous, to accept uncontrolled nuclear nationalism in the Middle East as an inescapable fate. The awareness of the enormity of the threat is vital for its prevention. It hovers over the region as a whole and its implications are of global gravity. Neither conventional strategy nor outworn policies can master it. Unless the governments in the area adopt a regional approach, the peril of preemptive war in the Middle East and ultimate destruction will become the predominant theme of the final years of the twentieth century.

The government of Israel has proposed declaring the Middle East a nuclear free zone. Egypt has taken an important initiative in this matter by introducing in 1982 a resolution in the United Nations that Israel supports. Nuclear proliferation for military purposes is, of course, not only a matter of concern for the countries in the Middle East, but of grave responsibility for the principal nuclear powers. Unlike the superpowers and their allies, which, with all their inherent differences and unresolved disputes, conduct their military and foreign policy with a sound measure of caution and rationality, the states in the Middle East are accustomed to act with a high grade of emotion and low rate of restraint. The region is marked by endemic instability, pervasive insecurity, unspeakable poverty and untold riches, interminable feuds, smoldering conflicts, and open wars. To add the nuclear trigger to this powder keg is nothing but suicidal folly to the millionth degree.

But awareness alone is not sufficient. Much preliminary work has to be done to cope with the immensity and complexity of the problem. Again, as in the case of the conventional arms race, the Middle Eastern governments are not prepared to meet in joint consultations. In the absence of a regional negotiation forum, the United States and the Soviet Union ought to give thought to creating a framework for the elaboration of a plan for the denuclearization of the Middle East, a forum in which representatives of the states in the area might be willing to cooperate. As a first step, the two powers might prefer to convene a less formal gathering attended by their scientists, academics, nuclear arms control experts, strategists, and diplomats, together with their counterparts from Middle Eastern countries. Such a meeting should do the preliminary work of identifying the problems and discussing approaches and means to deal with them. In any event, the fact that the two superpowers are fully conscious of the danger of nuclearization is evident in their collaboration within the framework of the nonproliferation treaty and in their discreet consultations on the prevention of the uncontrolled transfer of plutonium usable for military purposes. Their joint efforts in this field could form a basis for enlarged consultations on the danger of Middle Eastern nuclearization.

There is a side aspect, by no means negligible, to the problem. It is growing anxiety about the coming nuclearization of international terror, a pernicious prospect that should evoke the gravest concern of the superpowers. Moscow had adopted a rather benign attitude, to put it mildly, toward international terrorism,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

catering especially to the political views and logistic requests of Arab terrorist organizations. The specter of terrorist access to nuclear devices should alarm the Soviet Union no less than the rest of the world, and induce it to take counsel with the United States and other concerned governments on measures to combat the looming danger.

Although Soviet interests, aspirations, alignments, style, and policies diverge widely in most fields from those of the United States and its western allies, there are areas in the Middle East where their needs and interests converge. It would not be realistic to assume that the scope of their differences can be radically narrowed in the near future. There is a gray zone of common concerns which could possibly be brightened and enlarged.

Agreement in any one of the areas of convergence may generate progress in others. The main burden of responsibility for the elimination of conflicts rests, of course, upon the states in the region. But they would be greatly assisted by the reduction of differences between the superpowers, whose divisions are as dangerous to themselves as they are harmful to the cause of peace in the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Politics of Deficits

PAUL E. PETERSON

The Reagan administration's fiscal policies represent the boldest, yet most problematic, of all its efforts to transform the domestic agenda. By tolerating deficits on a scale unprecedented in peacetime history, the administration has been able to pursue simultaneously its commitment to a stronger defense and its pledge to cut the federal income tax rate. By tolerating these deficits, it has been able to create an austere political climate in which proposed cuts, not expected increments, focus the discussions of federal domestic programs. But by tolerating deficits of great magnitude, the administration has jeopardized the Republican party's reputation for fiscal responsibility and, perhaps more important, may have created a precarious political context in which any economic recession could have disastrous electoral consequences for the government in power.

Much has been written about the possible economic consequences of current fiscal deficits. But little systematic attention has been given to the political context that has produced them. To the extent that analysts have considered the political causes of current deficits, they have depended on the cliché that politicians like to confer benefits immediately but postpone costs—at least until after the next election.[1] While this observation contains more than a grain of truth, it is a verity that applies to many times and places. It does not account for the peculiar propensity to engage in deficit financing that currently plagues American politics.

To the extent that thinking about deficits has gone beyond a general suspicion

[1] James Buchanan has explained budget deficits in these terms. "Public Choice Theory and the Deficits," seminar at George Washington University, 15 March 1985.

PAUL E. PETERSON is director of governmental studies at the Brookings Institution. He is author of numerous books and articles on urban and national politics including *The Politics of School Reform, 1870–1940*, editor of *The New Urban Reality*, and coeditor of and contributor to the recently published *The New Direction in American Politics* (Brookings Institution) from which this article has been adapted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of politicians' fiscal responsibility, the conventional wisdom views deficits as a gradually accelerating problem in the postwar period, a by-product of an increasingly fragmented government crisscrossed by a vast network of legislative aides, aggressive interest groups, naive policy analysts, and self-serving bureaucrats. The "keystone" of this Washington establishment is to be found in Congress, whose members are thought to be more interested in capturing benefits for their constituencies than in conceptualizing an overall framework for policy.[2] The system, it is said, is so fragmented that it is nearly out of control.

In this article I present a quite different view of deficit politics. Deficits have not been a slowly developing political problem during the postwar period; instead they blossomed suddenly in 1981. Congress has not characteristically pursued an independent course in its tax and expenditure policies; instead, it has generally followed the presidential lead on broad fiscal policies. To account for the new politics of deficits, therefore, is to describe and explain a recent, significant shift in the policies of the executive branch.

It is too simplistic to attribute this shift just to President Reagan's own policy preferences. To say that deficits are caused by his commitment to a tax cut and a strong defense is correct but misleading—presidents have always wanted to cut taxes but spend more. To say that deficits are part of the President's plan to create an austerity climate in which he can cut domestic expenditure is also probably correct, but once again it is misleading: Republican presidents have time and again wanted to limit the size and scope of the federal government. But they did not run deficits to achieve this goal.

President Reagan's ability to persuade others—both in Congress and within his own administration—to accept and tolerate large-scale deficits has been due to changes in two factors that go well beyond the personal inclinations of the President himself. First (but definitely *not* foremost), the structure of public opinion has changed, in that people are more insistent than ever that government provide more services at less cost. Second, and more important, professional opinion on the short-term effects of deficits on economic activity has changed significantly. Whereas at one time economists thought fiscal policy was an important tool for managing the business cycle, greater stress is now placed on monetary policy. As a result, politicians now calculate the electoral consequences of deficits in quite different terms than they once did.

Changes in Deficit Politics

Budget deficits have been a pervasive feature of postwar American politics, occurring in thirty of the thirty-five years since 1950. Between 1950 and 1980 they averaged $26.7 billion annually (all deficit, expenditure, and budgetary data are reported in constant 1982 dollars, unless otherwise noted), and they made up 5.1

[2] Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

Gross Federal Debt, Fiscal Years 1946–89



Sources: *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1986*, table 1.1; and Congressional Budget Office, *The Economic and Budget Outlook, Fiscal Years 1986–1990*, pt. 1 (CBO, 1985), 64. Data for 1985–89 are projected.

percent of federal outlays.[3] Presidents and Congresses regularly overestimated revenue, underestimated expenditures, or treated the current context as exceptional enough to justify deficit financing. Deficits—and the talk of deficits—became a staple of American politics. Many observers condemned them, but they nonetheless persisted.

This legacy of annual deficits was politically significant, if only because Democrats became known as the party of deficits while Republicans were regarded as fiscally more responsible. But both Democrats and Republicans contributed to the production of deficits—under Democratic presidents they averaged $19.1 billion, while Republicans until 1976 ran an average deficit of $24 billion—and both parties were generally committed to keeping deficits under control.

From 1946 to 1981 the national debt remained level in real-dollar terms and declined steadily as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). But since 1981 deficits have increased rapidly, averaging about 20 percent of the federal budget and over 4 percent of GNP. The Congressional Budget Office's most re-

[3] Author's calculations, based on *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1950* and subsequent issues, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2

Gross Federal Debt as Percentage of Gross National Product, Fiscal Years 1946–89



Sources: *Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 1986*, table 1.1; CBO, *Economic and Budget Outlook, Fiscal Years 1986–1990*, pt. 1, 40; and *Economic Report of the President, February 1985*, 232. Data for 1985–89 are projected.

cent estimate for the next four years suggests the pattern of the past four years is likely to persist unless draconian measures are taken.

Three figures (1, 2, and 3) illustrate how modestly the public debt of the past compares with that of the Reagan era. Figure 1 shows that the real value of the federal gross debt changed hardly at all over the three decades after World War II. In 1981 the debt was no larger than it had been in 1947, though it had increased moderately from the low reached in 1974. Although annual deficits were incurred throughout this period, they were offset by inflation-caused declines in the real value of preexisting debt. In short, the pace of inflation was eroding the real value of the federal debt as rapidly as the government was adding to it by creating deficits in current budgets. Only after 1981 did the real value of the debt begin to increase at a remarkable rate, increasing by 54 percent between 1981 and 1985. It is expected to increase at a comparable rate in subsequent years unless current tax or expenditure policies are markedly revised.

The shift that occurred after 1981 appears even more dramatic when one examines the changes in the size of the federal debt as a percentage of GNP (see

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3

Net Federal Interest Payments as Percentage of Gross National Product, Fiscal Years 1946–89



Sources: *Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 1986*, table 3.1; and CBO, *Economic and Budget Outlook, Fiscal Years 1986–1990*, pt. 1, p. 54. Data for 1985–89 are projected.

Figure 2). Inasmuch as the economy grew steadily if unevenly throughout the postwar period, the debt, though remaining constant in real terms, declined sharply as a percentage of GNP, falling by an average of 8.8 percent a year in the decade immediately following the war. Between 1955 and 1974 it continued to fall, but at a lower rate—an average of 2 percent of GNP each year. After 1981 the debt in proportion to GNP began increasing by nearly 4 percent a year, and an increase of roughly this same magnitude is expected with every passing year until the political constellation that is producing deficits at the current rate comes to an end.

Still a third measure of the magnitude of the federal debt is the percentage of GNP needed to finance the necessary interest payments (see Figure 3). The system was more or less in equilibrium between 1950 and the mid-1970s. But after 1974 interest costs began to rise, and after 1981 they increased at a very rapid rate indeed, rising from about 2 percent of GNP in 1980 to a projected 4 percent in 1989. The rapid increases in interest charges seem to be a function of three factors: the increase in the size of the federal debt; the increase in the real rate of interest, partly caused by large deficits; and the additional increase in the nominal rate of interest, caused by higher expected inflation rates, which were also apparently affected by the size of federal deficits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress, the President, and Budget Deficits

Many believe that deficits occur because politicans seek to provide benefits to constituents immediately, while they try to defer costs at least until after the next election. Examples of this kind of cost postponement in American politics are legion. Increases in social security taxes are usually enacted five to ten years before they are actually imposed. Generous but temporarily "free" retirement benefits are used to attract people into the armed forces. Local governments also use disproportionately high retirement benefits to compensate their workers.[4] A specialized political vocabulary has even developed to codify and justify the political tactic of postponing costs to constituents; for example, politicians insert what are known as "grandfather" and "hold harmless' provisions when they make changes that could potentially reduce current benefits.[5]

Some have thought that Congress, more than the president, is susceptible to the temptations of postponing costs while distributing benefits as quickly as possible. Members of Congress may be particularly subject to bouts of fiscal irresponsibility, because they can blame their colleagues for undesirable outcomes, while the president is aware that for him "the buck stops here." Even if members of Congress want to be responsible, it is thought to be difficult for them to coordinate their efforts, because they are divided institutionally into two houses and hundreds of committees and subcommittees. Also, Congress has been controlled throughout most of the postwar period by the Democrats, the party that is reputed to be less fiscally conservative. As the Republican platform asserted in 1972, "Federal deficit spending beyond the balance of a full employment budget is one sure way to refuel inflation, and the prime source of such spending is the United States Congress."[6] Or, more recently, in the words of President Reagan, "Every budget that we have submitted since I've been here has been smaller than the one the Congress would finally agree to, so in fixing the blame for why we haven't done more . . . in reducing spending seems to be pretty evident."[7] Indeed, the view that congressional spending causes deficits has given currency to such

[4] Temporary Commission on City Finances, *The City in Transition: Prospects and Policies for New York* (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 181–85.

[5] "Hold harmless" clauses exempt beneficiaries from reductions in aid for a specific period of time, even though vigorous application of the new formula for allocating aid would seem to include them. The term "grandfather" dates back to Jim Crow legislation, enacted by southern states to give voting privileges only to those whose "grandfathers" had had such rights. Since no black grandfathers could have voted, these laws (which were eventually declared unconstitutional) preserved all-white electorates. Ever since, grandfather clauses have referred to privileges that individuals or communities receive because of some previous status. On this topic, see the excellent analysis by Christopher Leman, "How to Get There from Here: The Grandfather Effect and Public Policy," *Policy Analysis* 6 (Winter 1980): 99–116.

[6] Donald Bruce Johnson, comp., *National Party Platforms*, vol. 2, 1960–1976 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 862.

[7] Helen Dewar and Margaret Shapiro, "Wright Hits Regan, Denies Congress Culpable on Deficit," *Washington Post*, 29 January 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposed constitutional amendments as the one giving the president a line-item veto or another requiring a balanced budget except in emergency circumstances.

Expenditure Politics

To examine whether Congress is to be held particularly responsible for excessive spending, I compared presidential budget requests with what Congress finally appropriated for each fiscal year in the postwar period. If Congress is more of a spendthrift than the president, its appropriation should systematically exceed the President's budget requests.[8]

Data Limitations. Before reporting my findings, several limitations on the data need to be acknowledged. The simple comparison of presidential budget requests and congressional appropriations does not take into full account the interplay between the two institutions. Laws and appropriations are the product of continuous discussions among legislative committees, executive agencies, interested groups and organizations, and policy analysts. To state precisely what happens on Capitol Hill and in the bowels of the bureaucracy is difficult even when examining a particular program; to speak of these matters in general is all the more problematic.

Specifically, three factors generate some bias in my estimates, but it is doubtful that separately or together their impact leads to a serious underestimate of Congress's differential impact on spending. First, it may be argued that Congress might have spent more had it not been restrained by the threat and exercise of presidential vetoes. However, the veto has been used to defeat appropriations on only nineteen occasions during the postwar period. The amount of money presidents have saved by their vetoes is only $8.2 billion, 0.6 percent of the 1984 national debt. To be sure, presidential power is enhanced more by the threat of the veto than by its actual use. Had Congress not been concerned about presidential opposition, it might well have appropriated more on numerous additional occasions. The veto is a trump card that even when not played can shape the outcome of the budgetary game. Yet one should not exaggerate the influence of the veto. Like trump, it can be played more than once but it cannot be used indiscriminately. The veto is often a sign of presidential weakness, not strength. Unable to persuade Congress in other ways, the president is forced to rely directly upon the authority the Constitution ascribes to him. Thus it was Gerald Ford who used the veto most often (three times in a little more than two years) but who was also the president least able to keep expenditures close to his requests.

[8] The original presidential budget, together with all supplemental requests and rescissions, as recorded in subsequent presidential budgets, provided the basis for determining the president's expressed budgetary intentions. Eventual congressional appropriations are recorded in subsequent volumes of the president's budget. My exact procedure is described in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, *The New Directions in American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 372, fn. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the threat of veto has kept my estimates of congressional spending propensities too low, the same can be said of my estimates of presidential requests. If a president wants to spend less than he thinks Congress will appropriate, it is to his advantage to propose even less than he really wants.[9] In the bargaining process that ensues, a compromise may be struck that gives the president what he actually wants but more than he originally proposed. To the extent that this happens, my analysis exaggerates rather than underestimates the differences between the spending tendencies of the executive and those of the legislature.

Second, the president's budget may include expenditures for projects he opposes, because he is aware of congressional commitment to certain programs and he fears a congressional override of a presidential veto or other political costs. But if on occasion the president may include items in the budget to please Congress, he has incentives to keep such inclusions to a minimum. Presidents prefer, all things being equal, to propose balanced budgets. Only in the relatively rare case when cutting an item might antagonize a particularly powerful congressional leader—for example, former Senator Howard Baker's Clinch River breeder reactor for Tennessee or Jesse Helms's price supports for tobacco—would a president be tempted to place specifically congressional considerations ahead of broader political and policy concerns. What is more likely is that presidential refusal to cut such dubious items as exceptionally high retirement benefits for army officers—even when his own budget officer queries them[10]—is because he fears adverse reaction from sources such as his own defense advisers, veterans' groups, and a country grateful for the sacrifices its men were once called upon to make. In such cases, Congress often takes the blame for waste and extravagance that the president finds equally inconvenient to eliminate.

Third, it may be argued that the president often becomes "locked into" proposing additional expenditures for projects Congress has already begun. Such instances certainly do happen, but once again they do not necessarily lead to an underestimate of differential congressional spending propensities. For one thing, if the president does not exercise his veto but instead includes such proposals in his own budget, he seems prepared to accept the political blame—or, more often, the political credit—for approving a popular program. Second, starting a new program with a small expenditure is as apt a device for an executive agency as for a congressional committee. For every dam begun at the initiative of a legislative committee, one can find a new weapons system conceived in the Pentagon. Indeed, President Lyndon Johnson became famous for his use of this "camel's nose" strategy—for domestic as well as for defense expenditures. There is little evidentiary basis for concluding that one end or another of Pennsylvania Avenue is particularly successful at locking the other into its set of objectives.

[9] D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Agenda Power in the Federal Appropriations Process: The Role of Reversionary Expenditure Levels," paper prepared for the 1984 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[10] Helen Dewar, "Stockman Attacks Military Pension System," *Washington Post*, 6 February 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Differences in Appropriations Proposed by President and Passed by Congress, 1947–84
Billions of 1982 dollars

	Average annual difference[a]		
President	*Defense*	*Nondefense*	*Total*[b]
Harry Truman (1947–53)	17.5	−3.1	14.5
Dwight Eisenhower (1954–57)	−4.6	−0.3	−5.3
Dwight Eisenhower (1958–61)	−1.0	0.1	−1.0
John Kennedy/Lyndon Johnson (1962–65)	−2.4	−7.4	−9.3
Lyndon Johnson (1966–69)	1.0	−10.4	−10.9
Richard Nixon (1970–73)	−16.0	2.5	−12.8
Richard Nixon/Gerald Ford (1974–77)	−9.2	25.4	15.8
Jimmy Carter (1978–81)	9.8	−32.3	−21.6
Ronald Reagan (1982–84)	8.9	5.6	16.4
Average			
Republican administrations	−5.1	6.7	1.9
Democratic administrations	7.8	−11.7	−3.4
All years	−1.4	−2.5	−0.8

Source: *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1985* and earlier editions.

[a] Positive numbers indicate Congress authorized more than the president requested, and negative numbers indicate the reverse.

[b] Includes defense, nondefense, and interest payments.

Findings. Bearing these caveats in mind, let us consider the data presented in Table 1, which compares the president's budgetary requests with subsequent congressional appropriations over a thirty-seven-year period. As the table shows, executive-legislative differences are marginal, not fundamental. Over the postwar period Congress actually appropriated an average of $0.8 billion a year less than the president had requested. To be sure, Congress spent more than the president requested when a Republican held the presidency—appropriations exceeded requests by an average of $1.9 billion during these years, compared with $3.4 billion less than requested during Democratic administrations—but even when Republicans held office, the differences between White House and Capitol Hill were limited.

Agreement on the overall size of the federal government does not necessarily mean agreement on the size of its parts. Congress rejected some presidential initiatives (such as Nixon's family assistance plan and Carter's welfare initiative) while appropriating extra amounts to such legislative favorites as federally impacted school districts and projects to improve rivers and harbors. In this article I do not examine these kinds of policy differences on individual programs. But in the aggregate it is the similarity of congressional and presidential judgments that is striking. This is particularly true with respect to defense policy, where Congress has enacted what the president has requested within an average of $1.4

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

billion. Admittedly, this average is the product of appropriations exceeding requests when a Democrat was president and the opposite when a Republican was in office, but the numbers, though large enough to provoke frequent political disputations, hardly reflect wildly differing estimates of the country's needs for national defense.

The conflict over nondefense policy was somewhat greater. Congress spent an average of $11.7 billion less than Democratic presidents requested, but $6.7 billion more than Republicans wanted. During the Watergate years (1974–77), the differences between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue were especially great, as Congress outspent the administration's requests by over $25 billion a year. But the dramatic struggles of this era appear as much of a disturbance from the normal budgetary pattern as presidential impeachments themselves.

A public grown used to continuous bickering between president and Congress may wonder why these figures portray a working relationship so different from what cursory observation of Washington politics might lead one to expect. But it is to be remembered that politicians—and the news media that cover their activities—necessarily focus on their differences, not on the basics to which all consent. In fact it is difficult to imagine how a government operating under a separation of powers doctrine could operate effectively if the legislative and executive branches were not in broad agreement. The president is constrained to propose budgets that are at least minimally acceptable to Congress, while Congress must appropriate amounts that will survive a presidential veto. Even more important, both the executive branch, with its far-flung set of departments, bureaus, and offices, and the legislative branch, with its array of committees and subcommittees, respond to a roughly similar set of political interests and pressures. If the emphasis varies from one party to the next, or between the executive and legislative branches of the political parties, these differences are more often one of degree than completely different concepts of government's responsibility.

Also, it is worth reemphasizing the macropolitical and macroeconomic character of the policy under discussion. The numbers in the tables measure agreement on broad policies such as maintaining national defense, not commitments to specific means of achieving it, such as the construction of the B-1 bomber or the missile experimental (MX). On the domestic side the data show a fair degree of consensus on overall expenditure levels, not identical views on the relative importance of mass transportation as opposed to highways, or veteran's benefits as opposed to aid to families with dependent children.

On spending policies, Congress seems willing to concede to the president the responsibility for setting overall targets. Traditionally, it has been the responsibility of the Treasury and the office of Management and Budget (OMB) to predict revenue flows, to anticipate the outlays required by entitlements, and to propose a budget that is in some rough equilibrium. Not until the mid-1970s did Congress even begin to acquire its own capability for assessing overall budgetary policy, and not until the Carter years did the newly formed Congressional Budget Office acquire a stature that rivaled that of the OMB. Congress questioned the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

details of spending, but for it to move dramatically away from the president's overall view of what was fiscally prudent took more political or institutional resources.

The data shown in Table 1 not only put in question popular conceptions of Congress's spending predispositions but contradict recent scholarly interpretations as well. According to one school of thought, Congress as an institution is incapable of disciplining its spending proclivities.[11] Since members of Congress are primarily concerned about their own reelection, they are said to focus attention only on the consequences of policies for their own state or district. Because program expenditures are concentrated in particular districts, members of Congress readily support such expenditures in order to realize visibility and gratitude in their home districts. The costs of paying for the new projects, on the other hand, are spread over all congressional districts, and, it is argued, have little, if any, effect on any one member of Congress. In the words of the proponents of this point of view, "Because public expenditures often have a significant impact on a local economy . . . the purchase of program inputs is politically valuable wholly apart from the objectives sought by the program. Put simply, economic costs become political benefits when they are appropriately targeted."[12] In short, Congress may talk the language of fiscal integrity, but institutionally it is incapable of acting upon such talk.

This argument, however persuasive it seems at first blush, is empirically and conceptually flawed. In order to see its theoretical difficulties, imagine the case of an entirely wasteful project—say, the construction of a full-scale replica of Stonehenge in each of 218 congressional districts (a majority of districts). If members of Congress were insensitive to costs, there is no reason why they would not appropriate funds for such a project. Because the benefits would be concentrated and visible—construction workers would be given jobs and contractors would make money, while the costs would be diffused among all taxpayers—the Stonehenge projects, and any other projects the mind can conceive, would be enacted. The difficulty with such an understanding of how Congress works is that the total cost of such waste would be borne by taxpayers living in all districts, with no commensurate gain in benefits except to relatively few members of the construction industry. If opposition candidates for Congress held identical views with incumbents on all policies other than the elimination of the Stonehenge projects, incumbents would risk defeat.

I choose an extreme example to show that the institutional structure of Congress does not preclude political controls on spending. The data in Table 1 demonstrate that political constraints on congressional spending not only are theoretically present but in practice are nearly as strong as those restraining the

[11] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes," in Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer, eds., *Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1984), 343-67.

[12] Ibid., 356.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

president. Moreover, discretionary spending, which Congress is supposedly so adept at promoting, has not been growing rapidly in recent years. Instead, recent growth has been greatest in entitlement programs, which do not have well-defined territorial impacts, and defense programs, whose expansion has been at the behest of a president who perceives a need for strengthened national security. Indeed, domestic programs having the well-defined territorial impacts that Congress is said to focus on have been the very ones to have suffered the greatest reductions during the period excessive deficits have developed.[13]

Members of Congress have a political interest in disciplining spending that equals their interest in the enactment and implementation of federal programs. Members of Congress represent both recipients of government services and the taxpayers who pay for these services; they can be—and have been—defeated for spending either too little or too much. If they are eager to obtain as many government programs for their district as is feasible, they are equally concerned about their constituents' money being wasted on useless projects elsewhere.

The overt behavior of individual members of Congress may make it appear as if Congress is not conscious of cost constraints. If one only observes the overt activities in which individual members engage and does not examine their institutional context, one may exaggerate congressional interest in spending money. Individual members of Congress must concentrate upon the programs and activities that impinge on their own districts. They must maintain large staffs, attend to casework, obtain membership on the subcommittees whose missions are of relevance to their constituents, and proclaim loudly—through local and regional media—the benefits to the district of their untiring efforts. If the members of Congress do not fight for their districts, no one else will. If they were to meddle in the concerns of other districts by trying to cut everyone else's favorite subsidies, they would only earn the enmity of colleagues and jeopardize their own capacity to deliver the bacon. Very few representatives and senators (such as William Proxmire, Charles E. Grassley, and Wayne Morse) have found that playing "gadfly" pays political dividends.

But if few members are gadflies, many more—indeed, virtually all—recognize that undisciplined pursuit of district interests by most members of Congress would produce its own electoral havoc. The members have thus created and sustained a set of institutional arrangements that limit expenditure-prone behavior. These institutions are threefold: powerful committees, to which are appointed the most senior members of Congress, that screen appropriation proposals; party organizations whose elected leaders place member concerns within an overall party program; and a tradition of respect for and deference to the institutionalized presidency's guidelines on fiscal policy.

The weight and significance of each of these institutions vary with time and circumstance. In the 1940s and 1950s great authority was ceded to the House Ap-

[13] R. Douglas Arnold, "The Local Roots of Domestic Policy," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 250–87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

propriations Committee, within which a bipartisan conservative coalition exercised fiscal constraints. Since the budget reforms of the early 1970s, the Budget committees in the House and Senate have gained influence. But the most stable force has been the control of the fiscal agenda by the institutionalized presidency. Throughout the postwar period Congress has operated within a budget framework initially specified by the president, who (with the help of the OMB, the Treasury, and the Council of Economic Advisers) is best able to construct an overall national fiscal policy. However much Congress may modify the details of that policy, it seems to have accepted the executive's prerogative to define the budget's general contours.

Tax Politics

Deficits are a function of both revenue and expenditure policies. If Congress did not cause deficits by approving disproportionately large expenditures, perhaps deficits have been instead the by-product of Congress's disproportionate readiness to cut taxes. Although in recent years one has heard more about Congress's propensity to spend, it is also widely believed that nothing is more popular than a tax cut or more courageous than levying an increase. In 1981, for example, House Republicans and Democrats are said to have engaged in a virtual bidding war by proposing ever-deeper tax cuts to woo fellow members and their interest group allies.[14] Is this only a specific instance of a more general phenomenon? Does Congress regularly cut taxes over the resistance of the president? Does it typically go well beyond what he initially proposes? Or is Congress often faulted for currying popular favor when it does little more than what the president requests?

Before considering the findings in Table 2, certain qualifications on the information presented there must be acknowledged. The table shows information on the expected size of tax cuts for the first full year after their enactment and for the first full year after all of their features are to take effect. The expected size of tax cuts is notoriously inaccurate, of course. Tax incentives are turned into tax loopholes by creative accountants. As one loophole is closed, tax escapers exploit another one more assiduously. Also, the effects of marginal rate reductions are eroded by inflation-induced increases in income. These and other poorly anticipated consequences of tax changes alter the tax yield in ways that neither presidential nor congressional advisers can predict. To take these numbers as the actual consequences of tax policy would be quite misleading. But the official estimates of the expected effects are still the best available indicator of what the president and Congress intended when the law was signed. Although the revenue effects of tax changes may at times be either minimized or exaggerated for political purposes, the numbers employed are usually accepted as roughly correct by

[14] Norman J. Ornstein, "The Politics of the Deficit," in Philip Cagan, ed., *Contemporary Economic Problems* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), 311–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Presidential Tax Proposals and Congressional Enactments, 1948–84
Billions of 1982 dollars

	Presidential proposal		*Congressional enactment*		*Difference*	
Year	*First year*[a]	*Fully effective*[b]	*First year*[a]	*Fully effective*[b]	*First year*[a]	*Fully effective*[b]
1948	−3.2	—	−4.8	—	−1.6	—
1950	5.5	—	8.8	—	3.3	—
1951	10.0	—	5.7	—	−4.3	—
1954	−1.3	—	−1.4	—	0.1	—
1964	−6.3	−10.3	−7.7	−11.5	−1.4	−1.2
1968	7.4	—	10.9	—	3.5	—
1969	*	—	−2.5	—	−2.5	—
1971	−12.9	−9.3	−11.4	−10.0	1.5	−0.7
1975	−16.0	—	−22.8	—	−6.8	—
1976	*	—	−15.7	−6.2	−15.7	−6.2
1977	−13.8	−15.7	−17.7	−13.8	3.9	−1.9
1978	−24.5	−34.9	−18.7	−34.1	5.8	0.8
1980	*	—	3.6	—	3.6	—
1981	−56.6	−129.8	−37.7	−150.0	18.9	−20.2
1982	*	—	18.0	51.8	18.0	51.8
1984	*	—	10.6	22.5	10.6	22.5

Sources: Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation*, vols. 1–5 (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 1965–81); *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. 38 (1982) and earlier years; *President's 1963 Tax Message*, Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 88 Cong, 1 sess. (Government Printing Office, 1963), 57; *Legislative History of H.R. 8363*, prepared for the House Committee on Ways and Means, 89 Cong. 2 sess. (GPO, 1966), pt. 4; 1967), 5; *Summary of Tax and Spending Reduction Provisions (within the Jurisdiction of the Committees on Ways and Means and Finance) of H.R. 4170 as Passed by the House and the Senate*, prepared for the Joint Committee on Taxation, 98 Cong. 2 sess. (GPO, 1984), 118; *Revised Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1982*, 15; and Joseph A. Pechman, *Federal Tax Policy* (Brookings, 1983), 40.

* No presidential proposal.

[a] Expected revenue change first full year after the law is passed.

[b] Expected revenue change first full year after law is fully effective, if different from first column.

participants in the legislative process, and it is these numbers that Congress and the president typically expect the voters to praise—or blame—them for.

On tax matters, Congress also mainly follows the presidential lead. The data in Table 2 identify only the overall revenue effects of tax legislation, of course. Information on the incidence of taxation—that is, how it affects individuals or firms, higher- or lower-income taxpayers, broad classes or narrow groups affected by loophole closures— is not included in the table, because these features of tax policy have no direct bearing on fiscal deficits. Had these more specific aspects of the legislation been examined, significant congressional modification of presidential proposals would have been evident. But on the overall revenue effects, Congress seems to accept the president's guidelines. It is true that up until

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1976 Congress tended to cut taxes a bit more than presidents suggested and to raise them somewhat less than they proposed. But after 1976 the opposite tendency occurred: Congress became more resistant to tax cuts and showed more sympathy to tax increases.

During the first Reagan administration this new trend became quite pronounced as Congress became increasingly concerned about fiscal deficits. Even in 1981, when Democrats and Republicans were said to be outdoing one another in their enthusiasm for tax cuts, the cuts that were to take effect in 1982 actually generated a smaller short-term revenue loss than the President had initially proposed. In 1982, without having received any proposal from the President at all, Congress enacted a tax increase that reduced several "Christmas tree" items it had enacted in June 1981, as well as closing other loopholes.[15] Again in 1984 Congress passed still another "revenue enhancement" bill without a presidential request. However, these tax increases were not forced upon a recalcitrant administration. Whatever doubts about a tax increase President Reagan himself may have had, his key advisers welcomed the measure and persuaded the President to sign the tax bills Congress submitted to him. In short, in the immediate postwar period Congress was nearly as fiscally responsible as the president on tax matters, and recently it has shown more "courage" than has the executive branch.

The Transformation of Deficit Politics in 1981

Because big peacetime deficits are a political innovation that began in 1981, and because presidential initiatives in overall tax and expenditure policy are usually accepted on Capitol Hill, the transformation in deficit politics is likely to be a White House phenomenon. More detailed examination of the recent politics of deficits will confirm this expectation.

The immediate causes of the upsurge in deficits after 1981 are well known. First, Congress, at the administration's urging, passed a bill in July 1981 that cut taxes by an estimated $150 billion annually, even though cuts in outlays totaled less than $50 billion annually.[16] Second, the effect of these legislative actions was exacerbated by a recession that began in the very month the tax bill was approved. As a result, the 1983 deficit exceeded the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) 1981 estimates by nearly $40 billion (see Table 3). Third, the Federal Reserve Board, by pursuing a restrictive monetary policy that offset the stimulative effects of the tax cut, aggravated the recession and increased the cost of financing the public debt, which further contributed to the size of the deficit. These policies also lowered inflation rates, a development that may have been

[15] Accelerated deduction features in the 1981 tax bill scheduled to go into effect in 1985 and again in 1988 were eliminated, and the "safe-harbor" leasing provisions of that law, which enabled firms to sell unused tax breaks, were restricted. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* vol. 38 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1982), 29–31.

[16] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. 37 (1981), 93, 259.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

Deficit Projections by Office of Management and Budget and Congressional Budget Office and Actual Deficits, Fiscal Years 1981–84
Billions of nominal dollars

	Projections				
	Office of Management and Budget		Congressional Budget Office		
Year	Advance[a]	Current[b]	Advance[a]	Current[b]	Actual deficit
1981	−1.2	−16.0	−21.0	−47.9	−57.9
1982	5.0	−45.0	−29.6	−109.0	−110.6
1983	−22.9	−91.5	−157.0	−194.0	−195.4
1984	−82.9	−188.8	−197.0	−190.0	−175.4

Sources: *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1980*, 14; *Fiscal Year 1981*, M3; *Budget Revisions, Fiscal Year 1982*, 6, 97; *Fiscal Year 1983*, M5; *Fiscal Year 1984*, 9-3; *Fiscal Year 1985*, 9-4; *Fiscal Year 1986*, 9-10; Congressional Budget Office, *Baseline Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 1981–1985*, pt. 2, p. xix; *Fiscal Years 1982–1986*, 10; *Fiscal years 1983–1987*, 9; *Fiscal Years 1984–1988*, 9; and *Fiscal Years 1985–1989*, 7.

[a] Estimate twenty months before beginning of fiscal year.

[b] Estimate eight months before beginning of fiscal year.

desirable in other respects but that reduced the rate at which the public debt was being devalued in real-dollar terms.[17]

The upsurge in the deficit was partly unplanned. The Reagan administration clung to a rosy forecast of the immediate economic future as late as the fall of 1981, even after the recession had begun. Even if many in the administration did not believe the supply-side calculations that were projecting extraordinarily rapid economic growth in the wake of the tax cuts, they also did not anticipate the deepest recession of the postwar period or continued high interest rates in the midst of an economic recession. The Reagan administration, to be sure, is not the first to misperceive economic reality in making optimistic economic projections. As can be seen from Figure 4, presidents — and their economic advisers — have generally been quite inaccurate in forecasting future deficits; indeed, only 53 percent of the variance in postwar deficits can be accounted for by presidential budget estimates made five to eight months before the beginning of the fiscal year.[18] Yet the Reagan administration's underestimates were particularly egre-

[17] Some Reagan administration officals have argued that the deficits were not "caused" by the tax cut of 1981. They cite as evidence the fact that revenue as a percentage of GNP did not fall between 1981 and 1983. Instead, expenditures as a percentage of GNP continued to rise. What this ignores is that the 1981 tax cut did not take full effect until 1985 (when federal revenue as a percentage of GNP was in fact falling) and that the rise in expenditures after 1981 (due to defense and entitlement increases) could be — and was — anticipated at the very time the tax cut was passed.

[18] Indeed, presidential budgets seem to forecast little more than a continuation of the trends of the moment rather than accurately anticipate future developments; over two-thirds of the variance in presidential deficit estimates can be accounted for by current-year deficits. Of course, this is due

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 4

Presidential Estimates of Deficits and Actual Deficits, 1947–84[a]



Sources: *Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 1986*, table 1.1; and *Budget of the United States Government*, various years. a. Negative numbers indicate a surplus, and positive numbers indicate a deficit.

gious. The White House 1983 deficit estimate was off by over $100 billion, by far the largest margin of error in the postwar period (see Table 3). Furthermore, as can be seen by the much greater accuracy with which the CBO estimated the deficit at the same time, this error was not simply one of professional misjudgment.

There is additional evidence that the Reagan administration was hardly innocent of the consequences of the fiscal policies it was proposing. In May 1981, two months before the tax cut was enacted, Reagan's advisers discussed with the President a memorandum that showed that "the potential revenue loss from the tax bill was worsening the out-year deficit problem to a dangerous point."[19]

as much to the difficulty with which economists predict turning points in the economy (from growth to recession or vice versa) as to any political motivations on the part of the White House. In fact, presidents predicted larger deficits (or smaller surpluses) than those that actually occurred seventeen times in the course of the thirty-eight-year postwar period.

[19] Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History* (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 166–67. Also see the analysis of these events in Paul J. Quirk, "The Economy: Economists, Electoral Politics, and Reagan Economics," in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Elections of 1984* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 155–87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some members of Reagan's inner circle, including David Stockman, even contemplated accepting legislative defeat of the tax bill in the House. By the time the administration was using its full political muscle to push the 1981 tax cut through Congress, at least some Reagan advisers were saying to one another that the deficit would be as high as $60 billion in the next fiscal year. But to waver when victory was at hand seemed a foolish political course, whatever the long-range deficit consequences of the tax cut might be. And some advisers in the Treasury Department were drawing on supply-side theory to make the case that the government would be able to grow out of its deficits.

But if it remains uncertain whether the President himself was aware of the fiscal consequences of the 1981 tax cut at the time it was passed, it is quite clear that the administration did not modify its policies in subsequent years when large deficits were openly admitted in its own public statements. Although the administration underestimated the size of future deficits in its 1983 budget, even its own figures admitted deficits of a magnitude—$91 billion—unknown since World War II. And, working with the same information, the CBO predicted quite precisely the $195 billion deficit that eventually ensued (see Table 3). By 1984 presidential and CBO estimates began to correspond, but accurate projections did little to cause the administration to change course on fiscal policy. In short, deficits were hardly a political accident.

Public Opinion

Politicians are criticized for deficit spending when the problem is partly rooted in the structure of public opinion. A majority of the public, even though approving the idea of a balanced budget, demands increases in spending for public services at the same time that it complains that taxes are excessively high. To explore the changing shape of public opinion, I examined available trend data on the public views toward balanced budgets, taxes, and spending over the past two decades.

Polling is an inexact science, to be sure, and no great weight should be placed on any given percentage presented in the accompanying figure and table. Much depends on the wording of the question, the particular context within which it was asked, and the polling techniques of specific organizations, Even slight adjustments in the ordering of a question in an interview or in its exact phrasing can sharply alter the apparent picture of public opinion. In interpreting the data one should thus concentrate on any changes that can be identified when similar, or preferably the same, questions are asked by the same polling firm over time.

At first glance it seems the public was as opposed to deficits in the 1980s as it was in earlier decades. Indeed, expressed concern about deficits increased in the period immediately before 1981. Table 4, for example, shows that throughout the 1970s the public was ostensibly becoming ever more committed to a balanced budget. Although the shifts were only moderate in size, the direction was toward more fiscal integrity. But it should be noted that a much higher percentage of those surveyed supported a balanced budget than supported cuts in social pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

Support for a Balanced Budget, as Indicated by Polls, 1973–84 (percentages)

Polling organization and date	Response
General support for a balance budget	
Gallup[a]	
February 1973	60
March 1976	69
NBC[b]	
February 1979	68
March 1980	76
Support for cutting social spending to balance budget	
CBS[c]	
March 1976	43
April 1976	44
May 1976	40
June 1976	42
June 1978	51
ABC[d]	
February 1982	45
March 1982	43
January 1983	44
January 1984	34
Support for a constitutional amendment requiring balanced budget	
Gallup[e]	
March 1976	78
July 1978	81
February 1979	78
April 1981	65
September 1981	67
September 1982	75
NBC[f]	
November 1978	75
December 1978	79
February 1979	70
May 1979	73
May 1982	66
August 1982	63
Roper[g]	
March 1979	80
August 1980	79

Sources: Gallup Opinion Index, June 1976, 20; March 1979, 23; November 1981, 9; November 1982, 5; and data provided by Robert Shapiro, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, January 1985.

[a] The question asked was "How important do you think it is to balance the federal budget—very important, fairly important, or not so important?" The response shown here was "very important."

[b] The question asked was "Would you favor or oppose balancing the federal budget even if it meant the things you like about the federal government would have to be cut substantially?"

[c] The question asked was "The federal government must have a more balance budget even if that means spending less money on programs for such things as health and education" (agree or disagree).

[d] The question asked was "Do you think the government should cut spending for social programs to reduce the budget deficit, or not?"

[e] The questions asked were: "Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would require Congress to balance the federal budget each year—that is, keep taxes and expenditures in balance?" (March 1976, July 1978, and February 1979); "A proposed amendment to the Constitution would require Congress to approve a balance Federal budget each year. Government spending would have to be limited to no more than expected revenues, unless a three-fifths majority of Congress voted to spend more than expected revenue. Would you favor or oppose this amendment to the Constitution?" (April and September 1981); "I favor a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget" or "I oppose a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget" (September 1982).

[f] The question asked was "Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment which would require the Federal government to balance its budget?"

[g] The question asked was if respondents would favor or oppose "an amendment to require a balanced national budget—to prevent the government from spending more money than it takes in, except in certain specified cases of crisis or emergency."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 5

Public Opinion on Federal Tax and Expenditure Policies, 1955–84[a]



Sources: Tom W. Smith, *A Compendium of Trends on General Social Survey Questions*, National Opinion Research Center, report 129 (NORC, 1980); survey data from the General Social Survey, NORC archives; and Kirk Brown, *Public Opinion on Government Spending, Taxes and the Budget Deficit*, report 84.718 GOV (Congressional Research Service, 1984), 23.

a. The opinions on taxes and waste indicate the percentage of respondents stating that they are "too high"; the opinions on expenditure categories indicate the percentage of respondents stating that "too little" is being spent. Polls were not conducted in each year for each category.

grams to achieve it. When the question was cast in terms of an amendment to the Constitution, the rhetorical support for a balanced budget was even greater. After 1981 the support for an amendment faltered somewhat, but this could well be because the amendment had now become a somewhat partisan issue. Even so, the public hardly wavered in its proclaimed commitment to the ideal of budget balancing.

But asking the public directly about the budget balancing may not be the best way to ascertain the political context in which deficit decisions are made. Public opinion varies so much with the way in which the question is phrased that one is tempted to conclude that opinion on this issue is neither consistent nor entrenched. And even as the public was continuing to insist on a balanced budget, it was also demanding a combination of tax cuts and increased expenditures that could only have the opposite result.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The data presented in Figure 5 lend support to this conclusion. Between 1961 and 1982 the percentage who felt taxes were too high increased from 46 to 69 percent, an unusual and significant shift in public opinion on a major domestic issue.[20] Opinion on expenditure issues over the same period of time is not available, but, as can be seen in the same figure, the trend since 1973 does not show a corresponding decrease in support for public expenditures. Although opinion varied from year to year, overall the public continued to think in the 1980s, as in the 1970s, that the government spent too little on the nation's health, education, and environment. The percentage that felt too little was being spent on national defense fluctuated widely over the period, but overall the trend was upward. Support for more money for space and for welfare was generally weak and fluctuating, but the level of support in the 1980s was still higher than it had been in the 1970s. Only with respect to aid to the cities did the public become slightly more stingy with the nation's purse and even here the changes were not great.[21]

In short, Americans increasingly came to believe that taxes should be cut, but not at the expense of national defense or broad public services. They think the savings should come from money that is "wasted," which a significantly larger percentage of Americans think is "a lot" than was the case in the early 1960s (see Figure 5). To declare much government expenditure "a waste" is, of course, one way of rationalizing the call for lower taxes but more expenditure on specific programs. But one voter's waste may be another voter's vital public serivce. Unfortunately, political leaders, no matter what their ideological coloration, have not been able to find enough of what most people agree is waste to bring budgets into balance.

Professional Opinion

If the structure of public opinion had changed, with voters more willing to demand simultaneously higher expenditures, lower taxes, and a balanced budget, opinion was not so well defined that political leaders were prevented from constructing a policy that was both fiscally responsible and politically acceptable. To understand how deficit financing on a grand scale became standard practice, one has to appreciate not only the evolution in public opinion but also the way in which professional economic opinion on deficits was changing.

The Keynesians. For two decades or more a consensus on deficit financing had existed and the system seemed to be in equilibrium. The government incurred mild deficits annually (higher in periods of recession), but these hardly con-

[20] Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," paper prepared for the 1981 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[21] It should be noted that the question asks if taxes are *currently* too high and expenditures *currently* too low. Thus it is significant that the percentage of those thinking the federal income tax is too high continues at a high level, even though tax rates were cut in 1981. Also, those calling for more defense in the 1980s do so even in the face of substantial increases in defense expenditures. The greater support for domestic expenditure in recent years may be due to increased dissatisfaction with recent and proposed reductions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stituted an immediate threat to the postwar financial system. In time political leaders came to accept these deficits as normal, and the righteous concern with budget balancing that characterized immediate postwar rhetoric gave way to vaguer commitments to a full-employment budget. The Democrats led the way, arguing as early as 1960 that a balanced budget need not be realized "in periods of recession." But even the Republicans, after having held the reins of power, declared in 1972 only their commitment to "the balance of the full employment budget.[22]

Republicans in fact had adapted to the reality of mild deficits well before 1972. As fiscally conservative as the Eisenhower administration is reputed to have been, even its economic advisers stated as early as January 1954 that "tax policy was continually reviewed by the Treasury, not only from the viewpoint of moving toward budgetary balance, but also in light of . . . the part that fiscal policy could play in contributing to economic growth and stability."[23] As Herbert Stein has observed, a "post war consensus on macroeconomic policy" had emerged.[24]

The name usually given to this consensus was Keynesianism, though in fact it was only loosely related to Keynes's own views. Among its key tenets were: political management of the economy was possible; such management should be by means of indirect financial tools, rather than direct control of labor or capital through such devices as wage and price controls; and monetary and fiscal policies were the key mechanisms by which the government could achieve short-term economic objectives.

Differences of opinion could be discerned between more liberal and more conservative Keynesians. Liberals were especially concerned about high rates of unemployment, opposed to high interest rates, and more willing to use fiscal—as distinct from monetary—policy to pursue broad economic objectives. Conservatives were more concerned about rising inflation rates, more acceptant of rising unemployment, and more reluctant to use deficits as a means of providing an economic stimulus. But these differences were contained within a fundamental consensus that in retrospect can be seen to have shaped deficit politics. For one thing, the consensus placed upon the president and his advisers primary responsibility for the short-term performance of the economy. If the proper course for the postwar economy was the narrow channel between the Scyllian songs of inflation and the Charybdian rock of unemployment, then only the president could steer the ship of state on its perilous journey. With the good help of his mates in the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and the OMB, the captain needed to find the correct mix of interest rates, tax rates, and expenditure levels to maintain stability in potentially turbulent economic waters. With a certain amount of political jostling, Congress could be counted on to acquiesce in his overall judgment.

Presidents accepted with alacrity the assignment the postwar consensus gave

[22] Donald Bruce Johnson, comp., *National Party Platforms*, vol. 2, 1960–1976 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 598, 862.

[23] *Economic Report of the President, January 1954,* 52.

[24] Herbert Stein, *Presidential Economics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to them. If the dustbin of history into which Herbert Hoover had been swept were not by itself sufficient incentive, presidents were also well aware that their day-to-day political influence, their monthly popularity ratings, and their success in off-year congressional elections, to say nothing of their own reelection prospects, depended heavily on economic trends. It was better to believe that one could control these economic and political forces through carefully balanced policies than to regard oneself as utterly dependent upon the Goddess Fortuna.

And so it was that a delicious blend of economic consensus and political pragmatism produced decades of mild deficits that were regularly offset by inflationary trends and economic growth. It is true that in times of recession politicians were encouraged to incur deficits on the grounds that they would stimulate the economy. And the government did spend somewhat more—roughly 5 percent annually—than it collected in revenues between 1946 and 1980. For years, conservative Keynesians expressed concern that politicians would run ever-larger deficits to try to keep the economy growing at a faster rate. And in fact the federal budget ran an actual surplus in only eight of the thirty-eight postwar years. Yet the temptation to spend more was disciplined by the stern advice of even the more liberal Keynesians: big deficits will cause big inflation, which will require big jumps in interest rates, which will induce a big recession, which will mean a big defeat. In the end it was the perceived close connection between short-term fiscal policy and short-term economic trends that both induced mild deficits and kept them within a tolerable range.

The Reagan deficits of the 1980s cannot be understood apart from the breakdown of this economic consensus. To be sure, Ronald Reagan, who identifies himself with Franklin Roosevelt, is well aware that rapidly advancing deficits did nothing to harm Roosevelt's popularity—with either the public or the historians. In addition, Ronald Reagan is well aware that his program calling for decreased domestic expenditures is more likely to succeed in a world of budget deficits than one of budget surpluses.[25] And to be sure, Ronald Reagan wears a party label that has earned a reputation for fiscal integrity, thereby diffusing and confusing political opposition. Yet Reagan, like Roosevelt, needed an economic theory that would provide the intellectual basis for a dramatic departure from past political practice. No president, no matter how willful and committed, can retain the confidence of his advisers and allies, to say nothing of the public more generally, unless his policies are consistent with at least some minimally acceptable policy doctrine.

The Supply-siders. Supply-side economists have received much of the credit (or, more often, the blame) for the new policies of deficits. A small band of economists led by Arthur Laffer of the University of Southern California have made the rather dubious claim that the United States could increase its revenues by cutting its taxes. While most economists called it the "laughter" curve, some

[25] In this regard, Reagan is, of course, little different from the Johnsonian enthusiasts who conceived new programs for spending the "fiscal dividend" that was eagerly anticipated in the mid-1960s. They, too, delighted in a budgetary climate that would facilitate their policy objectives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political leaders—notably Jack Kemp and Ronald Reagan—seemed to give credence to the extraordinary suggestion that activity in the private sector could be so stimulated by reductions in marginal tax rates that the ensuing growth would actually produce increased tax revenues. This reasoning underpinned the figures contained in President Reagan's budget estimates in his first six months in office.

But if supply-siders were used to justify Reagan's initial budget figures, their actual influence remains a matter open to considerable dispute. It can be argued that they achieved key positions within the Treasury and persuaded Secretary Donald Regan, who became an increasingly influential adviser to the president (indeed the chief of staff in 1985), that revenue flows would be greater than those projected by critics on Capitol Hill. Thus it is possible that the magnitude and growing size of the deficits caught the administration unaware. But it can also be argued that the Federal Reserve, the OMB, and the CEA all had more realistic assessments of the deficit picture, as apparently did James Baker, the president's chief of staff at the time. According to this view, the President and his top staff espoused a supply-side doctrine not because it was inherently persuasive, but because it was politically convenient. The President wanted to increase defense spending, cut taxes, and balance the budget. Only by accepting the supply-side argument could he propose a program that would appear to achieve all these objectives simultaneously.

The estimates of extraordinary revenue growth made by supply-side economists may have been influential in the first year of the Reagan administration. But by 1982 it was becoming increasingly apparent that the revenue growth predicted by the supply-siders was not to occur in the immediate future. For the administration to adhere to its budgetary course, it needed a much more substantial body of economic opinion than supply-siders could offer. Quite ironically, it found its answer in monetarism.

The Monetarists. The most significant change in macroeconomic theory in recent decades has not been the formation of a small band of "supply-siders" whose dubious theories have remained on the edge of academic respectability. Instead, it has been the increasingly widespread acceptance of the doctrine that monetary policy—not fiscal policy—has the greatest short-term effect on the business cycle. This view was articulated by University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman, both holder of a Nobel laureate for fundamental research in economics and a newspaper commentator whose conservative views were especially persuasive to business and Republican party leaders. He emphasized the central—indeed, the almost exclusive—role of the Federal Reserve in determining swings in the business cycle. Initially treated with considerable skepticism, monetarist theory gained rapid ascendance in the 1970s and was accepted as the leading macroeconomic theory by many within the Reagan administration.

The core element in monetarist theory, as it relates to fiscal policy, is the proposition that prices, income, and economic stability are a function of growth in the money supply, not a function of the proportion of public expenditures

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paid for by borrowed funds. As long as the money supply grows at a constant rate commensurate with potential growth in GNP, economic activity will expand without placing upward pressure on prices and wages. In this monetarist world, fiscal policy has short-term macroeconomic consequences only when it is accommodated by monetary policy, that is, only when the cost of financing the public debt is eased by allowing the money supply to grow more rapidly than potential growth in GNP.

Most monetarists recognize long-term effects of fiscal policy on economic growth. For one thing, it is thought that deficits reduce the amount of capital available for private investment.[26] But, in the view of many monetarists, private investment would still be "crowded out" even if the deficits were eliminated by a tax increase as long as government expenditure remained the same. "Suppose that the $200 billion of borrowing [occurring in 1984] were replaced by $200 billion of additional taxes," Friedman has argued. "The extra tax payments would reduce the funds available to the public to spend and to lend. This too would crowd out private borrowers. . . . Our aggregate wealth, our 'permanent income,' is precisely the same [in either case]."[27] Given this perspective, the fiscal policy that holds the greatest promise for stimulating long-term growth is one that reduces public-sector spending. High expenditure levels—whether paid for either by taxes or by borrowing—reduce private incentives to work and invest. If deficits create a political climate in which expenditure cuts can be made more easily, it may be argued that they have a salutary, not a negative, effect on economic growth. Even Edward Gramlich, an economist with no known ties to the monetarist school, has argued that the "short-run impact of the deficits" is marginal, though the consequent "reduction in the national savings rate seems undesirable from a long-term perspective." But, he admits, "that perspective must be a very long term one indeed, from ten to twenty-five years."[28]

This does not mean that any major group of economists—Keynesians, monetarists, or supply-siders—advocates continued high deficit levels such as the United States is currently experiencing. On the contrary, most condemn continued high deficits as counterproductive and eventually dangerous. Deficit-prone policies have born the unrelenting criticisms of such prominent economists as Martin Feldstein, former chairman of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers, and Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker. But if politically influential economists are continuing to denounce deficits, their pronouncements no longer have the political bite they once had. To the extent that the business cycle is determined by monetary policy, as the monetarists say, to that extent politicians need not be concerned about the short-term (that is, the politically relevant) effects of their fiscal policies.

[26] Edward M. Gramlich, "How Bad Are the Large Deficits?" in Mills and Palmer, *Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s*, 43–68.

[27] Milton Friedman, "The Taxes Called Deficits," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 April 1984.

[28] Gramlich, "How Bad Are the Large Deficits?" 49, 64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some monetarists may be more concerned about negative long-term consequences of the deficit, but the presidents who listen to them have no strong incentives to share this concern. Negative effects that may take place a decade or more in the future mean little to a political leader whose influence depends on the current public mood and immediate economic prospects. Once monetarist doctrine moves the economic consequences of fiscal deficits to the long term, policital leaders in the White House and on Capitol Hill are free to propose long-term reforms such as constitutional amendments instead of making hard decisions that involve major tax increases or spending cuts.

The political success of monetarism owes much to the inflation of the 1970s and to the 1979 decision of the Federal Reserve Board to use money targets as a means of bringing price increases under control. Even before 1979 the Keynesian consensus had eroded in the face of increasing unemployment levels, accelerating inflation, and slowing rates of growth in productivity. Some analysts attributed these developments to the formation of the oil cartel and the extraordinary upsurge in the price of commodities; others insisted they were due to increased government expenditures and new regulatory interventions in the economy; and still others claimed that they were caused by presidential mismanagement of the macroeconomy: Johnson's pursuit of both guns and butter during the Vietnam War; Nixon's price controls and overstimulation of the economy in 1972; and the unwillingness of the Carter administration to tighten interest rates. But throughout these debates one set of economic analysts argued self-confidently that inflationary problems could be contained only by keeping growth of the money supply at a rate commensurate with potential growth in GNP.

When the Federal Reserve seemed to accept this argument in 1979 and when inflationary pressures began to subside shortly thereafter, monetarist theory gained the political ascendancy. The Regan administration brought with it this new school of economic thought, which proved to have a more enduring influence than did the supply-siders who received so much publicity. Monetarists did not advocate deficits, as Keynes once had. On the other hand, neither did they identify any short-term negative consequences of deficit financing. Politicians were given a free hand to please the public in a manner unknown since the days of that master politician Franklin Roosevelt.

Conclusions

The aphorism that politicians benefit if they can spend now but pay later rings true. Yet there is little evidence that members of Congress are any more susceptible to this tendency than are members of the executive branch. Instead, Congress seems to defer to the president on fiscal policy. If the president finds a way of keeping expenditures and revenues roughly in balance, Congress does little to disturb the equilibrium. But if the president insists on major new expenditures or significant tax reductions, Congress is also willing to acquiesce, even if this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may mean budget deficits. In short, on overall fiscal policy Congress is not so much responsible as deferential. It seems to have the mechanisms for keeping its own program within the framework set forth by the administration, but it does not have the resources to impose a discipline the executive itself has not achieved.

Presidents, no less than members of Congress, can benefit from postponing the costs of their programs. Roosevelt discovered that secret and founded a New Deal coalition that owed much to this political insight. His successors—whether Democrats or Republicans—continued to outspend revenues, but only to the moderate degree permitted by the Keynesian consensus. Yet the secret of the success of this consensus—modest inflation that reduced the real value of the nominal debt at roughly the same rate as annual deficits were adding to it—may also have been its undoing. The minuscule inflation rate of the Eisenhower years gave way to a moderate level during the Great Society years. And after the Vietnam War ended, inflation, rather than returning to prewar levels, continued to accelerate. Keynesian confidence that politicians could steer a middle course eroded, and a tough monetarist doctrine asserted itself instead.

Monetarism was a strict taskmaster. The Federal Reserve, by severely controlling the growth of the money supply, induced the longest and most severe postwar recession during 1979–83 in spite of the increase in deficits. Yet it succeeded—temporarily at least—at the one task it regarded as paramount: the reduction of inflationary pressures. Even though the United States economy is now launched on a recovery, it has yet to cause an upsurge in inflation despite massive deficit financing. But the Reserve's very success has had an ironic consequence no economist of the Keynesian era could have anticipated: it has provided presidents and acquiescent Congresses with a virtually unprecedented license to incur deficits. Although political leaders will denounce deficits, none want to give up their favorite policy objectives—defense, social security, domestic welfare, or tax cuts—to address a problem whose unfortunate consequences are now said to be long term.

At least, this will be the politics of deficits until the next major recession. The causes of such a recession will be as obscure and open to conflicting interpretations as any the United States has suffered in the past. But one fact will loom large: it will have occurred in the midst of a large, growing public debt. In a recession context, the size of annual deficits will increase dramatically from a large number to an astounding one. Those in office will be blamed for letting this happen. The public will lose confidence in government, and the party in power will suffer a reverse. Whatever the reality, it will be widely believed that the cause of the economic and political turmoil is the growing public debt, and the era of deficit politics will come to an end.*

* Alice G. Keck provided research assistance. Barry P. Bosworth, Robert Z. Lawrence, Norman J. Ornstein, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles L. Schultze, and Robert Y. Shapiro made helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans and Democrats in 1982

GARY C. JACOBSON

In congressional elections, the collective interests of a party do not coincide with the individual interests of each of its candidates. The party's optimal distribution of campaign resources will not be optimal for every candidate, and vice versa. This instance of the familiar collective goods problem creates a potentially important role for national party organizations. To the degree they control campaign resources and use them to pursue collective interests, national party organizations will have an important role in shaping elections. Their capacity to impose an efficient distribution of campaign resources promises more victories for a party's candidates than would occur without it.

This, in its simplest form, is the principal argument of this article. In the first section I explain why the conflict between a party and its candidates arises and describe how it plays itself out in congressional elections. The emphasis here is on both the potential payoffs from, and the formidable barriers to, greater party control and efficiency. In the second section I describe how, despite these barriers, Republican party committees have recently achieved a more centralized and strategically efficient resource distribution system. The Democrats, in contrast, remain wedded to a thoroughly decentralized system. The effect of these organizational differences on the 1982 elections is the subject of the third section. Here I argue that the Republicans' stronger national organizations were instrumental in helping them escape a major electoral disaster. I conclude by

GARY C. JACOBSON is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of *Money in Congressional Elections*, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* (with Samuel Kernell), *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, and numerous articles and essays on American electoral politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speculating on the future evolution of the national parties' financial role in congressional campaigns.

Parties Versus Candidates

In congressional elections, a party's collective interest lies in winning as many seats as possible. It is obviously to the advantage of every member to be in the majority. Beyond that the theoretical argument that members of a majority coalition would prefer that the majority be small—a minimum winning coalition—is analytically irrelevant given the uncertainties of congressional election politics and the fragility of coalitions in Washington. At some hypothetical extreme, perhaps the marginal utility of an additional seat would be trivial or even negative; but at existing levels of party competition, every additional seat is valuable. Even though House Democrats may not expect their majority status to be seriously threatened, the larger their majority, the stronger they are as a party in confronting the conservative coalition or a Republican president wielding the veto. Historically, Democrats have needed extraordinary majorities to pass their core legislative program. Correspondingly, the usually Republican minority party is more effective the more seats it holds, even when it falls short of a formal majority. Finally, one need only recall discussions of the stakes in the 1982 Senate elections to appreciate that parties care about their long-term strength and look to pile up seats in good years as insurance against losing control in future bad years.

For the parties, then, maximizing seats is the goal. In the abstract, it should make little difference to them which individual candidates win, only that as many as possible do. Individual candidates care passionately who wins. Losers do not share the collective benefits of the party's victory. Although it is possible to imagine a situation in which winning is of little value unless one is part of a majority (and thus in which candidates would be willing to take considerable electoral risks to improve their party's chances), this is emphatically not true of congressional election politics. The fruits of victory belong by no means exclusively to the majority. The principal interest of each candidate lies in maximizing his or her own likelihood of victory. The party's collective interests are decidedly secondary.

The differing perspectives of parties and their candidates naturally generate conflicts over the distribution of campaign resources—basically money, but including in-kind contributions and various other types of assistance. The party would prefer to deploy resources in a way that promises to maximize the number of seats it wins. It would redirect resources from campaigns of its stronger candidates to the campaigns of weaker candidates up to the point where the expected marginal gains in seats among the latter began to be matched by the expected marginal losses among the former. Individual candidates, on the other hand, would understandably resist giving up resources if doing so would increase their risks of defeat.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In practice, the conflict is between the party and its incumbents. Incumbents win with remarkable frequency, usually by wide margins, and so are obviously the strongest candidates; they also enjoy the greatest capacity to raise campaign funds. Any redistribution of resources from stronger to weaker candidates must, therefore, come almost entirely at the expense of incumbents.

Formally, the situation is identical to that described by Bruce Cain in his study of redistricting.[1] A party can only draw district lines that improve the chance of winning new seats by increasing the risk of losing old seats. When the holders of the old seats are the ones who must vote to establish the new districts, an efficient partisan gerrymander is out of the question. Neither theory nor practice leaves any ground for believing that individual electoral interests will be voluntarily sacrificed to the party's collective good. The party's problem is magnified by the high level of subjective uncertainty surrounding elections; incumbents are guided more by worst-case scenarios than by objective assessments of electoral odds. The inclination to minimize regret is a major barrier to any substantial redistribution of electoral resources, be they registered voters or campaign funds.

The situations with regard to redistricting and campaign finance do differ in one important respect. In the former, it is possible to assume that a vote is a vote; one district's gain in party supporters will be matched by losses elsewhere, and vice versa. But with campaign money, a dollar is not a dollar; that is, a dollar spent in one campaign will not necessarily have the same effect as a dollar spent in another. The marginal productivity of campaign spending in terms of votes varies; it is, in general, much greater for nonincumbents than for incumbents. This means that, other things equal, a given amount of money produces more votes for a party if spent on a nonincumbent's rather than an incumbent's campaign.

Of course, the party's goal is to win seats, not votes per se. A redistribution of campaign money that increases a challenger's share of the vote from 30 percent to 49 percent while reducing an incumbent's share of the vote from 51 percent to 49 percent is hardly profitable. For this and several other reasons, it is no simple matter to specify an efficient distribution of a party's available campaign funds. Campaign spending clearly does affect congressional election results; the evidence for this is overwhelming. But money is by no means the only thing that matters. The strength of the party in the district, national electoral forces, and, most importantly, the characteristics of individual candidates and campaigns are also crucial. Campaign money is most productive of victories in campaigns where these other factors make winning possible *if* the money is available.

This means that money is best spent in contests that are, on other grounds, expected to be close. But since campaign spending affects the vote, whether or not a contest actually turns out to be close depends partly on how much money

[1] Bruce E. Cain, *The Reapportionment Puzzle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 154–155.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

candidates raise and spend. In contests involving incumbents, what matters most is the challenger's ability to raise money; very few challengers who are not relatively well financed are able to offer a serious threat to the incumbent. The principal reason is that underfinanced challengers normally cannot command the attention of voters, and voters are reluctant to vote for candidates they know nothing about. Incumbents enjoy the advantage of being well-known before the campaign begins and the first dollar is spent.

The dynamic relationship between campaign money and electoral expectations complicates the problem of distributing campaign resources efficiently. If all distribution decisions were made at the beginning of the campaign, mistakes would be unavoidable. It would be necessary to figure out which contests *might* be close *if* sufficient money were given to the candidate. But many of the factors that also influence outcomes may not be at all clear before the campaign begins: the candidate's virtues as a campaigner, the thrust of major issues, economic conditions and the political climate in the period just before election day, and the funds available to the opposing candidate. Given the uncertainties of electoral politics, money is bound to be wasted on disappointing failures or easy winners, and otherwise promising candidates will be overlooked; erroneous expectations lead to squandered resources and lost opportunities.

An efficient distribution strategy would, therefore, require flexible deployment of campaign resources in response to developments in specific campaigns. This requires a capacity to monitor the progress of candidates so that resources can be funneled into the close contests where they are most likely to affect the outcome. Promising challengers who receive early funds and who use them effectively to augment their suppport can then be given additional funds; those making little progress can be cut off. Incumbents whose potential opposition evaporates can be safely neglected; aid can be rushed to those endangered by a vigorous challenge. The hypothetical distribution of campaign funds over the range of election results made by an efficient party seeking to maximize its share of seats would thus look something like the sharply peaked curve in Figure 1, with the mode at the 50 percent mark. All of the funds would not be concentrated totally in, say, the 40–60 percent range, only because of the uncertainties prevalent at the beginning of the campaign season. That aside, the flatter the distribution or the further its mode from 50 percent, the less efficient the distribution of funds would be. For example, the hypothetical curve in Figure 2 represents a situation in which money was wasted on easy winners while candidates in close contests who faced an uphill battle were slighted.

The actual distribution of campaign money in congressional elections will be inefficient to the degree that individual candidates have any say in the matter. And as a matter of practice, one set of candidates—incumbents—has a great deal to say indeed. Incumbents are the principal beneficiaries of a campaign finance system that clearly reflects and reinforces the contemporary system of candidate-centered, entrepreneurial electoral politics. Most fundraising is conducted by and for individual candidates; the great majority of campaign contributions made by individuals or political action committees (PACs) go directly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

Efficient Distribution of Campaign Contributions (Hypothetical)



to congressional candidates without being routed through the parties. Party sources currently provide less than 5 percent of the dollars given directly to congressional candidates, although if coordinated party spending is included, the party's share is closer to 10 percent.

Insofar as fundraising is a scramble of everyone for himself, incumbents are at an enormous advantage. People and groups who contribute in order to buy political influence, access, or good will naturally favor the candidates most likely to win; incumbents seeking reelection are successful more than 90 percent of the time. Even groups who are not particularly fond of an incumbent may give to his campaign to avoid future hostility. Others contribute out of gratitude for past services. Of course, many contributors have loftier motives, but incumbents are, through past experience, more likely to know who they are and how to attract their support. Congressional incumbents enjoy privileged access to party funds as well; the national senatorial and congressional campaign committees are themselves led by members of Congress who serve at the pleasure of their peers.

There is no reason to expect, then, that campaign money will be distributed very efficiently. And in general it is not, although, as we shall see, Republicans do a noticeably better job than Democrats on this score. For now it suffices to observe that House incumbents of both parties had more than $12 million in unspent funds left over after each of the last two elections; had this money been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2

Inefficient Distribution of Campaign Contributions (Hypothetical)



available to challengers, their aggregate financial resources would have been greater by a third. These unspent funds, which to the party represent wasted opportunity, amount to about 15 percent of all the money raised by House incumbents in 1980 and 1982.[2]

Another of the party's crucial electoral "resources" is also subject to maldistribution. In a system of candidate-centered electoral politics, how well a party does depends strongly on the quality of the candidates it fields. Strong candidates are, therefore, a valuable resource for a party. Because nearly every incumbent can be considered a strong candidate, the consequential variation occurs among nonincumbents. The greater the number of high quality nonincumbent candidates a party fields, the better its chances on election day.

National parties have traditionally had very little influence over the quality of their candidates. Self-recruitment is the norm, one which can harm collective party interests. The individual pursuits of higher elective offices by political careerists produces a distribution of candidacies that exaggerates the injury done

[2] The campaign finance data for 1982 used here and elsewhere in this essay are from the Federal Election Commission, *FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1981-1982, Interim Report No. 3: U.S. Senate and House Campaigns* (Washington, D.C., May 1983); the data for 1980 are from the Federal Election Commission, *FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980, Final Report: U.S. Senate and House Campaigns* (Washington, D.C., January 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to a party by baneful national forces. In general, the most promising nonincumbent candidates are those who have already won and held lower elective offices and are looking to move up. As a rule, such career politicians are acutely sensitive to the political odds facing them, for they have a great deal at stake; a lost election may end a career. Thus when national conditions indicate that it will be a bad year for a party, the strongest of its potential challengers—its ambitious lower-level officeholders—will be most hesitant to run for Congress. The disproportionate number of inferior candidates running in such election years magnifies the damage.

The party faces, once again, a collective goods problem; rational individual behavior produces inferior collective results. The problem is all the more severe because recruitment and campaign finance practices reinforce one another. The availability of money attracts strong candidates; promising candidates attract campaign contributions. Contributors ignore weak candidates; the shrewder potential candidates choose not to run if they are not assured of sufficient funds. A party would be better off, collectively, if it could mount candidacies that counteract rather than reinforce contrary national forces. But this is only possible to the degree that recruitment and campaign funding do not depend on strategic individual decisions.

Present-day methods of congressional campaign finance and candidate recruitment apparently offer little opportunity for the conscious pursuit of collective party interests. A system of electoral politics that amounts to little more than the sum of the activities of individual political entrepreneurs in a decentralized political marketplace gives short shrift to collective goods. The barriers to the development of institutional instruments that could be used to distribute campaign resources efficiently seem formidable indeed, even if the payoffs look very attractive. It is, therefore, less difficult to understand why the Democrats have made little progress in this direction than it is to explain why the Republicans have managed to develop organizational tools for a much more centralized and efficient pursuit of party electoral goals.

Republican Campaign Committees

National-level Republican party committees have assumed an important role in financing campaigns because of their remarkable ability to raise money. Between them, the Republican National Committee (RNC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) raised $190 million during the 1981–1982 cycle; their Democratic counterparts raised $28 million. National-level Republican party committees were able to put $19 million into House and Senate campaigns in 1982; the comparable figure for Democrats was $3.4 million.[3] And this was in a year when recession and an unpopular administration were giving the Republicans serious headaches.

[3] Federal Election Commission, "FEC Reports Republicans Outspent Democrats by More Than 5-to-1 in '82 Elections," news release, 26 April 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Republican committees raise most of their money through direct mail solicitation; 85 percent of it comes from private individuals in sums of less than $500; the average contribution is about $28. That they can raise *any* money in this way contradicts simple accounts of rational behavior. To donors of small sums, a party's congressional victories can only be collective goods. Individual contributions are too small to make any perceptable difference in any election. There is, therefore, no reason to contribute if the only purpose of the contribution is to help the party win seats.

Republican fundraisers have overcome this particular collective goods problem with a vengeance. A properly phrased solicitation letter can evidently tap sentiments felt by some citizens that makes the act of giving itself sufficiently rewarding to outweigh the cost. It takes time to find such people, but once they are identified they can be tapped repeatedly. Republican officials have been honing their mailing lists for a decade and are now reaping the reward: a large and steadily growing income little affected by shifts in the political winds. Control over this money is the foundation of the national party's influence in congressional elections.

But the money is not, by itself, enough to establish an important independent role for the party. What the party does with it is decisive. If the party merely responded to the individual demands of its incumbents, it might distribute resources no more efficiently than would a completely decentralized fundraising process. Since incumbent members of Congress control the national congressional campaign committees of both parties, this is no idle possibility. Republicans have found a solution to this problem as well—in, ironically, the legal limitations on party contributions.

Congressional campaign finance practices are governed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and its subsequent amendments. As sources of direct contributions to candidates, party committees are treated by the FECA as equivalent to nonparty political action committees; both are subject to the same contribution ceiling—$5,000 per candidate per campaign. But state and national party organizations are permitted to spend additional money jointly on behalf of their candidates.

This coordinated spending, as it is called, is also limited, but the ceilings are higher and, unlike contribution ceilings, rise with inflation. The original limit for a House campaign was $10,000; by 1982, inflation had pushed it up to $18,440. The ceiling for Senate campaigns varies with the population of the state ($0.02 times the voting age population, adjusted for the change in the Consumer Price Index since 1974, with a minimum of $20,000, also adjusted). It ranged from $36,880 (in the five least populous states) to $655,874 (in California) for the 1982 election. The Senate limit also applies to House candidates in those states with a single House seat.

The FECA permits state party organizations the same level of direct and coordinated campaign spending as the national party committees. But very few of them have much money to spare for congressional candidates. Republicans took

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advantage of this situation to double, in effect, the amount the national party can spend for its candidates. The national party simply contracts with each state party to act as its agent for raising and spending the money. The Democrats' argument that the ploy violated the FECA failed to persuade the Supreme Court, so it is legal.[4]

National Republican party committees are thus able to put substantial amounts of money into congressional campaigns. In 1982, for example, a House candidate could, in principle, receive as much as $66,880 in assistance directly or indirectly from national party sources: direct contributions of $5,000 in both the primary and general election from the party's national committee, the congressional campaign committee, and the state party for a total of $30,000, plus twice $18,440 in coordinated spending. For Senate candidates the ceiling varied from $101,260 in the least populous states to $1.4 million in California. The effective ceilings are normally somewhat lower—in the neighborhood of $50,000 for 1982 House campaigns—because the party committees usually stay out of primary contests.

Although these are by no means trivial sums of money, they do not establish the national party committees as the dominant sources of campaign funds. It is difficult at present to mount a competitive House campaign for less than $200,000, and under most circumstances more than $300,000 is necessary. Thus national party committees can provide only about one quarter of the funds required for a serious House campaign. Party committees can supply a larger share of the funds necessary for a full-scale Senate campaign—perhaps as much as half in some states—but other sources of money are still essential. Even a party as well-heeled as the Republican cannot, therefore, supply a sufficient share of the necessary campaign funds to guarantee their efficient distribution.

The limits imposed by the FECA thus seem to impair the party's ability to use its resources efficiently. Once the limits are reached, party committees can do no more for a candidate, even if the election is close and more money might make a difference. Hence the law restricts a party's ability to pursue its collective electoral goal of winning the largest possible share of seats.

This all assumes that party officials are free to pursue the party's collective interests without worrying about those of individual candidates. They are not, because the senatorial and congressional campaign committees are led by members of Congress who are expected to take care of their colleagues. This being so, it is entirely conceivable that the net effect of ceilings on party assistance is to *enhance* rather than diminish the party's ability to allocate its resources efficiently. Incumbents can demand no more than the law allows them to receive; once given the maximum, they cannot object to money being spent on other candidates. Because Republicans have so much money at their disposal, plenty remains for nonincumbents after incumbents have been satisfied to the

[4] *Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,* 454 U.S. 27 (1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legal limit. So although the FECA theoretically prevents an efficient distribution of party resources, it may well contribute to one in practice, at least up to the point where a party is so well endowed that conflicts over resources do not arise.

Republican national committees have found several other good uses for their money. Realizing that strong candidates are the key to success in a candidate-centered election system, they have made a major effort to identify, recruit, and train promising congressional aspirants. Partly to strengthen the "farm team," the national party has even helped finance Republican candidates for state legislatures, the main cradle of future congressional talent. About half the current members of Congress have served in legislatures. The party is able to entice potentially attractive congressional candidates with offers of substantial assistance, financial and otherwise, that makes costs of running smaller and the probability of success seem greater. This assistance works against the inclination of ambitious career politicians to avoid challenging Democratic incumbents when conditions are unpropitious. Part of the assistance takes the form of intensive training in how to organize and conduct a congressional campaign. Thus even candidates who have never run for office do not have to suffer through learning from their own mistakes. Inexperienced Republican candidates can count on a free source of expert advice; Republican party organizations have become central repositories of the same sort of technical expertise purveyed by the professional campaign outfits that have proliferated in recent years.

Republican party committees have also developed the capacity to monitor individual contests and, therefore, know where to focus their attention in the final weeks of a campaign. They have the money to pay for frequent tracking polls to tell them which of their candidates are becoming safe or hopeless and which might benefit from last-minute help. They also influence the distribution of resources that they do not control directly; a number of Republican-oriented PACs follow the advice of the national party committees in deciding where to invest their money. Even those who do not do so explicitly may respond to signs of a "hot" contest, and the party's attention is an important sign.[5] All of these things help the party deploy its resources with greater collective efficiency.

The Democrats have so far scarcely begun to match the Republicans' organizational capacity to effect a more efficient distribution of party resources. Democrats raise, in aggregate, just as much campaign money as Republicans, but very little of it passes through the hands of national party committees. They have begun to develop their own centralized direct-mail fundraising system, but it is a slow process and they remain far behind. Democratic fundraising is still almost entirely a matter of everyone for himself. And among potential Democratic candidates, recruitment still means self-recruitment.

Laissez-faire politics had coincided with years of Democratic electoral prosperity, and the shock of losing the Senate and many apparently "safe" House

[5] Larry Sabato, "Parties, PACs, and Independent Groups," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman Ornstein, eds., *The American Elections of 1982* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 97-98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seats in 1980 did not immediately overturn old assumptions. Indeed, it only frightened the remaining incumbents into hoarding an even greater share of the party's resources. This, combined with the Republicans' growing capacity to use campaign assets efficiently, probably saved the Republicans from electoral disaster in the 1982 election, which provides an excellent demonstration of how centralized control over resources can serve a party's collective interests and of how its absence can injure them.

The 1982 Election

Had the 1982 election followed the pattern of previous postwar midterm elections, the Republicans would have lost between forty and sixty House seats and at least a few Senate seats. The economy was in its worst postwar recession, and the Republican President's job performance rating in the preelection Gallup Poll (42 percent approving) was lower than that of any president since Harry Truman in 1946. Under these conditions, different models predicted Republican losses of varying magnitude,[6] but none came close to predicting accurately that Republicans would lose as few as twenty-six House seats while breaking even in the Senate.

The outcome was not the only major departure from previous patterns evident in 1982. Normally, national conditions sharply favoring one party over the other are strongly reflected in the distribution of the parties' campaign resources; the distribution of resources, in turn, reinforces the electoral effects of national conditions. Take 1974 as an example. Republicans, beset by recession and the legacy of Watergate, fielded inexperienced, underfinanced challengers. Democrats, on the offensive, attracted an unusual number of experienced challengers and funded them generously, as the data in Table 1 indicate. For the only time since accurate campaign finance data have been available, a party's challengers spent more, on average, than the party's incumbents. Democrats wound up with a net gain of forty-eight House seats over 1972; they also picked up five Senate seats.

Conditions were ripe for a similar Republican disaster in 1982, but neither party followed the usual script. First of all, Republicans recruited a much stronger group of challengers than would have emerged spontaneously given election-year conditions. Party officials recruited vigorously in 1981, when the administration was riding high and a rosy Republican future could be envisioned. They worked successfully to hold on to most of those who had signed

[6] Edward Tufte's well-known equation, combined with a standard seats/votes equation, predicted a Republican loss of fifty-eight House seats; see Gary C. Jacobson, "Reagan, Reaganomics, and Strategic Politics in 1982: A Test of Alternative Theories of Midterm Congressional Elections," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1-4 September 1983. Douglas Hibbs's alternative model, in which only the economy matters, predicted Republican losses of forty to sixty seats depending on the seats/votes equation or swing ratio adopted; see his "President Reagan's Mandate from 1980 Election: A Shift to the Right?" *American Politics Quarterly* 10 (October 1982): 387–420.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Average Campaign Expenditures of House Candidates, 1972–1980, by Party and Incumbency Status (in thousands of 1982 dollars)

Year and Party	Incumbents	Challengers	Open Seats
1972			
Democrats	115	70	234
Republicans	122	75	213
1974			
Democrats	91	117	204
Republicans	160	42	158
1976			
Democrats	136	77	248
Republicans	165	95	168
1978			
Democrats	167	107	320
Republicans	209	110	288
1980			
Democrats	196	81	223
Republicans	225	131	241
1982			
Democrats	254	116	259
Republicans	276	126	271

Note: Data include only candidates with major party opposition.

Source: Compiled by the author from data supplied by Common Cause (1972 and 1974) and the Federal Election Commission (1976–1982).

up even as conditions turned bleak. As a result, Republicans fielded their most experienced group of challengers since 1972. They also provided vicarious experience to the rest; the training program allowed them to recruit promising novices, who, with the proper instruction, were not without advantages in an era when politicians as a class were in disrepute. A Republican consultant, comparing the 1982 Republican challengers with those of 1974, claimed that "the candidates we had that year couldn't even be the drivers for this year's bunch."[7]

One reason Republicans managed to keep their recruits was that they could promise them well-financed campaigns despite the contrary national trends. Every Republican challenger showing any real possibility of winning could count on close to the maximum amount of help the national party could legally offer. Unlike their predecessors in 1974, the Republican challengers of 1982 could not complain that they had been written off by contributors as sure losers before the campaign even started. Table 1 offers evidence of this; the average Republican

[7] Adam Clymer, "Those Who Recruit Candidates Say Parties are Running About Even," *New York Times*, 8 March 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

challenger was almost as well funded in 1982 as in 1980, the latter on all counts a much better Republican year.

Largely in response to what the Republicans were doing, Democrats also departed from the patterns expected in what promised to be a good Democratic year. One traditional pattern did hold. After a slow start, Democrats had no trouble finding formidable challengers; the economy's precipitous decline inspired a large number of ambitious, experienced Democrats to attempt the move up to Congress. A postwar record of 42 percent of the Democratic House challengers had previously held elective office.[8] Experienced Democrats were especially likely to challenge Republicans first elected in 1980 and thus thought to have comparatively precarious holds on their districts; 60 percent of the freshman Republicans faced Democrats with experience in elective office. This is just the kind of individual response expected when national conditions make the Democrats' chances look bright.

But money did not flow into the campaigns of Democratic challengers in nearly the proportion expected in a good Democratic year. Compare the ratio of contributions to Democratic incumbents and challengers in Table 1; the ratio for 1982 is much closer to that for 1980 than to that for 1974. The reason is that Democratic incumbents, stunned by what had happened to some of their colleagues in 1980, and fearful of the resources Republican challengers appeared to be mobilizing against them for 1982, went on a fundraising binge. According to Martin Franks, executive director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), "Panic is not too strong a word to describe it. Even people who were traditionally safe went out and really raised money in Washington and around the country in a way that they haven't before."[9]

Much of this feverish fundraising activity took place in 1981 and in the first half of 1982, before the thrust of national conditions was fully apparent. But by the time Democratic incumbents felt secure enough to relax their fundraising efforts, they had absorbed so much of the available money that many otherwise promising challengers were unable to finance their campaigns adequately. Challengers were especially starved for funds during the critical summer months. At midsummer, the average Democratic incumbent had raised seven times as much money as the average Democratic challenger.[10]

In the end, many incumbent Democrats accumulated much more money than they needed. No fewer than thirty-two House Democrats had more than $100,000 left over after the campaign; their unspent funds alone amounted to more than $6.3 million.[11] But the party had no institutional means to redistribute any of

[8] Calculated from information on all House candidates in "Special Report: The 1982 Election," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 October 1982, 2477-2616.

[9] Adam Clymer, "Campaign Costs Up Sharply in 1982," *New York Times*, 3 April 1983.

[10] Dennis Farney and Brooks Jackson, "GOP Channels Money into Those Campaigns That Need It Most," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 October 1982.

[11] By no means were all of them unopposed conservative Southern Democrats, either; almost half this surplus was held by northern liberals and moderates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the surplus into the campaigns of promising challengers. The Republicans, with greater central control over campaign assets, could respond strategically to changing circumstances; the Democrats could not. This became crucial as economic conditions deteriorated. The 8 October 1982 announcement that unemployment had reached a postwar high of 10.1 percent had, in the words of Joseph R. Gaylord, then political director of the NRCC, "a devastating impact on Republican challengers. We saw people who in their survey research were within two or three points of a Democrat drop 15 or 18 points behind . . . . The same held true of a lot of incumbent areas, where we had members with 20- and 25-point leads who watched those evaporate down to six, seven, three."[12] According to his boss, Nancy Sinnott Dwight, "it was a disaster facing us, of major proportions—55 to 60 seats."[13]

The Republicans responded by rushing assistance to the newly endangered candidates. In every contest that seemed remotely close, Gaylord said, "We were on the phone asking 'What do you need? Is there anything we can do? Do you want to change the message?"[14] Using its authority to make coordinated expenditures for candidates, the committee produced television ads, bought television time, paid old campaign bills, and put out mailings; it spent $2.5 million in the last eighteen days of the campaign, all of it in the most doubtful contests.[15] It was a strategy aimed at minimizing losses; in the end, the party gave up on its challengers and focused instead on endangered incumbents and candidates for open seats who still had a chance.

The economy had given the Democrats a golden opportunity, but they were organizationally incapable of exploiting it. National Democratic committees had little to contribute, and Democratic incumbents who suddenly found themselves home free and flush with cash could not be persuaded to part with it. "By late September it was pretty clear that Democrats were moving like mad. The incumbents were safe, and our challengers were moving up," said one Democratic fundraiser. "But our [spending] decisions were already made, and once the money is out there, you can't get it back."[16]

A number of well-heeled House incumbents were reportedly asked to help the DCCC with surplus funds. Only two, Gillis Long of Louisiana (who had won reelection by winning the primary and wound up the campaign with more than $300,000 still in hand), and Charles Schumer of New York (who spent less than 40 percent of the half million dollars he raised in winning 80 percent of the vote against an obscure and hopelessly underfinanced challenger), responded favor-

[12] Phil Duncan, "Wealthy and Well-Organized GOP Panel Eyes 1984 Elections," *National Journal*, 2 July 1983, 1351.

[13] Adam Clymer, "The Economic Basis for 'Throwing the Bums Out' in the 1980 and 1982 American Elections," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1-4 September 1983, 5.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] John J. Fialka and Dennis Farney, "Democrats Trail GOP in Ability to Direct Cash to Closest Races," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 November 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3

The Distribution of Campaign Spending for House Candidates, 1982 (Incumbents and Challengers)



Republican Incumbents (26)	(27)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(22)
Democratic Incumbents (73)	(31)	(27)	(22)	(9)	(1)

ably. "One of the more depressing things," said another party fundraiser, "was the absence of selflessness out there."[17] But anything else would have been novel; for Democratic incumbents, it was business as usual.

What difference did the Republicans' superior national-level organization make? For one thing, they distributed their campaign money much more rationally. Figure 3 shows the average amount of total campaign money (direct contributions plus coordinated party spending) available to incumbents and challengers of both parties at various levels of competition (measured by the difference between the incumbent's and challenger's share of the two-party vote). There is, of course, a problem of simultaneity involved here; elections are closer in part *because* more money is spent; but the figures give a rough idea of the

[17] Ibid. Family ties, no less than party ties, were insufficient. Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, who finished the campaign with nearly $1 million unspent, refused to transfer any money to his cousin, Harriet Woods, who was giving Senator John C. Danforth of Missouri a stiff challenge. He did finally allow the party committee to give her $25,000 that had been earmarked for him, but by then it was too late. According to political scientist John Petrocik, who was polling for the Republicans, Woods was on her way to victory until her funds ran out and she disappeared from the television screen during the final few weeks of the campaign (personal conversation).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

connection between competition and spending, which is sufficient to make the point.

At every level of competition, there is a gap of more than $150,000 between the average amounts available to Democratic incumbents and challengers. Nearly a third of Democratic funds went to incumbents who won with more than 70 percent of the vote; this money is, from the party's perspective, almost completely wasted. On the Republican side, although some money was clearly wasted on safe incumbents (13 percent went to incumbents who won with more than 70 percent of the vote), in the more competitive contests, incumbents and challengers were, on average, given similar amounts of money at equivalent levels of competition. When we recall that, in general, a given amount of campaign spending benefits a challenger much more than an incumbent, the comparative inefficiency of the Democrats' distribution is even more striking. And remember that 1982 was the kind of year in which Democrats should logically have been on the offensive, going after seats held by Republicans, with the Republicans concentrating on defending them. The pattern here is more consistent with the opposite strategies.

National-level Republican party committees are largely, though not entirely, responsible for the more efficient distribution of funds among Republican candidates. This is evident from Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the distribution of party funds (contributions plus coordinated expenditures) in House races between incumbents and challengers by level of competition. (Notice that the figures are not to the same scale.) Aside from the obvious point that Republican committees could be much more generous to their candidates than could Democratic committees, the figure indicates that Republican were especially attentive to the needs of challengers; more party money was wasted on what turned out to be hopeless Republican challengers than on safe incumbents. The distribution for incumbents generally matches the hypothetical curve in Figure 1, with sharply higher amounts going to the tightest contests. Its shape reflects the extensive last-minute help given to threatened officeholders. The distribution for challengers is a consequence of the party's active early support for its most promising recruits.

The distribution of Democratic party money shows a small bias in favor of incumbents, but party committees were, on the whole, relatively more generous to challengers than were PACs or private contributors. The distribution of Democratic party money was also more efficient than the distribution of money from other sources; 73 percent of party funds went for campaigns that were won with less than 60 percent of the vote. But party committees controlled such a tiny share of the campaign money available to Democrats that they could do very little to enhance the overall efficiency of its distribution.

Indeed, with so little party money, even this distribution falls far short of true efficiency. Party contributions to Democratic incumbents in close contests amounted to little more than 2 percent of their campaign money and so could hardly have made a difference. The party would have been better off targeting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 4

The Distribution of Party Spending for House Candidates, 1982 (Incumbents and Challengers)



Republican Incumbents (26)		(27)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(22)
Democratic Incumbents (73)		(31)	(27)	(22)	(9)	(1)

its efforts narrowly; for example, had it concentrated its funds in the contests of the forty-four nonincumbent Democrats in very close contests (won or lost by margins of fewer than 10 percentage points), it could have spent about $32,000 on each, more than tripling the actual average party expenditure. Even narrower targeting, spending the maximum selectively on as many of these competitive candidates as funds allowed, would have represented the most efficient use of such limited party resources.

The party contribution patterns underline the importance of Republican party committee wealth. National committees of both parties target campaign resources a good deal more efficiently than do other contributors. They do, in other words, attend to collective party interests. But Republican committees, because they control so much money, can improve the overall efficiency of their party's campaign finances significantly; the relatively impoverished Democratic committees cannot.

The distribution of PAC funds, shown in Figure 5, supports the common belief that most PACs care more about access to winners, if not more tangible payoffs, than about influencing election results. Incumbents of both parties are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 5

The Distribution of PAC Contributions to House Candidates, 1982 (Incumbents and Challengers)



Republican Incumbents (26)	(27)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(22)
Democratic Incumbents (73)	(31)	(27)	(22)	(9)	(1)

well supplied with PAC money regardless of the electoral threat they face, though the amount does increase with increased competition, mainly because incumbents solicit funds more aggressively the more seriously they feel threatened.[18] Challengers are generally ignored by PACs unless they are very competitive, and even then they are not nearly so well supported as incumbents. (The sole piece of contrary evidence—the level of PAC contributions to "winning Republican challengers"—is based on a single individual). PAC contribution strategies are a major reason why campaign funds are, from the party's collective perspective, distributed so inefficiently. PAC strategies may, of course, be quite efficient for achieving the policy goals of PACs, but that is another matter.

Within this pattern, though, Republicans enjoy a more efficient distribution of PAC money than do Democrats. The gap between incumbents and challengers is smaller at every level of competition; 64 percent of Republican PAC money

[18] Gary C. Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 113–123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

went to candidates in races that were won with less than 60 percent of the vote; the comparable figure for Democrats is 42 percent. The main reason for this is that there were more Republican incumbents in these closer races—75, compared to 32 Democrats. But Republican-oriented PACs were also evidently more willing to invest in promising challengers. This is probably because the wealthiest ideological PACs, which show the strongest inclination to support nonincumbents,[19] are on the conservative side. Corporate PACs turned conspicuously defensive in 1982;[20] in 1980, 30 percent of their funds had gone to Republican challengers, 27 percent to Republican incumbents; for 1982 the equivalent figures were 12 percent and 44 percent.

The analysis so far has been confined to incumbents and challengers. There is, of course, a third category, candidates for open seats. Contests for open seats are generally competitive and so attract strong candidates and ample funds (see Table 1). Because it is easier to take seats from the other party when no incumbent stands in the way, efficient parties would concentrate resources in these races. Data comparable to that presented in Figures 3, 4, and 5 indicate that parties are efficient in this respect. Contributors of all kinds invest heavily in campaigns for open seats, particularly when the contest is close. But the pattern of contributions differs depending on whether the candidate turns out to be on the winning or losing side. Within their respective parties, winning candidates for open seats are, in retrospect, treated like incumbents; they are generously funded even when they win easily. Losing candidates for open seats are treated like challengers; they are amply funded only when competitive enough to come very close to victory. This follows naturally from PAC strategies and so is most evident in the distribution of PAC money. Both parties' committees treated open-seat candidates who were at all competitive as generously as their most competitive challengers; of course, this meant that Republican candidates for open seats enjoyed a huge advantage in party assistance.

Did the Republicans' more efficient deployment of party funds help them win congressional seats they would otherwise have lost? Officials of both parties think so. Their post-election consensus was that the RNCC's last minute help kept an additional ten to twenty House seats from going to the Democrats.[21] But the Democrats' failure to take advantage of their opportunities by backing promising challengers as conditions became more favorable is at least equally to blame.

Forty-seven Democratic challengers won at least 45 percent of the vote. Among them, 60 percent of those who spent at least $200,000 won; only 32 per-

[19] William P. Welch, "Patterns of Contributions: Economic and Ideological Interest Groups" in Herbert E. Alexander, ed., *Political Finance* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), 199–220.

[20] Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 100–101.

[21] Adam Clymer, "Campaign Funds Called a Key to Outcome of House Races," *New York Times*, 5 November 1982; Richard E. Cohen, "Giving Till It Hurts: 1982 Campaign Prompts New Look at Financing Races," *National Journal*, 18 December 1982, 2146.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cent of those who spent less than this amount were victorious. Late money apparently made a particular difference. Eighteen of the twenty-seven Democratic challengers (66 percent) in this category who reported spending more than $100,000 after September 30 won; only four of the twenty-three (17 percent) whose late spending amounted to less than $100,000 were successful.[22] Although skepticism is often warranted when challengers blame their failure solely on financial difficulties, many of the Democratic challengers who came close, but fell short, in 1982 can make a pretty solid case that an extra $50,000 or so would have put them in the House. With regard to the Senate, at least one Democratic fundraiser claimed that if money had gone to promising Democratic challengers in August, Democrats could have gained from three to five seats.[23] The claim is not farfetched. In 1982 as in 1980, Republicans won the close ones; a shift of 35,000 votes, properly distributed, would have given the Democrats control of the Senate.[24]

Although the Republicans' last minute efforts have attracted the most attention, their earlier work to recruit and finance strong challengers helped them materially to escape the full consequences of the recession. It alarmed incumbent Democrats, whose strong aversion to risk inspired frantic fundraising that absorbed most of the money available to Democrats. This made it harder for Democratic challengers to raise money early in the campaign and so condemned many of them to a slow start. Even after the threat to incumbents visibly subsided, so much Democratic money had already been committed that relatively little was left to help surging challengers. The party had neither the tradition of cooperation nor the institutional means to reallocate money for the sake of its collective interests—even when this would have incurred no risk to any incumbent. The Republicans' institutional strengths played to the Democrats' institutional weaknesses; this is a principal reason why the 1982 election was not a major disaster for Republicans.

AFTERMATH

The lessons of 1982 have not been lost on leaders of either party. Democrats are fully aware of their wasted opportunities; "the unwritten story of the 1982 election," said one, is "not that we won twenty-six seats, but it's why didn't we win forty?"[25] It is less clear what they can do about it.

Several features of the Democratic coalition make it difficult for the party to centralize campaign finance. Democrats are demographically much more diverse than Republicans; the party fields candidates with a far broader range of ideo-

[22] The data on late campaign spending are derived from Clymer, "The Economic Basis for 'Throwing the Bums Out'," tables 8 and 9.

[23] Fialka and Farney, "Democrats Trail GOP."

[24] Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, "Election '82: The Voters Send a Message," *Public Opinion* 5 (December/January 1983): 7.

[25] Fialka and Farney, "Democrats Trail GOP."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logical positions and policy preferences. Democratic contributors have far greater reason to care *which* particular Democrat receives the money and so to retain that decision for themselves. Organized labor, a major component of the coalition and a major source of campaign money for Democrats, presents another problem. A declining political force, labor has no incentive to weaken itself further by relinquishing control over any of its campaign resources.

The only thing that might unify Democrats in pursuit of collective party gains is opposition to a Republican administration; it is easier to agree on Republican misdeeds than on Democratic alternatives. But this leaves the party dependent on the administration's fortunes, by all evidence a very unreliable ally.

Democrats will also continue to have difficulty taking advantage of the quirk in the campaign finance law that allows a party to redistribute large sums of money from one campaign to another. Incumbents resist giving up unused funds for at least three reasons. First, they may have designs on higher office (usually the Senate) and plan to use the money to execute them. Second, a full war chest is thought to discourage strong future opposition and to be needed if it does not; career-minded members have to think about winning repeated elections, not simply the one they are currently facing.[26] Third, House members who were in Congress prior to 1980 may, upon retirement, simply pocket unused campaign funds. Senate rules forbid this; current House members were "grandfathered" out when the prohibition on personal use of campaign contributions was enacted in 1979.

A more general problem is the absence of any tradition of mutual aid among Democratic candidates. It is not impossible that one could develop; members of a highly fragmented Congress might well find it possible—and profitable—to win influence among future colleagues by helping to finance their campaigns. The California legislature offers an example of a system in which party leaders are chosen and supported for their ability to raise campaign money for party members. But at best, a tradition of intra-candidate redistribution will not emerge quickly.

Meanwhile, the party is limited to marginal improvements in its management of campaign resources. An example is the new Democratic Media Center which will, among other things, make campaign commercials for Democratic candidates at discount rates.[27] Many of its clients are expected to be nonincumbents. Another is the senatorial campaign committee's new rule that incumbents who get money from the party must return it if they finish the race with a surplus.[28] These things should help, but they are no substitute for what Democratic committees really need to pursue their collective party goals—control over much more money.

[26] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), chap. 6.

[27] Dudley Clendinen, "New Center Moves Democrats From Machine Age to TV Age," *New York Times*, 7 February 1984.

[28] Fialka and Farney, "Democrats Trail GOP."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Republican problems are of a different order. Party leaders naturally plan to do more of the same things that served them so well in 1982. By August of 1983, for example, the head of the congressional campaign committee was celebrating its success in recruiting candidates as the economy improved. "Even candidates who turned us down are beating on the door," he said, claiming that candidates had been recruited in seventy-one of the ninety districts targeted for special efforts in 1984.[29] The Republicans' problem is to find ways to spend more of the money that continues to arrive in ever increasing amounts. They developed their fundraising system in opposition, which is a clear advantage because direct mail appeals work best when they can play on fear and loathing of the current administration. But Republican fundraising is sufficiently institutionalized that it did not suffer when Republicans took control of the White House and Senate.

Republican party committees now have more than enough money to put the legal maximum into the campaign of any candidate having the remotest chance of winning. What can they do with the surplus? One obvious possibility is to conduct more extensive national campaigns along the lines of 1980's "Vote Republican, For a Change" and 1982's "Stay the Course." Another is to find new loopholes in the FECA through which partisan funds can be slipped into congressional campaigns. Senator H. John Heinz recently organized a "Republican National Independent Expenditure Committee" that plans to pour millions of dollars into congressional campaigns as "independent" expenditures, which cannot be limited by law.

The committee was deliberately organized to skirt the financial restrictions imposed on parties and candidates' organizations by the FECA. Such committees are forbidden to coordinate their spending with the party or campaign, but tacit coordination is impossible to prove or prevent. Republican party officials are unhappy with Heinz's activities, especially as he remains a member of the senatorial campaign committee and his independent committee's treasurer was, until a year ago, finance director of the party committee. Claims of independence may seem threadbare, and party officials fear legal repercussions.[30] But the independent route will become increasingly inviting as bulging Republican coffers run up against the FECA's contribution and spending restrictions.

From the Republicans point of view, the best solution would be an amendment to the FECA giving parties a much larger financial role in campaigns. This is an attractive idea even to less partisan observers, because it offers a way to offset the growing dependence of candidates on political action committees; better a member with obligations to the party than to "special interests." Surprisingly, some Democratic leaders also like the idea. Representative Tony L. Coelho, chairman of the Democrats' congressional campaign committee, favors lifting the ceiling on party contributions, albeit by increments so that Democrats have

[29] "Washington Wire," *Wall Street Journal*, 5 August 1983.

[30] Brooks Jackson, "Group Formed by Sen. Heinz Aims to Pour Money into GOP Races, Exceeding Limit," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 November 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time to catch up.[31] The specter of PACs overrunning the system may yet inspire Congress to unleash the parties. If it does, and if both parties attain central control over critical campaign resources and the autonomy to distribute them efficiently, congressional elections and politics could be profoundly reshaped. At the very least, a campaign finance system better suited to pursuing the party's collective goal of maximizing its victories than to keeping its incumbents safely in office would surely have some interesting ramifications.*

[31] Brooks Jackson, "The Problem With PACs," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 November 1982.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Weingart-Caltech Conference on the Institutional Context of Election, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, 16–18 February 1984. It has benefitted from the official comments of John Aldrich and Robert Erikson and the unofficial comments of many other participants in the conference; a special debt is owed to Samuel Kernell, with whom I have worked on most of these ideas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada

MICHAEL RUBNER

On the morning of 25 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced that 1,900 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers, joined by 300 troops from six Caribbean states, had launched a predawn assault on the island of Grenada.[1] The President explained that he had ordered the invasion for three reasons: to protect the nearly 1,000 American citizens—most of them medical students at St. George's University School of Medicine—whose lives had been allegedly jeopardized by actions of a military junta that had gained control of the island after a bloody coup a few days earlier;[2] to "forestall further chaos"; and "to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada."[3]

[1] The assault force included troops from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. All of these states, except for Barbados and Jamaica, are members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

[2] On 13 October 1983, Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest by an extremist clique led by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin. On 19 October, Bishop was freed by his supporters, only to be killed by Grenadian troops a few hours later. Austin then announced that he was heading a new military government and ordered a twenty-four hour, "shoot on sight" curfew. Useful discussion of the events culminating in the invasion can be found in Eldon Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theater," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Spring 1984): 625–647. See also Christopher Dickey, "Central America: From Quagmire to Cauldron?" *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1983): 688–690.

[3] The complete White House text of the President's statement is reproduced in "U.S. Military in

MICHAEL RUBNER is professor in the international relations program at James Madison College, Michigan State University. He specializes in U.S. foreign policy formulation and international security affairs and is the author of two monographs on the American role in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because of the unexpectedly stiff resistance by Cuban and Grenadian forces, the invading contingent was eventually augmented by approximately 4,000 American troops.[4] Following the successsful evacuation of U.S. citizens, the Pentagon announced on 2 November that armed hostilities had ceased and that American troop withdrawal would begin shortly.[5] In the meantime, the ruling military junta was dissolved and de facto authority devolved on the British-appointed Governor-General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon. By mid-November Scoon announced the appointment of a nine-person advisory council to help administer the island's affairs until a new government would be elected sometime in 1984.[6] On 15 December, the last U.S. combat forces departed Grenada, leaving 300 noncombat American servicemen to insure internal security and to train the 300 troops from neighboring Caribbean islands in maintenance of law and order.[7] Although relatively swift and ostensibly successful, the invasion led to substantial loss of life. According to the Pentagon, 18 American soldiers were killed and 116 were wounded. Cuban forces were estimated to have suffered 24 dead and 59 wounded, while Grenadian military casualties were put at 45 killed and 337 wounded.[8]

While much as been written about the events that precipitated the invasion, the military and political repercussions of the war, and the disputed legality of the venture under international law, there has been no systematic analysis of the nexus between the decision to invade Grenada and the 1973 War Powers Resolution. Passed over President Richard Nixon's veto on 7 November 1973, the War Powers Resolution established various procedures to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities."[9] This article addresses three questions: To what extent did the Reagan administration comply with the requirements stipulated in the War Powers Resolution? How did Congress respond to the administration's interpretation of its obligations under the War Powers Resolution? What can be learned from the Grenada episode about the utility of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for securing legislative participation in future decisions involving deployment of American forces abroad?

It should be stressed at the outset that Congress and the White House could not reach agreement on the ground rules under which the post-invasion debate

---

Grenada, Reagan, Charles Announce," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 October 1983, 2258–2259.

[4] *New York Times*, 29 October 1983.

[5] *New York Times*, 3 November 1983.

[6] Ed Magnuson, "Getting Back to Normal," *Time*, 21 November 1983, 16.

[7] *New York Times*, 16 December 1983.

[8] *New York Times*, 17 December 1983. According to official Cuban estimates, twenty-five Cuban and twenty-one Grenadian soldiers were killed during the fighting. Kurt Andersen, "Not All Sugar and Spice," *Time*, 28 November 1983, 21.

[9] Sec. 2(a), Public Law 93–148. The full text of the War Powers Resolution is reproduced in Robert F. Turner, *The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983), 143–147.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the War Powers Resolution was to be waged. Like its predecessors, the Reagan administration never acknowledged the constitutionality of the legislation. Yet while they resorted to circumlocutory rhetoric during the Grenada imbroglio, administration officials made their opposition to the 1973 Resolution increasingly clear in a series of statements shortly before and after the invasion.

For example, in July 1983, after the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act in *Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha*, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam contended that the *Chadha* decision also invalidated that section of the War Powers Resolution, 5(c), requiring the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from hostilities if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.[10] Similarly, when he reluctantly accepted a congressional resolution that invoked the War Powers Act and authorized the continued participation of U.S. Marines in the Multinational Force in Lebanon for eighteen months, Reagan stated on 12 October 1983 that his signature was "not to be viewed as any acknowledgement that the President's constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute."[11] Such assaults on the War Powers Resolution reached a climax in late March 1984, when Secretary of State George Shultz challenged the constitutionality of the entire act and told a Senate subcommittee that the administration's ability to conduct its foreign policy had been "constantly undermined" by congressional interference.[12]

On the other hand, bipartisan majorities have demonstrated continuous strong support in Congress for the 1973 resolution. The predominant congressional sentiment on the status of the legislation was most succinctly expressed by Senator Gary Hart (D-Col.) shortly after the start of the Grenadian invasion, when he noted that

> . . . the War Powers Act is still the law of the land and is still in full force and effect. It still binds all citizens of our country up to and including the President of the United States. And we expect the President, absent a change or repeal in that law, to obey it.[13]

In light of these diametrically opposed interpretations of the constitutionality

[10] Ellen C. Collier, Congressional Research Service, *The War Powers Resolution: A Decade of Experience*, Report No. 84–22 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 6 February 1984), 10. It should be emphasized that there is no consensus among legal scholars about the applicability of the *Chadha* decision to the War Powers Resolution. See Michael J. Glennon, "The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics than Law," *American Journal of International Law* 78 (July 1984): 577–78; Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., "The War Powers Resolution: Resolving the Dilemma," *SAIS Review* 5 (Winter/Spring 1985): 47; and I.M. Destler, "Dateline Washington: Life After the Veto," *Foreign Policy* 52 (Fall 1983): 181–186.

[11] *New York Times*, 13 October 1983.

[12] *New York Times*, 3 April 1984. While giving tentative approval to the idea of having the U.S. Supreme Court rule on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, Secretary Shultz suggested in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary that a preferred alternative would be for Congress and the White House to reach a "common sense" solution on this issue. See *New York Times*, 29 March 1984.

[13] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14869.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the 1973 law and because of various ambiguities within the statute, an acrimonious dispute between the executive and legislative branches following the invasion of Grenada was inevitable.

CONSULTATIONS

Section 3 of the 1973 War Powers Resolution stipulates that "The President *in every possible instance* shall consult with Congress *before* introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."[14] The President is also enjoined to consult regularly with Congress until the forces cease to engage in hostilities or are removed from such situations. There can be no doubt that the invasion of Grenada was one type of situation that the framers had in mind when they inserted the consultation requirement in the War Powers Resolution. After all, the invading forces were engaged in fierce combat as soon as they landed on the island, and twelve Cuban soldiers and two American Marines were killed during the first ten hours of the operation.[15] Hence, the basic issue that needs to be ascertained is the extent to which the Reagan administration complied with the consultation clause.

From the very beginning, administration officials claimed that the White House had fully met its legal obligations to consult Congress about U.S. troop deployment in Grenada. For example, during hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 October 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam asserted that "there was consultation with the leadership—bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate." Responding to persistent questioning by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), Dam insisted that "we did consult to the maximum degree consistent with the safeguarding of American lives, both military and civilians."[16] However, a careful reconstruction of the sequence of events that took place immediately before and after the decision to invade had been reached clearly shows that the Reagan administration circumvented the requirement to consult with Congress before deploying troops in Grenada.

Several sources confirm that the final order permitting U.S. forces to proceed with the invasion was issued by President Reagan around 6 P.M. on Monday, 24 October 1983.[17] About two to three hours later, a bipartisan group of five congressional leaders, including House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.), House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Tex.), House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), Senate Majority Leader Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.), and Senate

[14] Turner, *War Powers Resolution*, 143. (Emphasis added.)

[15] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983.

[16] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Situation in Grenada*, Hearing. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 27 October 1983, 11.

[17] Ibid. See also *New York Times*, 26 October 1983; Michael J. Russell, "The War Powers Resolution: An Act Facing 'Imminent Hostilities' A Decade Later," *Vanderbilt Journal of International Law* 16 (Fall 1983): 1009; Ed Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada," *Time*, 7 November 1983, 28; Ralph Kinney Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy of a 'Go' Decision," *Readers' Digest*, February 1984, 76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), was quietly whisked into the White House.[18] The congressmen were then briefed by the President about the imminent invasion. According to various accounts by those present at that meeting, congressional advice was not solicited nor did any meaningful consultations take place. Speaker O'Neill, for example, admitted that "we weren't asked for advice," adding that "we were informed what was taking place."[19] Likewise, Senator Baker acknowledged on the Senate floor that

> I was with the minority leader at the White House on Monday night when the President called in the joint bipartisan leadership to advise us of this operation in advance. I use the term "advise" because it is true that we were not consulted in the sense that there was no solicitation of opinion, but we were told of it in advance, for which I am grateful.[20]

Senator Byrd concurred, expressing concern that

> . . . the administration only tells the Senate after the administration makes its decision. It informs us then that it is going to do this and that. It does not ask for the advice of the Senate through the Senate leadership . . . . I think we are entitled to more than that.[21]

None of the legislators present at the Monday evening session raised any objections to the operation, and at the end of the meeting, Speaker O'Neill reportedly turned to Reagan and said: "God bless you, Mr. President. And good luck."[22] On Tuesday, 25 October, at approximately 8:15 A.M., the President briefed the entire congressional leadership on the invasion that had begun about three hours earlier.[23] There is no evidence that additional executive-legislative "consultations" ever took place on any aspect of the Grenada invasion while the operation was being carried out.

The record thus suggests that the Reagan administration violated both the letter and spirit of Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution. It should be emphasized that during deliberations on the 1973 Resolution, the House Foreign Affairs Committee devoted much attention to the meaning of "consultation" as used in Section 3 and unequivocally rejected the notion that consultation was equivalent to mere transmission of information. In its 1973 report, the committee stated that "consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that members of Congress are being asked by the

[18] Richard Whittle, "Questions, Praise Follow Grenada Invasion," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 October 1983, 2221.

[19] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983.

[20] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14912.

[21] Ibid., 14913.

[22] Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada," 28.

[23] Bennett, "Grenada," 77. At least one source claims that this meeting took place at approximately 6:30 A.M., about one hour after the start of the invasion. See Russell, in "The War Powers Resolution," 1009.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President for their advice and opinions."[24] Furthermore, since the stated intent of the resolution is to secure the collective judgment of both Congress and the president in decisions involving the introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities, it cannot be reasonably argued that merely briefing a group of legislators about imminent action based on a decision that had already been finalized qualifies as applying the judgment of Congress to such decision. This argument was articulated most emphatically by Senator Pell during the Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the situation in Grenada, when he pointed out that "there is a world of difference between being consulted and being asked do we think this is wise or not, or being informed, saying we are doing this at 5 A.M. tomorrow."[25]

In defense of the Reagan administration's behavior, it might be argued that the phrase requiring consultation "in every possible instance" was deliberately inserted into Section 3 in order to provide the president discretion concerning the feasibility, form, and timing of consultation with Congress. Indeed, several scholars have suggested that the physical inability to communicate with key legislators, the need for an immediate reaction to an emergency, and the fear that sensitive information would be leaked, might render prior consultation with Congress impossible or undesirable and that the ultimate decision in such cases rests with the president.[26] It is apparent, however, that none of the circumstances that might have reasonably recused President Reagan from the obligation to consult Congress was present in the case at hand.

First, Congress was in session in October 1983 and legislative leaders were physically available in Washington for meetings with the President. Furthermore, the sequence of events leading to the ultimate decision to deploy U.S. troops leaves no doubt whatsoever that there had been ample opportunity and sufficient time for meaningful executive-legislative deliberations before acting. According to administration officials, discussions on the use of military force in Grenada were initiated with friendly Caribbean states as early as 15 October 1983.[27] Two days later, President Reagan gave the go-ahead for the planning of a noncombatant evacuation operation in Grenada to an interagency group with representatives from the State Department, CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of Defense.[28] On 20 October, the National Security Council's Special Situation Group, chaired by Vice President George Bush, drew up a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) instructing the Joint Chiefs to plan for both a noncombatant evacuation of Americans and a complete military seizure of the island. The NSDD was initialed by the President on Friday,

[24] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House Rep. 287, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973. Cited in Robert Zutz, "The Recapture of the S.S. *Mayaguez*: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolution," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 8 (Winter 1976): 468.

[25] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Situation in Grenada*, 11.

[26] John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemma*, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 69–70. See also Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 465.

[27] *New York Times*, 30 October 1983.

[28] Bennett, "Grenada," 72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

21 October.[29] Perhaps the best proof for the contention that up to this point the situation in Grenada was not viewed as a crisis requiring immediate action is provided by the fact that Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane left Washington later that very evening for a weekend of rest at the Augusta National Golf Club in Georgia.[30]

The decision to refine the NSDD by transforming it into an action plan to "land U.S. and allied Caribbean military forces in order to take control of Grenada no later than Tuesday" (25 October) was made at a meeting of the Special Situation Group, in which the President, Shultz, and McFarlane participated via a telephone hookup, on Saturday, 22 October.[31] It was the disaster at Marine barracks in the outskirts of Beirut that brought the President and his entourage back to Washington early Sunday, 23 October, and after two lengthy meetings with his top advisers, Reagan gave his tentative approval to the modified NSDD later that evening.[32] The invasion plans were refined in a meeting between the President, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the JCS on Monday afternoon, and it was only *after* the President had sent a cable to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher advising her of his impending decision, and *after* he had signed the final directive ordering the invasion, that he met with the bipartisan congressional leadership.[33] Since the planning for deployment of U.S. forces in Grenada stretched over several days rather than a few hours, any claim that the White House did not have the necessary time to seek congressional advice remains totally unpersuasive.

There is some evidence that the administration made an effort to maintain a facade of normalcy while planning for the operation proceeded apace. That might explain why the President deliberately decided to stay in Augusta on Saturday, 22 October, several hours after the request for American military intervention had been relayed from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to Shultz.[34] The concern for maximizing secrecy would also explain why the bipartisan congressional leadership group was brought into the White House basement through the Old Executive Office Building on the eve of 24 October. However, whether the fear of premature leaks was a legitimate excuse for avoiding prior consultation with Congress remains a highly debatable proposition for several reasons.

First, the secrecy of the plan may have been already compromised by reports in the Caribbean press and on Grenadian radio more than two days before the invasion that such an operation was being planned by Caribbean leaders. Second, on 28 October, Wesley L. McDonald, commander of U.S. forces in the Atlantic region, acknowledged that the Cubans had known that "U.S. interven-

[29] Ibid., 74.
[30] Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada," 27.
[31] Bennett, "Grenada," 74.
[32] Whittle, "Questions, Praise Follow Grenada Invasion," 2224.
[33] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983.
[34] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion was likely" and that they had prepared for it.[35] Third, after a meeting with President Reagan in Washington on 6 November, Jamaica's Prime Minister, Edward Seaga, revealed that General Hudson Austin, the leader of the Grenadian junta before the invasion, had been told of the invasion plan nearly thirty-six hours before it was carried out.[36] The White House never challenged this claim. Finally, and most importantly, Reagan and his closest advisers may have fallen prey to the dubious assumption that consultation with a small group of legislative leaders is necessarily more dangerous to national security than are discussions between the President and members of his staff and cabinet. The prevalent belief that the executive branch enjoys an inherent monopoly over the ability to maintain secrecy was challenged on the Senate floor by Minority Leader Byrd, who noted that

> There are few people, there are at least a few who can keep a secret here, and I would say that the Senate can be trusted as much as the Defense Department can be or the State Department can be or the White House can be to keep a secret.[37]

The exclusion of Congress from prior consultation in violation of Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution had two major consequences. First, it invited both opponents and supporters of the invasion in Congress to criticize the decision on purely procedural grounds and to assert the institutional prerogatives of Congress. For example, Representative Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.) reminded the White House that

> . . . the law reads "in any case, the President shall consult with Congress. In any case." It does not say in some cases. It does not say in all cases except Grenada. It does not say in all cases except when the Cubans are involved. It says the President shall consult with the Congress in all cases.[38]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Representative Robert W. Edgar (D-Pa.), who lamented that "the President failed to adequately consult Congress in planning and executing the invasion," and by Representative Mervyn M. Dymally (D-Calif.), who complained that "once again the Congress of the United States was in on the landing, but not the takeoff."[39] Likewise, Representative Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), one of the authors of the War Powers Resolution and a supporter of the invasion, stated that he was "deeply distressed that the law was not

[35] *New York Times*, 6 November 1983. According to another report, the State Department informed the Cuban government a few hours before the invasion that the assault was imminent, assuring Castro that the operation was not aimed at Cuban civilians in Grenada. The Pentagon was reportedly dismayed by this tip-off. See Ed Magnuson, "Now to Make It Work," *Time*, 14 November 1983, 23.

[36] *New York Times*, 7 November 1983.

[37] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14913.

[38] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Grenada War Powers: Full Compliance Reporting and Implementation*. Markup on H.J. Res. 402, 27 October 1983. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 12.

[39] U.S. Congress, House, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 26 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:8639, 8644.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complied with so that the Congress could have also shared in the responsibility of this commitment of U.S. troops and lives."[40]

Second, and more significantly, by leaving Congress completely out in the cold, the White House may have deprived itself of a potentially useful source of advice in the policy formation phase. Long after the last U.S. combat forces had left Grenada, some basic questions about the wisdom of the invasion decision remain unanswered: Were American lives in fact threatened by actions of the Revolutionary Military Council in Grenada before the invasion? Why did the administration ignore assurances from the military junta that Americans on the island were not in danger and that they would be permitted to leave if they so desired?[41] If evacuation of civilians was indeed necessary, could it have been accomplished without the use of force through assistance of intermediaries or with the help of the Red Cross? Did concern for the safety of American lives justify the overthrow of the Grenadian government and takeover of the entire island in apparent violation of the United Nations and Organization of American States (OAS) charters? Could the security of the allegedly-threatened Caribbean states have been enhanced by interposing American naval forces in the area? Was it prudent to proceed without prior consultation with major U.S. allies?[42]

Ordinarily, such pointed questions would have been raised in the predecision stage by State Department officials, who are led by traditional bureaucratic orientations to urge caution and to search for alternative diplomatic options in crisis situations. In this instance, however, a strange bureaucratic role reversal took place, as the main impetus for a large-scale military operation came from State Department diplomats, while the Defense Department and the JCS were urging delay, further study, and restraint. Specifically, as early as 17 October, officials from the Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, backed by Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, began pressing for military contingency planning for an evacuation operation in Grenada, while representatives from the JCS refused to even acknowledge the need for such planning.[43] At the following interagency meeting two days later, the military personnel reluctantly agreed to discuss a limited action to evacuate Americans from Grenada, while State Department officials argued strongly for military takeover of the entire island. The JCS and Weinberger continued to urge caution with respect to Grenada following the murderous onslaught against the U.S. Marines barrack in Beirut on 23 October.[44] According to one senior official, the JCS "were dismayed by what happened in Beirut that morning, and were not

[40] Ibid., 8691.

[41] These assurances were contained in a note received by the U.S. embassy in Barbados on 24 October, a day before the invasion. See Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada," 28.

[42] For a cogent treatment of these issues, see Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theater," 635–647.

[43] *New York Times*, 7 November 1983.

[44] Secretary Weinberger's conservative posture in this instance is consistent with at least one of the six criteria that he subsequently outlined for weighing decisions on deployment of American troops abroad: namely, that "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort [to be] used only when other means have failed." *New York Times*, 29 November 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the mood to get into another situation where we would take additional casualties."[45] Secretary of State Shultz, on the other hand, reportedly convinced the President to "strike while the iron is hot."[46]

Under these unusual and tense circumstances, it is likely that the President's team could have benefited from continuous consultation with congressional leaders. If nothing else, a select group of legislators, considerably less strongly attached to vested bureaucratic stakes, would have been in an ideal position to raise sharp questions about the reasonableness of competing objectives and the costs and benefits of various alternative options. Such additional input from an external source might have prevented the premature foreclosure of options, could have altered the terms of the debate, and might even have tipped the scales in favor of the Pentagon's more restrained and conservative posture. It is a tragic, yet telling fact, that in attempting to ascertain the likely impact that congressional participation might have had on the quality of the final decision in this case, one is necessarily compelled to rely on speculation.

Reporting and Triggering the Sixty-Day Clock

Section 4(a) of the 1973 War Powers Resolution stipulates that in the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which American armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," or "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat," or "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation," the president must submit within forty-eight hours a written report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. Such report must identify the circumstances compelling the deployment of armed forces, the constitutional and legislative authority under which such deployment is taking place, and the estimated scope and length of the hostilities or military involvement. The president is further required to submit periodic reports to the Congress on the status of hostilities and their anticipated duration so long as U.S. forces continue to be engaged. Section 5(b) stipulates that within sixty days after a report is submitted pursuant to Section 4(a) (1), the president must terminate deployment of U.S. forces, unless Congress has declared war or has specifically authorized such deployment, extended the sixty day period by law, or is unable to meet as a result of an attack on the U.S. The sixty-day period may be extended up to thirty additional days if the president determines and certifies to Congress in writing that such extension is necessary for safe and prompt removal of troops. The president is compelled to terminate such deployment at any time if Congress so directs him by concurrent resolution.[47]

[45] *New York Times*, 7 November 1983.

[46] Walter Isaacson, "Weighing the Proper Role," *Time*, 7 November 1983, 44.

[47] Turner, *War Powers Resolution*, 144–145.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the afternoon of 25 October 1983, less than twelve hours after U.S. forces had landed in Grenada, President Reagan sent a written report to Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), president pro tem of the Senate, and to House Speaker O'Neill. Claiming to be "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," the letter notified Congress that approximately 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel, supported by some 300 troops from Jamaica, Barbados, and various OECS members, had begun landing on Grenada at about 5:00 A.M. The objectives of the operation were identified as "assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States citizens."[48] The President noted that the deployment was being undertaken "pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations, and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces."[49] The report also stated that because "it is not possible at this time" to predict the duration of deployment, "our forces will remain only so long as their presence is required."[50]

Thus, President Reagan had seemingly complied with the reporting provisions of Section 4(a).[51] His report was filed with the designated congressional leaders well within the specified deadline, described the conditions that prompted the invasion and identified its objectives, cited the constitutional authority on which the decision was based, and while being imprecise about the duration of the operation, at least contained a commitment to terminate it promptly. In fact, however, Reagan's report opened a Pandora's box.

First, the President notified Congress that he was filing the report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" instead of acknowledging that he was "informing Congress on this matter *under* the War Powers Resolution."[52] Critics of the President in both the House and Senate became necessarily alarmed by his deliberate choice of words because the "consistent with" formula had been used by Reagan himself in the case of Lebanon and by his predecessors to avoid conceding the validity of the War Powers Resolution.[53]

Second, the President's letter did not state explicitly that U.S. troops landing in Grenada were being introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."[54] This proved to be a crucial omission because pursuant to Section 5(b), it is only the

[48] The complete text of the President's report may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 26 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14610.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] The argument that the historic pattern of "implied compliance" was also repeated in the case of Grenada is strongly advanced by Christopher Madison, "Despite His Complaints, Reagan Going Along with Spirit of War Powers Law," *National Journal*, 19 May 1984, 989–993.

[52] See comments by Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.), House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Grenada War Powers*, 15. (Emphasis added.)

[53] See comments by Gary Hart (D-Col.), U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14875.

[54] Comments by Zablocki, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Grenada War Powers*, 1.

LICENSED TO OUP.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

submission of a "hostilities" report under Section 4(a)(1) that triggers the automatic sixty-day termination provision. Because none of the other reports required by Section 4 set the sixty-day clock ticking, and because Reagan failed to specify which type of report he was filing, considerable ambiguity emerged on the question of whether the sixty-day time limit had been automatically invoked by his report.[55]

Third, the resulting confusion was further compounded by the administration's reluctance to provide a clear and unequivocal indication that it intended to comply with the War Powers Resolution. Thus, when he was asked by Senator Pell, "Do you consider the time clock running now under the War Powers Resolution?" Deputy Secretary of State Dam kept running in circles, finally admitting that "the administration does not have a view to express on that position, and, therefore, I cannot give you an administration answer."[56] Such nebulous responses, coupled with Reagan's failure to cite any specific provision of the 1973 Resolution or to indicate a termination date, eventually convinced substantial majorities in Congress that the central issue raised by the President's report was "whether the executive branch alone is going to be able to place forces of this country into hostilities indefinitely without coming to the Congress of the United States as the War Powers Act requires."[57]

That issue was addressed directly by Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.) on 26 October 1983, when he introduced H.J. Res. 402, declaring that Congress "determines that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, when United States Forces were introduced into Grenada."[58] The measure intended to eliminate confusion by declaring that the sixty-day time limit had been triggered by the President's report. After it refused to accept an amendment by Representative George W. Crockett (D-Mich.) that would have required the President to withdraw American forces from Grenada no later than 24 November 1983, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Zablocki measure on 27 October by a lopsided vote of 33 to 2.[59] On 1 November, following a brief and perfunctory floor debate, H.J. Res. 402 was adopted by the full House by vote of 403 to 23. The measure was supported by 256 Democrats and 147 Republicans.[60]

Language identical to H.J. Res. 402 was also introduced by Senator Gary Hart (D-Col.) in the form of an amendment to a bill increasing the national debt ceiling. It was approved by the Republican-controlled Senate on 28 October in

[55] Glennon, "War Powers Resolution," 572.

[56] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Situation in Grenada*, 10.

[57] Comments by Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14870.

[58] U.S. Congress, House, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 26 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:8697.

[59] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Grenada War Powers*, 22–32.

[60] Richard Whittle, "Congress Examines Causes, Costs of Grenada," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 5 November 1983, 2292. For the breakdown of the vote, see ibid., 2326–2327.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a bipartisan vote of 64 to 20.[61] However, on 31 October, the version of the debt limit bill containing the Hart amendment was defeated, and the amendment itself was eventually omitted from the final debt limit bill that was approved by the House-Senate conference committee on 17 November.[62] On the following day Congress adjourned without passing any joint legislation that would have invoked the War Powers Resolution in reference to the invasion of Grenada. Senate Minority Leader Byrd described the actions of both chambers on this issue "like two ships passing in the night," noting that "the Senate acted on one vehicle; the House of Representatives acted on another. But both houses have acted 'finding' that the War Powers Act sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) have been triggered."[63] Thus, in the strictly legal sense, Reagan was taken off the hook by a procedural impasse.

Perhaps the most instructive conclusion to be drawn from the debate over H.J. Res. 402 is that the extremely brief yet heated exchanges in the House and Senate focused almost exclusively on questions of institutional prerogatives rather than on the wisdom of the decision to invade Grenada. As the following excerpts show, one legislator after another sought to drive a wedge between procedural and substantive issues, insisting that it was imperative to concentrate on the former at the expense of the latter:

> Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.): The resolution is not, nor is it intended to be, critical of the President or his action in ordering the invasion of Grenada. House Joint Resolution 402 does not pass judgment on this action.[64]
>
> Rep. Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-Calif.): It is important to emphasize that the purpose of this resolution is not to determine the merits of the President's actions. It is merely to establish that the timeclock is running . . . .[65]
>
> Sen. Gary Hart (D-Col.): This amendment has nothing to do with whether we should be there at all. It does not raise the question of whether the U.S. citizens' lives or security or safety were in danger. It does not . . . question the authority of the President to have done what he did . . . . Whether we disagree or agree with the policy, whether or not we think it is wise, the issue is, will the President be bound by the laws of the United States or will he not? That is the only issue.[66]

The President's report thus provided additional impetus for the congressional penchant to transform substantive issues into controversies over procedures and institutional rights. As a result, the merit of Reagan's decision to invade Grenada never received the close legislative scrutiny that it surely deserved.

Questions may also be raised about the extent to which the White House com-

[61] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14876. The affirmative votes came from 39 Democrats and 25 Republicans.

[62] Ibid., 17 November 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:16593.

[63] Ibid.

[64] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Grenada War Powers*, 1.

[65] U.S. Congress, House, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 31 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:8888.

[66] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14869.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plied with its obligation to keep Congress informed of developments in Grenada after the start of hostilities. The administration did send one additional report to Speaker O'Neill and Senate President pro tem Thurmond on 9 November 1983, informing Congress that U.S. military forces on the island had been reduced to 2,700. It also claimed that it was still not possible to predict the precise withdrawal date for the remaining troops and promised that American servicemen will continue to withdraw as their functions are gradually taken over by a peacekeeping force composed of units from neighboring Caribbean states.[67] At other times, however, the administration was much less forthcoming with information. For example, even after being briefed by intelligence officials in a closed session on 31 October, several House members complained of being kept in the dark. Representative Gerry E. Studds (D-Mass.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who had attended the meeting, stated that "it reminded me of how little we know . . . . They didn't satisfy anyone. They didn't even satisfy friendly Republicans who support the policy and asked leading questions.[68] Likewise, while admitting that the administration had responded to his earlier requests for details about White House deliberations before the invasion, Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) complained that the replies had still left "voids."[69]

It must also be noted that the administration barred journalists from Grenada until the third day of the invasion, thereby depriving Congress and the American public of vital details at a crucial stage of the operation. And it was because "the media [had] been substantially restricted from obtaining and providing detailed information concerning the situation in Grenada" that Minority Leader Byrd proposed appointing a Senate fact-finding mission to visit the island and to submit a factual report as soon as possible.[70] While Byrd argued that such firsthand information was essential to enable the Senate to meet its responsibilities pursuant to provisions of the War Powers Resolution, the administration resisted this idea because of the "logistics" involved and because "we're trying to avoid the aura of any long-term commitment" to Grenada.[71] The legislative branch eventually prevailed and between 4–8 November, three congressional delegations visited Grenada: a fourteen-member bipartisan House group headed by Majority Whip Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.) and Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, a

[67] Russell, "War Powers Resolution," 1008; *New York Times*, 10 December 1983.

[68] *New York Times*, 1 November 1983.

[69] On 18 November 1983, Ronald Dellums introduced a resolution "directing the president to furnish certain information to the House with respect to U.S. activities regarding Grenada." U.S. Congress, House, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 18 November 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:10582. On 7 February 1984, the resolution was sent to the floor with a negative recommendation after the Foreign Affairs Committee had voted 17 to 7 not to support it. Most committee members were reportedly opposed to reliance on the rarely-used resolution of inquiry in this instance, claiming that this type of procedure should be reserved for more important(!) investigations of executive policies. See "Grenada Resolution," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 11 February 1984, 288.

[70] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 31 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:14970.

[71] Whittle, "Congress Examines Causes, Costs of Grenada," 2293.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

team of four Republican House members sponsored by the National Defense Council, and a one-person mission carried out by Senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.).[72] An uninhibited flow of information between the White House and Capitol Hill would have obviated the need for such missions.

Implications and Conclusions

In the aftermath of Grenada, Congress has four options with respect to the 1973 War Powers Resolution. It can repeal the resolution, accept the status quo, enforce the existing legislation more vigorously, or amend the resolution. Entirely different implications flow from each of these alternatives.

Repeal of the legislation has been favored by conservatives who claim that such legislative restrictions on the president's power as commander-in-chief are unconstitutional, impractical, and dangerous because they deny the chief executive maximum flexibility in times of crisis. It is for these reasons that a bill for repeal of the War Powers Resolution was introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) on 31 October, shortly after the fighting in Grenada had subsided.[73] However, in justifying this measure, Goldwater did not make a single reference to the Grenadian venture, perhaps because he could not find a shred of evidence that in this instance the legislation constituted "a dangerous impediment to taking necessary actions in defense of the freedoms of our citizens and the security of our Nation . . . ."[74]

While repeal might indeed avoid a serious constitutional confrontation in a future international crisis, the fact remains that the War Powers Resolution is the only potentially effective legal mechanism currently available to insure some legislative participation in decisions involving use of American forces in hostilities in the absence of a formal declaration of war. Ultimately, one wonders whether conservatives of Goldwater's persuasion would be content to rely on congressional appointment, appropriations, and impeachment powers as the sole checks against a chief executive bent on using American forces against right-wing regimes in undeclared wars.

Acceptance of the status quo, on the other hand, carries the risk that White House occupants will continue to circumvent the law by excluding Congress from prior consultations in crisis situations, with the resulting loss of potentially useful legislative input before critical decisions are made final. Furthermore, as the Grenada episode clearly demonstrates, semantic ambiguities in the present law fail to insure the automatic triggering of time limits on American troop deployments in hostilities and shift the burden of invoking such limits from the White House, where it had been originally lodged, back to Congress. As a result, legislators are forced to waste precious time on procedural issues and institu-

[72] John Felton, "After the Invasion: Support Widens on the Hill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 November 1983, 2360-2361.

[73] U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 31 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:15082.

[74] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional prerogatives, while the substantive merit of presidential policies remains largely unexamined.

Current executive practice and legal ambiguities notwithstanding, Congress could attempt to enforce stricter compliance with the War Powers Resolution through various means that are theoretically available to it. For example, in the absence of a prior declaration of war, Congress could pass a concurrent resolution urging immediate withdrawal of armed forces from hostilities. Furthermore, as Robert Zutz has pointed out, Congress could also seek a court injunction to prevent the president from acting until he complies with existing legislation.[75] Confronting a defiant chief executive, Congress could also vote to bar expenditure of funds needed to finance presidentially initiated military ventures. As a last resort, Congress could impeach a president for violating the law.

Indeed, attempts to exploit such Congressional prerogatives were initiated by various legislators in the case of Grenada. It is instructive, however, that all of these efforts ended in utter failure. For example, on 27 October 1983, Representative Dymally, who was joined by sixteen Democratic colleagues, introduced a concurrent resolution that "expressed the sense of the Congress that the United States should recognize the right of the people of Grenada to territorial integrity, calling upon the President immediately to remove United States Armed Forces from Grenada."[76] The measure was forwarded to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs where it died. On the following day, Representative Don Edwards (D-Calif.) introduced a joint resolution, cosponsored by nine Democrats and nine Republicans, "declaring that the President violated the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress to declare war when he ordered United States Armed Forces to invade Grenada on 25 October 1983, and requiring the immediate withdrawal" of these forces from the island.[77] This resolution was never reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. On 10 November, Representative Theodore S. Weiss (D-N.Y.) introduced a resolution calling for the impeachment of Ronald Reagan for "the high crime or misdemeanor of ordering the invasion of Grenada in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and other high crimes and misdemeanors ancillary thereto."[78] This measure, too, died in the House Judiciary Committee.

In addition, eleven members of Congress sought a court injunction ordering the President to remove American troops from Grenada and requesting judicial determination that the invasion was unconstitutional because it had violated the power of Congress to declare war. However, the court denied jurisdiction in this case because the injunction would have forced the judiciary to "unnecessarily and unwisely interfere with the legislative process and raise significant separation of powers concerns."[79] It should be noted that the Congress made no attempt

[75] Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 472.
[76] U.S. Congress, House, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 27 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:8779.
[77] Ibid., 28 October 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:8849.
[78] Ibid., 10 November 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:9706.
[79] Russell, "War Powers Resolution," 1013–1014.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to deny funds for the Grenada operation, and as will be argued and demonstrated below, such a move would not have received the necessary legislative support even if it had been initiated.

The Grenada episode makes perfectly clear that it is not the absence of constitutional or legal powers that prevents effective enforcement of the War Powers Resolution. Rather, in this as well as in previous cases in which the legislation had been violated, Congress was unwilling to secure strict compliance with the law because it was severely constrained by political circumstances over which it had very little control.

First, in the absence of full information, overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both the House and Senate readily accepted the President's description of the invasion as an essential rescue operation and were willing to support it on the sole condition that American forces would be pulled out as soon as the evacuation and the other stated objectives had been achieved. Indeed, from the very beginning and throughout the Grenadian venture, Congress was continually bombarded with a steady stream of assurances from the White House that U.S. troops would be deployed for an extremely short duration, falling well within the sixty-day limit stipulated in the War Powers Resolution. For example, on 25 October, Secretary of State Shultz announced that "our troops will leave as soon as they possibly can . . . . I think they will be leaving very very promptly."[80] On 28 October, President Reagan stated in his nationally televised address that "it's our intention to get our men out as soon as possible."[81] At his press conference on 3 November, the President insisted that the operation was "a successful rescue mission" and proclaimed that "our objectives have been achieved and as soon as the logistics permit, American personnel will be leaving."[82] And on 16 November, the administration announced that U.S. combat troops would be withdrawn by 23 December.[83] Given this constant barrage of promises and concrete evidence of gradual troop removal, it should not come as a surprise that most members of Congress opted for a "wait and see" posture. Eventually, the last American combat forces were withdrawn on the forty-ninth day of the operation, thus rendering compliance with the sixty-day time limit a moot issue.

Second, any potentially massive legislative criticism of presidential conduct was simply suppressed as events in the Grenadian drama kept unfolding. First, the publication of pictures of returning medical students kissing American soil, together with the nearly unanimous praise for the invasion by the evacuees, convinced even the more ardent congressional skeptics that the President's swift decision had been fully justified, even if it did not strictly adhere to the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.[84] Such sentiments were further reinforced by the administration's claim that U.S. forces in Grenada had discovered huge

[80] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983.
[81] Ibid., 29 October 1983.
[82] Ibid., 4 November 1983.
[83] Ibid., 17 November 1983.
[84] Whittle, "Questions, Praise Follow Grenada Invasion," 2223.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quantities of Cuban and Soviet arms stockpiles as well as secret military agreements between the island's former rulers and Cuba, the USSR, and North Korea.[85] Thus, the invasion seemed to have been much more successful than had been initially anticipated.

Third, as a result of these fortuitous developments and because it also provided a timely outlet for pent-up frustration in the wake of the Beirut disaster, the invasion became such an extremely popular venture with the American public that Congress was left with the choice of putting up or shutting up. There is indeed substantial evidence that public opinion aligned itself solidly behind the President. For example, in a *New York Times*/CBS poll conducted 27 October 1983, 55 percent of the respondents approved the decision to invade Grenada, while only 31 percent registered disapproval.[86] Likewise, an ABC News sample the night of the President's 27 October address on TV showed 64 percent favoring the invasion before the speech, and 86 percent endorsing the move after the speech. This poll also found that 74 percent agreed with the statement, "I feel good about Grenada because it showed that America can use its power to protect our own interests."[87] Similarly, a Gallup poll conducted for *Newsweek* on 26–27 October showed that 53 percent approved and 34 percent disapproved U.S. participation in the invasion.[88] The "rally around the flag" phenomenon is also evident in a post-invasion poll taken by the *Washington Post* and ABC News showing that 63 percent approved the way President Reagan was handling the presidency, the highest level in two years.[89] Finally, in a *Time* poll taken during the first week in December, 58 percent agreed that the invasion was in the best interest of the nation, while only 32 percent disagreed.[90] In view of such overwhelming outpouring of support for the President, his critics in Congress were in no position to prolong debate over Reagan's compliance with the War Powers Resolution and the wisdom of his policy. The mood of Congress was best described by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who noted that "the move is popular and therefore there's no disposition in the Senate to be opposed to it."[91]

The already slim hope that the Democratic-controlled House would take on the White House on the War Powers question evaporated completely when key Democratic leaders flip-flopped on the propriety of the invasion. Particularly noticeable here was the complete turnabout of Speaker O'Neill, who had initially insisted that "we can't go the way of gunboat diplomacy" and that the policy was "wrong" and "frightening."[92] However, on 8 November, O'Neill admitted that a House fact-finding mission had convinced him that "sending American forces

[85] Magnuson, "Now to Make It Work," 20.

[86] *New York Times*, 29 October 1983.

[87] Frank Gregorsky, "The Liberation of Grenada; the Enslavement of the Democrats." Reprinted in U.S. Congress, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 16 November 1983, *Congressional Record* 129:E5583.

[88] David M. Alpern, "How the Public Sees It," *Newsweek*, 7 November 1983, 65.

[89] Magnuson, "Getting Back to Normal," 17.

[90] Evan Thomas, "High for Mondale and Reagan," *Time*, 26 December 1983, 13.

[91] *New York Times*, 4 November 1983.

[92] Isaacson, "Weighing the Proper Role," 50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into combat was justified under these particular circumstances."[93] The fact-finding mission also had a sobering effect on one of its key members, Representative Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and a leading critic of President Reagan's policies toward Central America and the Caribbean. Following a four-day visit to Grenada and Barbados, Barnes was persuaded that the danger to American citizens was "adequate justification" for the invasion.[94]

Thus, the invasion of Grenada drives home a lesson that should have been absorbed in 1975, when American forces were used to rescue the captured S.S. *Mayaguez*. Namely, that in low-intensity conflict situations, the political power of Congress to constrain the president through strict enforcement of the War Powers Resolution is severely limited if it is not dead altogether. There are no assurances, however, that future crises will necessarily follow the *Mayaguez* and Grenada model—the use of a relatively small force in a geographically confined area where the U.S. can quickly establish superiority in pursuit of limited objectives that can be secured with minimal casualties. These precedents do not vitiate the need for effective legal mechanisms that would enable Congress to have some impact on decisions involving use of American forces in future hostilities. While certain political realities will inevitably remain beyond its control, Congress can nevertheless take a step in the right direction by removing serious ambiguities and weaknesses from the existing war powers legislation.

The Grenada episode confirms that Congress paid little attention to the language of Section 3 when the War Powers Resolution was originally drafted. The terse wording in that section allows the president considerable discretion on such questions as when consultation must occur, who must be involved, and what actions constitute consultation. Congress can reduce executive discretion on these matters in several ways. First, instead of mandating consultation "in every possible instance," Section 3 could be amended to require consultation "at least twenty-four hours prior to any presidential decision to commit U.S. forces under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 4(a)(1)."[95] The president would be exempted from this requirement only in those situations in which he is unable to initiate consultation as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.

Another major problem with Section 3 is its failure to specify the identity of those members of Congress whom the president is required to consult. Hence, several legal scholars have argued that meaningful consultation could best be promoted by an amendment that would explicitly designate those congressional leaders from each party who must be involved in consultation. Here, several options could be considered. Former Senator Jacob Javits suggested that the designees come from the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs

[93] Felton, "After the Invasion," 2360.

[94] Ibid., 2361.

[95] Thomas M. Franck, "After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control Over the War Power," *American Journal of International Law* 71 (October 1977): 638.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Committees.[96] Alternatively, law professor Thomas Franck has proposed designating two members, a Republican and Democrat, from each of the committees in the Senate and House dealing with foreign affairs, armed services, and intelligence, two members from each of the foreign affairs appropriations subcommittees, as well as the two senior leaders of both parties in the two chambers. In any event, the bipartisan congressional group should remain sufficiently small to minimize the risk of leaks, and its members would have to agree to be permanently available for consultation, either in person or by electronic communication, much like the members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.[97]

To insure that executive-legislative dialogue is meaningful rather than perfunctory—as it surely was in the case of Grenada—Section 3 could be further amended by adopting Senator Thomas Eagleton's proposal that requires the president to "discuss fully and seek the advice and counsel" of the designated congressional group, instead of merely "to consult."[98] It would also be prudent to require direct presidential involvement in such exchanges whenever time permits it.[99]

Finally, to close the huge loopholes that shifted the burden of triggering the sixty-day time limit from the White House to Congress in the Grenada case, Michael Glennon has recommended sensible amendments for Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. One would provide a clear definition of "hostilities"; no such definition is included in the present law. An additional change would require the president to specify which type of report he is filing under Section 4(a) and to designate a "hostilities" report as such. This would restore automaticity to the sixty-day triggering mechanism and hopefully help avoid the regrettable procedural impasse that occurred in the Grenada case.[100]

Of course, there are at least two major unresolved issues that must be confronted promptly if the amended legislation is to fulfill its intended purposes. First, both branches must find mutually agreeable means for determining the constitutionality of the act. Second, since the Supreme Court's ruling in the *Chadha* case casts doubts about the validity of the legislative veto provision in the War Powers Resolution, the executive and legislative branches would have to reach consensus on the legality of legislative vetoes, especially in cases involving exercise of the constitutionally-mandated power of Congress to declare war.

The power to order armed forces into hostilities is among the most awesome that governments exercise. It is debatable whether the American founders, who ardently believed in the principle that authority over fundamental decisions should be shared, ever intended to lodge the war power exclusively in the hands

[96] Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 467.

[97] Franck, "After the Fall," 625.

[98] Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 472; Franck, "After the Fall," 638. See also William B. Spong, Jr., "The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?" *William and Mary Law Review* 16 (Summer 1975): 857.

[99] Zutz, "Recapture of S.S. *Mayaguez*," 468.

[100] Glennon, "War Powers Resolution," 580.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of one individual or solely in one branch. Indeed, those wielding the power of the sword ought to heed the eloquent admonition by former Senator Jacob Javits, the principal author of the War Powers Resolution, that "the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the American people; he is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces alone—a very different and much more limited function."[101] By amending the War Power Resolution along the lines suggested above, Congress could take a giant step forward in reconciling its power to declare war with the powers of the president as commander-in-chief. That the need for such reconciliation is paramount cannot be doubted. It remains to be seen whether executive and legislative leaders have the vision and the will to resolve the war powers controversy in the aftermath of Grenada.*

[101] Jacob K. Javits, "The War Powers Resolution and the Constitution: A Special Introduction," in Demetrios Caraley, ed., *The President's War Powers: From the Federalists to Reagan* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1984), 3.

* An earlier version of this essay was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association/Midwest, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, November 1984. Appreciation is expressed to Timothy J. Connors of James Madison College, Michigan State University, for his valuable research assistance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arms Control and Alliance Commitments

JANE M. O. SHARP

In order to conclude an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union, the executive branch of the United States government must pursue at least three sets of negotiations. Most public attention focuses on the bilateral forum with the Soviet Union, which is arguably the least troublesome of the three. Often more difficult, in terms of reconciling disparate interests, is the intragovernmental bargaining in Washington necessary not only to formulate American objectives, but also to develop and refine effective bargaining strategies and to ratify agreements signed with the Soviets. Least understood, and most poorly executed, is the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) consultation designed to keep American arms control policy in step with its alliance defense commitments.

This article tackles the recurrent problem of trying to reconcile East-West nuclear arms control with alliance cohesion and extended deterrence—NATO's capability to deter a Soviet attack on western Europe. How should the United States design its forces and conduct its arms control diplomacy in ways that do not undermine the security of either its NATO allies or its Warsaw Pact adversaries?

NATO's Nuclear Arms Control Dilemma

All military alliances suffer a common security dilemma, namely the tensions induced by the risks of being abandoned by one's allies in a crisis and the risks

JANE M. O. SHARP was the 1984–85 Peace Fellow at The Bunting Institute, Radcliffe College, and is currently a research associate at the The Center for European Studies, Harvard University. She is also a George B. Kistiakowsky Visiting Scholar of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of being entrapped in a conflict not of one's own choosing.[1] NATO's nuclear hierarchy, in which there are seven different classes of states with respect to their nuclear rights and obligations, exacerbates this dilemma.[2] The West European allies oscillate between two contradictory fears: on the one hand that the United States will not be willing to carry out its threat of nuclear retaliation to a nonnuclear Warsaw Pact attack because of the risk of a Soviet counterstrike on the American homeland, and on the other that the United States might resort to nuclear weapons too soon, try to limit nuclear warfare to Europe, and incinerate the continent in the process.[3]

These fears are also reflected in West European anxieties about bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. The smaller NATO countries swing from anxiety that a superpower agreement will discriminate against the security interests of western Europe, to fear that the Soviet Union and the United States will engage in an unbridled nuclear arms competition. Thus, many Europeans resented the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which restricted the nuclear weapons club to the United States, USSR, Britain, France, and China, which had already tested nuclear explosions by 1967, and established a highly discriminatory regime with respect to inspection of civilian nuclear power facilities. Anxieties about abandonment were evident in European complaints that the bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War—signed by the two superpowers in 1973—implied that the United States was more interested in Soviet-American arms control than in its security commitment to NATO. More recently, West German critics of the second Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II), signed in 1979, complained that the agreement limited intercontinental-range missiles that threatened the American homeland while leaving unconstrained medium-range strategic missiles and bombers that threatened western Europe. These anxieties generated NATO's double-track decision to deploy new American missiles in western Europe.[4]

[1] On the abandonment-entrapment dilemma, see Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 461–495; and James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), especially part III, NATO Strategy, 135–244.

[2] On NATO's nuclear hierarchy, see Jane M. O. Sharp, "Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 38 (July 1982): 33–36.

[3] On NATO's nuclear dilemmas, see Michael Mandelbaum, "NATO: The Nuclear Alliance," in *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 147–175; and David N. Schwartz, *Nato's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), especially chaps. I and III.

[4] On the background to NATO's double track decision, see Simon Lunn, *The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces*, report prepared for the United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980); Jane M. O. Sharp, "Understanding the INF Debacle: Arms Control and Alliance Cohesion," *Arms Control* 5 (September 1984): 95–127; and for a Carter administration viewpoint, see James A. Thomson, (National Security Council Staff 1977–1980), "The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of U.S. Theatre Nuclear Policy 1975–1979," *International Affairs* 60 (Autumn 1984): 601–614.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO allies seem to experience cycles of anxiety about American leadership that typically have five stages. Stage I represents the loss of confidence in Washington, which can be triggered by economic, political, or military anxieties. Problems can arise, for example, when the United States appears to export inflation, becomes enamoured of repressive right-wing military regimes in the Third World, engages in extra-NATO military activities that could trigger conflict in Europe, proposes weapons programs like the Sentinel and Safeguard antiballistic missile systems in the 1960s and 1970s and the current Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which suggest a "Fortress America" approach to defense planning.[5] Sometimes events collide to exacerbate alliance relations as in October 1956 when the most traumatic feelings of abandonment were experienced in western Europe—as President Dwight D. Eisenhower condemned the Anglo-French action in Suez precisely as Soviet forces invaded Hungary. Recurrent problems arise when Europeans fear that Soviet-American arms control diplomacy seems to be conducted at the expense of NATO interests. The French, for example, were upset by test ban talks in the late 1950s and 1960s, just as they were starting their independent nuclear weapons program; West German leaders felt discriminated against during the NPT negotiations; and many of the European powers were distressed by President Jimmy Carter's SALT II diplomacy in the 1970s.

In Stage II, allies seek reassurance from Washington and look for signs of a renewed commitment to defend the political and territorial integrity of western Europe. These anxieties are best dealt with in political, rather than military currency. A good example was the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in the late 1960s. The NPG successfully broke the cycle of anxiety by reassuring Europeans troubled by a combination of nuclear worries, including the cancellation of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and the discriminatory aspects of the NPT.

More often, however, the cycle moves to Stage III in which Washington responds to European anxiety with the latest nuclear hardware, raising tensions and complicating arms control efforts between East and West. This then triggers Stage IV, in which fear of entrapment takes over from fear of abandonment, as Europeans protest the new cold war, excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, and the new risks of nuclear holocaust. In Stage V, Europeans encourage a new Soviet-American rapprochement, in particular a return to serious arms control

[5] On West European attitudes to the American ABM program in the 1960s, see Ian Smart, "Perspectives From Europe" in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 185–222, at page 187. On European apprehension about President Reagan's SDI program, see Paul E. Gallis, Mark M. Lowenthal and Marcia S. Smith, *The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 February 1985); Christoph Bertram, "Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance" *Weapons in Space Volume II: Implications for Security*, special edition of *Daedalus* (Summer 1985): 279–296; Lawrence Freedman, "Europe and the ABM Revival" in Ian Bellamy and Coit Blacker, eds., *Antiballistic Missile Defense in the 1980s* (London: Frank Cass, 1983); and David S. Yost, "European Anxieties About Ballistic Missile Defense," *The Washington Quarterly* 7 (Fall 1984): 112–129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talks. If the ensuing détente generates more bilateral agreements, these may trigger a new round of NATO abandonment fears.

To the extent that these cycles of anxiety are due to overreliance on American nuclear weapons, one obvious remedy is for NATO to adopt a defense policy that relies less on the nuclear, and more on the nonnuclear components of NATO's military force posture. This shift was indeed attempted on a number of occasions. The results were only partially successful, however, since the impetus for change usually came from the United States and was perceived by European leaders as yet another manifestation of the lack of American commitment to the alliance, thereby becoming part of the problem rather than the solution.

Previous Efforts to Reduce NATO's Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the ability to deter a Warsaw Pact attack against western Europe was thought to rest on the threat of massive retaliation with American nuclear weapons in response to any kind of Soviet military thrust into NATO territory. American defense analysts, notably at the Rand Corporation, questioned the rationality of this all-or-nothing policy in the late 1950s, but it was not until the late 1960s that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara managed to persuade NATO governments to endorse a range of less cataclysmic options.[6]

The essence of the new policy, designated "flexible response," was to respond "appropriately" to whatever level of aggression might be inflicted by an adversary. Thus, while the threat to launch intercontinental-range strategic nuclear weapons on Soviet cities might be appropriate to deter Soviet strikes on the cities of the United States, it was now deemed implausible to deter lesser acts of aggression, such as further encroachment on West Berlin. To deter low-level threats to NATO, McNamara argued, the alliance should be capable of a range of military options, from nonnuclear, through limited nuclear, all the way up to a massive strategic response.

The European response to the proposed change was cool at best. French and British officials objected to McNamara's assertion that a vital attribute of deterrence was central American control of all NATO's nuclear assets, which implied that small independent nuclear arsenals were both dangerous and redundant. In Bonn, NATO's threat of early and massive nuclear use was deemed the best deterrent to Soviet adventures and West German officials were apprehensive about a policy that semed to reduce the risks of aggression for the Warsaw Pact armies. Most European officials worried about Washington's apparent reluctance to risk

[6] For McNamara's first attempt to change NATO's doctrine, see Robert S. McNamara, *Remarks Delivered at a Restricted Session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting (Athens, Greece)* 5 May 1962, released by Freedom of Information Act, 17 August 1979; for the debate on flexible response through the 1960s, see David N. Schwartz, "Flexible Response and the Nuclear Planning Group" in *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 136–192; and Fred Kaplan *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American security on behalf of western Europe and, especially, about a policy that required larger investments in conventional military forces.

French opposition was the most vociferous and only after General Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces from the integrated NATO command and pushed NATO headquarters out of France, did the other fourteen governments in the integrated NATO command structure endorse the NATO document M/C 14/3 approving flexible response. This policy was a conscious compromise from the start, with no clear transatlantic consensus on what military action the policy prescribes should deterrence fail.[7] Robert McNamara's goal appeared to be to keep the nuclear threshold high, the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons firm, and the conventional phase of any conflict as long as possible, thereby putting the onus of nuclear escalation onto the adversary. Insofar as this kind of thinking envisages a prolonged conflict on European soil it is anathema to West European—especially West German—officials. They prefer to threaten the Soviets with the shortest possible conventional pause and the earliest nuclear use—optimally, of a strategic American attack on the Soviet Union—and to argue for military forces capable of controlling every rung in a hypothetical ladder of escalation.[8]

As long as NATO doctrine is discussed in vague terms, these different perspectives do not seriously threaten alliance cohesion, but when NATO reformers try to refine response and rationalize forces for specific operations, intra-NATO tensions tend to increase.[9] Thus in early 1982 when Robert McNamara and three other former government officials spelled out the irrationality of initiating the use of nuclear weapons under conditions of Soviet-American strategic parity, and advocated an explicit doctrine of No-First-Use, West German officials responded predictably with alarm.[10]

In both his 1960s' version of flexible response, and his 1980s advocacy of No-First-Use, McNamara urged stronger conventional forces for NATO and less reliance on European-owned and European-based nuclear weapons. By contrast, European officials who oppose No-First-Use also oppose the build-up of conventional forces for a long war and, while not necessarily averse to cutting back

[7] For a concise history of efforts to develop guidelines for nuclear use, see J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response* R-2964 FF (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation, April 1983). See also Catherine M. Kelleher, "Thresholds and Theologies: The Need for Critical Reassessment" *Survival* 26 (July/August 1984): 156–163.

[8] The concept of a ladder of escalation is from Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 177–208.

[9] On the problems of trying to refine NATO doctrine, see Christoph Bertram, "Political Implications of the Theater Nuclear Balance" in Barry M. Blechman, ed., *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982), 101–128; and Lawrence Freedman, "The No-First-Use Debate and the Theory of Thresholds" in Frank Blackaby et al., eds., *No-First-Use* (London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1984), 67–78.

[10] McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (Spring 1982); and the establishment West German response from Karl Kaiser, George Leber, A. Mertes and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (Summer 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stockpiles of vulnerable short-range battlefield systems, tend to support the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They claimed that NATO needs nuclear forces capable of a progressive series of escalatory responses to Soviet aggression in order to maintain the credibility of flexible response. Thus, in the late 1970s, a small but powerful group of transatlantic officials argued that without new INF missiles the alliance would be missing a vital rung in the ladder of escalation, and would thus be unable to maintain "escalation dominance." Despite counterarguments by some senior members of the Carter administration that such a rationale would be perceived as decoupling the security of western Europe from United States central strategic systems, the criterion of escalation dominance remained a central theme of the conservative analysts' case for the new cruise and Pershing II missiles.[11]

European governments' anxieties about No-First-Use in the 1980s parallel official anxieties about Flexible Response in the 1960s. First, there appears to be an unduly pessimistic view of the East-West balance of conventional forces; second, and flowing from the first, there is reluctance to allocate funds to improve nonnuclear forces because the task not only seems so enormous, but also suggests a willingness to contemplate a long conventional war; third, there is apprehension about American resolve to use force in defense of western Europe if it risks a retalitatory Soviet strike on the American homeland; and fourth, there is apprehension about the risks of tampering with anything as fundamental as alliance military doctrine.[12]

While not yet ready to accept No-First-Use, and standing firm on the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO leaders nevertheless reached a consensus, in reaction to widespread protest against the double track INF decision, that NATO must rely less on nuclear weapons. This was reflected in the NATO Shift Study undertaken at the instigation of the Dutch government, which resulted in the withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. warheads in connection with the December 1979 "double track" decison to modernize intermediate-range nuclear forces, and the decision in October 1983 to withdraw another 1,400. In addition, for each new INF warhead introduced in accordance with the December 1979 decision, an old nuclear warhead will be removed. This still leaves some 4,600 United States nuclear warheads in western Europe, and many NATO officials

[11] A good example of the "escalation dominance" school of analysis is James Martin, "How the Soviet Union Came to Gain Escalation Dominance: Trends and Asymmetries in the Theater Nuclear Balance," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, Volume I: The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983), 89–122. For accounts of how the argument was presented in the INF debate, see two congressional reports prepared by Simon Lunn: *The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces*, Fn 4; and *SALT and the NATO Allies*, a committee reprint for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 96th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).

[12] Jane Stromseth, "Prospects for a Conventional Defence of Western Europe: Some Lessons From the 1960s," *Proceedings of the 32nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs*, Warsaw, 1982 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1983), 370–374.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would like to remove more, especially those designated for artillery or other short-range, short reaction time battlefield systems. Proposals to change NATO's Flexible Response doctrine to one of No-First-Use continue to meet strong official opposition, however, and the issue will need to be thoroughly debated, particularly in West Germany, before any change can be expected.

Reassessing the Requirements for Extended Deterrence

Both in the 1960s and the 1980s, McNamara and other NATO reformers believed that reducing reliance on nuclear elements of the force posture must be accompanied by a build-up in conventional forces. Indeed in November 1984, NATO adopted a new Follow-On-Forces-Attack (FOFA) concept, which aims to make NATO conventional forces more effective in attacking rear-echelon Warsaw Pact forces in the event of a Soviet attack on western Europe.[13] The move is controversial since it appears to transform what were manifestly defensive NATO forces into a more offensive posture, thereby threatening in peacetime one of the most basic Soviet security requirements: control over their East European buffer zone.[14]

Both NATO reformers and their critics alike may seriously misjudge the requirements of extended deterrence, however, by overestimating the level of military force, and by underestimating the degree of political cohesion necessary to deter possible Soviet adventurism in western Europe. NATO planners appear to base alliance force requirements, which determine and constrain NATO arms control possibilities, on several misplaced assumptions. First, they assume that the Soviets have an urge to expand territorially westwards and would have invaded western Europe long ago in the absence of the United States commitment to retaliate against a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with nuclear weapons. Second, they assume that the credibility of this retalitatory threat requires American nuclear forces at least in balance with, and preferably superior to, the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. Third, they assume that the American people will continue to support the effort to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and the threat to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

These assumptions drive force requirements, and, if correct, actually preclude effective arms contol. Under these conditions, the negotiation process will continue to be more competitive than cooperative, the allies will continue to suffer cycles of anxiety about the American nuclear umbrella, and the special interests opposed to arms restraint will continue to hamper United States arms control efforts. In the mid-1980s, however, all three assumptions need to be reexamined.

[13] William Beecher, *The Boston Globe*, 10 November 1984; and "Fee, Fi, Fofa, Hm" *The Economist*, 24–30 November 1984, 47–48.

[14] See the correspondence on "Conventional Retaliation into Eastern Europe" between Jonathan Dean and Samuel P. Huntington in *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984): 203–217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Threat to Western Europe

In the early 1950s, fear that the Korean War presaged a Soviet move into western Europe was the primary stimulus behind the conventional rearmament of the NATO countries.[15] Since then, however, apart from some pressure on West Berlin in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there is little evidence that the Soviets have had either the opportunity or the urge for territorial aggrandizement westwards.[16] On the contrary, since 1945 the Soviet leadership has been preoccupied with the effort to consolidate eastern Europe as both a security and an ideological buffer against military threats and destabilizing influences from the West.

Maintaining control over eastern Europe has been the *sine qua non* of Soviet security policy, but has proved to be an extremely demanding requirement. The Soviets have had to deploy their most highly trained forces and most up-to-date equipment in the Warsaw Pact states, not only to deter an attack from the NATO countries, but to impress East European communist party leaders and populations with the firmness of Soviet control over this vital buffer zone. The Soviets have also provided many East European military units with modern equipment, but this does not translate automatically into loyalty to Moscow. The Warsaw Treaty Organization may appear to have an impressive blitzkrieg capability on paper, but Soviet leaders can hardly count on the Warsaw Pact armies for anything but defending East European territory—certainly not for an offensive move into western Europe.[17]

These occupation costs, together with the economic subsidies to maintain even the minimum living standards necessary to establish a modicum of legitimacy for the ruling communist parties, make eastern Europe as much of an economic and military liability for Moscow as it is a political asset. This suggests that the next generation of Soviet leaders will be at least as likely as the postwar generation have been to limit their role in Europe to preventing any interference with either their military or political control over the Warsaw Pact states.[18]

As Robert Jervis, Glenn Snyder, and others have noted, deterrence does not exist in a vacuum.[19] States run risk in particular contexts for particular objec-

[15] Louis P. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[16] Michael McGwire, "Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Summer 1984): 745–768.

[17] On the reliability of East European troops, see Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability and Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies" *Armed Forces and Society* 6 (Winter 1980): 270–296; and A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation, 1980).

[18] For recent analyses of Soviet problems in eastern Europe, see David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Sarah Terry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, eds., *Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

[19] Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives and will always be prepared to pay a higher price to defend positions and interests than to expand them. Thus, while paranoid at their periphery, the Soviets are merely opportunistic beyond it. Keeping the Soviets out of western Europe, therefore, may well be a much less demanding task than NATO planners now assume, because the temptation for Soviet mischief is so low. Here, as elsewhere, deterring an action is much easier than compelling one, since the would-be aggressor must initiate the process of changing the status quo and suffer the initial burden of risk. Recall that in the late 1940s, the western powers were deterred from pushing the Soviets out of Eastern Europe—despite an American nuclear monopoly—by the prospect of engaging Stalin's war-torn armies in conventional battle.[20] For Soviet leaders now, as for western leaders then, the prospect of sustained conventional combat is a powerful deterrent to aggression. For a nation as risk-averse as the Soviets have proved to be, any move into western Europe would have to be a last ditch effort to avert the imminent collapse of Soviet control over eastern Europe or an imminent attack from the West. Even under those dire circumstances, Soviet planners contemplating military action would have to weigh not only NATO's conventional military capability to resist attack, but also the United States' resolve to defend its sustained interest and substantial investment in the territorial and political integrity of western Europe.

As Michael Howard wrote in criticism of those who argued that the new Soviet SS-20 missiles undermined the credibility of the American security guarantee:

> There is no consensus in the European community, and there is no sense among the European people as a whole that the SS-20s present a threat of a new order of magnitude. *The United States is "coupled" to Europe not by one delivery system or another, but by a vast web of military installations and personnel, to say nothing of the innumerable economic social and financial links that tie us together into a single coherent system.*[21]

NATO nevertheless proceeded to shore up an imagined nuclear deficiency in its military posture, thereby generating an outpouring of antinuclear and anti-American sentiment in western Europe that seriously compromised the "single coherent system" and the political cohesion on which—as Howard rightly claims—extended deterrence rests.

Rather than focusing exclusively on military capabilities, NATO leaders should be more sensitive to the dangers of an alliance in political disarray being perceived by a potential aggressor as a tempting target. Today, as in the prenuclear era, the degree to which great powers see any advantage in initiating military activity against each other's allies rests largely on the perception each has of the other's capability and resolve to defend its protégés, be they formally

---

(Winter 1979–80); and Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[20] Michael MccGwire, "Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence."

[21] Michael Howard, *The Times* (London), 3 November 1981. (Emphasis added.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or only loosely allied.[22] When an alliance appears cohesive there is less temptation to attack its member states militarily or probe alliance differences politically. If the interests of alliance members begin to diverge, however, an adversary is tempted to exploit the rift by intervening in intra-alliance debates on sensitive issues, setting off one ally against another and undermining alliance cohesion. This tendency is manifest in both Soviet behavior towards NATO and United States behavior towards the Warsaw Pact.

Thus, in the early 1980s, even as he denounced strikes by air traffic controllers at home, President Ronald Reagan enthusiastically supported strikes by the independent Polish trade union Solidarity. Industrial unrest in Poland not only challenged Communist party rule in that country, but also tended to undermine Soviet control over Poland in particular and over eastern Europe generally. Similarly, as West Europeans took to the streets to protest their governments' willingness to provide bases for the new American cruise and Pershing II missiles (mandated by Nato's "double track" decision of December 1979), the Soviets stepped up their carrot-and-stick campaign against NATO by threatening dire retribution against those states which accepted the new missiles and less drastic treatment for nuclear-free states. With East German Communist party leader Erich Honecker assigned a key role, the Soviets also mounted a carefully orchestrated campaign against the INF deployments in West Germany, intervening with clumsy and ultimately counterproductive tactics in the March 1983 federal elections.

In an extreme case, alliance interests could diverge so far that one superpower would appear to have abandoned its commitment to defend its allies' interests. An adversary might then be tempted to go beyond political mischief and initiate military actions against a weak and abandoned protégé, confident that the guarantor state—despite its capability to do so—would not retaliate. An alliance in disarray could thus tempt a would-be aggressor to act militarily in a crisis.

Thus, while a threat that leaves open the possibility of nuclear retaliation is not an insignificant factor in deterring Soviet adventurism, NATO's cohesion, in terms of effectively integrated forces in western Europe and manifest commonality of political and economic interests between the United States and western Europe, is the crucial component of the western deterrent. NATO policy should, therefore, concentrate on both increasing political cohesion in the alliance and on removing any temptation for Soviet military action in a crisis. Those objectives should inform both alliance force planning and alliance diplomacy at the two multilateral negotiations on European security—the interalliance talks in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the pan-European Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures (CSCBM) in Stockholm.

For the United States this means, above all, conducting a foreign policy that makes American interest in defending the integrity of western Europe unambig-

[22] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900–1980," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 496–526.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uous so as not to tempt the Soviets. As far as possible, transatlantic squabbles about trade and monetary policy, defense burden sharing, and technology transfers to the East bloc should be avoided. NATO should also abstain from patterns of deployment in western Europe that suggest an offensive-looking posture that might threaten Soviet control over eastern Europe. Few, if any, West European governments want anything but the most gradual evolution in eastern Europe, and to suggest by deep strike force postures or inflammatory rhetoric either the capability or the intention to change the political or territorial status quo in eastern Europe by force, is not only provocative to the Soviets but profoundly unsettling to West Europeans.

The Need for Balanced Nuclear Forces

United States policy has rested on the assumption that the credibility of the American security guarantee to NATO—specifically the threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack—requires nuclear forces at least in balance with and preferably superior to those of the Soviet Union. Indeed, this is the primary motor which drives the acquisition and modernization of the United States nuclear arsenal.[23] It is an assumption strengthened by the traditional arms control process that seeks balanced agreements with reciprocal rights and obligations. It is mirrored by the Soviet preoccupation with maintaining parity with the United States to demonstrate a positive correlation of forces in favor of the socialist camp. Moreover, most of the public interest groups that lobby for arms control, including those supporting the nuclear freeze, subscribe to the concept of balance. Brave indeed is the elected official who dares to suggest even the most modest measures of unilateral restraint. Even the American Catholic bishops' pastoral letter, which argues at length the immorality of any purpose for nuclear weapons except deterrence, nevertheless asserts the need for "deterrence based on balance."

If balance makes any sense, however, it can only be in militarily useful systems. Yet, four decades into the nuclear era, despite the best efforts of civilian strategies and game theorists, the military have not been able to devise any rational missions for nuclear explosives. Neither military nor political purposes can be served by escalating from nonnuclear to nuclear use.[24] The devastation

[23] Earl Ravenal, "Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection," *International Security* 6 (Spring 1982): 26–43; Richard K. Betts, "Elusive Equivalence: The Political and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance" in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies For American Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), 101–140.

[24] On the inutility of military use of nuclear weapons, see Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" *Adelphi Paper* No. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall 1983); and Michael Carver, "No-First-Use: A View From Europe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 39 (3 March 1983). On the inutility of coercive diplomatic use of nuclear weapons, see McGeorge Bundy, "Atomic Diplomacy Reconsidered," *The Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 38 (October 1984): 25–44; and Morton Halperin, *No-First-Use*, forthcoming; See also Steven Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense," *Foreign Policy* 58 (Spring 1985): 28–52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from blast, heat, and radiation is too immense, and the costs of a nuclear war are unimaginable. Thus, regardless of relative capability, we have a state of what McGeorge Bundy has called "existential deterrence." In addition to the effects long anticipated in the northern hemisphere from an East-West nuclear war, studies by atmospheric scientists now suggest the possibility of catastrophic global effects on climate from massive emissions of smoke and toxic chemicals following a major nuclear exchange. These risks will not go away, nor will they be materially changed by advances in technology, fluctuations in relative nuclear capability, nor changes in military doctrine on either side. This is the essence of the nuclear revolution.[25]

If nuclear explosives have no military utility, and their only practical purpose is for deterrence, this can be achieved by a force of a few hundred warheads at most, each of which can credibly threaten to destroy a city.[26] To be deterred from provoking what would be a devastating retaliatory strike, the would-be aggressor only needs to know this deterrent force is invulnerable. Some analysts claim that while such a force might be sufficient to deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States, it would not necessarily serve to deter a Warsaw Pact conventional attack on western Europe.[27] But, as Denis Healy observed in the 1960s, credibility is not symmetrical between potential attackers and defenders. A 95 percent likelihood that the United States would respond to a conventional Warsaw Pact attack with nuclear weapons might not be enough to reassure the West Europeans of the American commitment, but only a 5 percent chance of such a response could be more than enough to deter the Russians.[28] As already noted, one state extends its deterrent capabilities over another not so much by increasing its military capability as by demonstrating a closer political affinity with its protégé.[29]

Yet, far from coming to terms with our permanent vulnerability, NATO strategists vainly try to refine alliance doctrine by searching for implementable threats. In particular, strategists have tried to move away from the apparently immoral threat to target the adversary's civilian populations in cities, to the seemingly more benign strategy of targeting the enemy's military forces. But the distinction between countercity and counterforce targeting is not operationally feasible. Despite recent attempts to produce smaller, "cleaner" nuclear explosives, any effective nuclear counterforce strike would also kill unacceptably large

[25] Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of Nuclear Strategy*, 147–170.

[26] In October 1984 at a MITRE Corporation symposium on national security issues in Bedford, Mass., Richard Garwin suggested that 1,000 nuclear warheads on invulnerable platforms would be a prudent deterrent force for the United States.

[27] For a detailed analysis of the range of expert opinion on deterrence theory in the United States, see Charles Glaser, "The Debate over the Requirements of Deterrence," paper delivered at the Workshop on Explicating the Arms Control Debate, sponsored by the Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 1984.

[28] For Denis Healey's deterrence theorem, see Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, *Denis Healey and the Policies of Power* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971), 142.

[29] Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sections of the population and could hardly be viewed as "limited" by the state under attack.

The inutility of nuclear forces for any military or political purpose beyond deterring their use by others has several implications for NATO policy:

- nuclear explosives are not military weapons, they are simply nuclear explosives;
- nuclear superiority is not military superiority, it is simply nuclear superiority;
- deterrence of aggression by other nuclear powers requires only a few hundred nuclear explosives based on invulnerable delivery vehicles;
- beyond this absolute capability, relative nuclear strength is irrelevant to NATO security;
- the search for nuclear balance is meaningless;
- there is nothing irresponsible, or dangerous, about reducing redundant nuclear systems unilaterally;
- nuclear explosives cannot substitute for conventional forces and in no way compensate for conventional inadequacy;
- therefore, reducing current nuclear arsenals does not imply a reduction in military capability and does not require any compensatory increase in conventional strength;
- on the contrary, removing nuclear weapons comingled with NATO ground forces will actually increase the conventional capability of those units by releasing manpower currently occupied with the custody of nuclear warheads.

Continued Public Support for NATO's Nuclear Policy

Since its inception, NATO doctrine and force planning has been in the hands of a relatively small community of defense experts. Politically, the strongest transatlantic bonds are between British, West German, and American officials and analysts of the center-right, with an especially conservative coterie dominating policy in the late 1970s.[30] This group formulated NATO's double-track decision to modernize and control intermediate range nuclear forces which, as already noted, focused on shoring up misperceived inadequacies in the nuclear component of NATO's deterrent at the expense of alliance cohesion.

The early 1980s were thus marked by growing anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic about the dangers of nuclear war and a profound rethinking of the tenets of alliance doctrine across the political spectrum. Of particular concern toward the end of the Carter presidency was the emphasis on limited nuclear options and the stated requirements for a capability to fight and prevail in a nuclear war

[30] Fred Kaplan, "Warring over New Missiles for NATO" *New York Times Magazine*, 9 December 1979; Raymond L. Garthoff, "The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Summer 1983): 197–214; and "European Theatre Nuclear Forces 1977–80" in *Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985) 849–886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so as to be able to dominate every rung on a hypothetical ladder of escalation.[31] Later, the public, and much of the expert community as well, grew increasingly disturbed by the primitive anti-Soviet rhetoric and loose talk of nuclear use among senior appointees in the Reagan administration. The public outcry to the decision to deploy 572 new INF warheads on cruise and Pershing II missiles in western Europe, capable of striking Soviet targets, demonstrated the wide disparity between the experts' and the public view of what couples the United States to western Europe. The experts claimed the new missiles would ease NATO's fears of abandonment by coupling United States and West European security more closely together. By contrast, most Europeans believed that cruise and Pershing II would increase the risk of nuclear war by presenting attractive targets to Soviet forces—a classic fear of entrapment anxiety to which the experts seemed quite insensitive. These European anxieties were not eased when the Reagan administration eventually began to implement the negotiation track of the double-track decision. On the contrary, the manifest lack of interest in Washington in concluding an equitable INF agreement made it clear that the earlier promise of negotiations had been primarily a fig leaf for deployments.

A number of retired officials, from government and military service in the NATO countries, are among the new nuclear skeptics.[32] They complain of many aspects of NATO policy, including the fact that nuclear war fighting plans are dangerously unrealistic, that targeting policy and military training tend to dehumanize the adversary, that inside assessments of the Soviet threat do not sufficiently take into account Soviet security requirements, and that NATO's nuclear emphasis is often at the expense of prudent conventional force planning.

In western Europe, antinuclear activists from the late 1950s and early 1960s joined forces with newly aroused professional and grassroots organizations, including very active church-based groups. In the United States, architects, educators, environmentalists, lawyers, musicians, scientists, and physicians formed antinuclear groups, all of which supported the national campaign to freeze the testing, production, and deployment of Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. The League of Women Voters also endorsed a nuclear freeze. The Protestant churches had long been critical of American nuclear policy, but now the United States Catholic Conference also became involved.

In May 1983, a pastoral Letter on War and Peace sought to place defense policy in the context of Catholic teaching on the requirements for a just war.[33]

[31] For an authoritative account of the Carter administration's strategic doctrine, see Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," *International Security* 5 (Spring 1981): 18–27; see also his "Extended Deterrence," *The Washington Quarterly* 4 (Fall 1984): 93–103.

[32] In addition to the Gang of Four, senior government officials who proposed No-First-Use in early 1982, a number of retired senior military officials not only support No-First-Use and a nuclear freeze, but advocate radical nuclear disarmament measures. These include Canadian Admiral Robert Falls, United States Admirals Noel Gayler and John Marshall Lee, and British Field Marshal Michael Lord Carver.

[33] United States Catholic Conference, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Publishing Series, USCC, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In particular, the bishops emphasized the need to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, and the need for proportionality between military means and political ends. The gist of the pastoral letter was to delegitimize any use of nuclear weapons—whether first or second, early or late—since the bishops concluded that even if ostensibly aimed at military targets, nuclear explosives would destroy millions of noncombatants, and no one could be certain that, once begun, a nuclear exchange could be limited. The bishops were unambiguous in their support for a bilateral nuclear freeze and for a NATO No-First-Use policy, and echoed the judgment of Pope John Paul II at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982 that possession of nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring others was morally acceptable only as an interim measure on the way to disarmament.

The freeze movement, the new professional activists, and the bishops' letter in the United States, as well as the various facets of the antinuclear movement in western Europe, raised public consciousness on the nuclear issue on both sides of the Atlantic. Public opinion surveys revealed substantial majorities opposing NATO's nuclear policies in the early 1980s. Most of those polled in NATO Europe, for example, opposed the deployment of new cruise and Pershing II INF missiles.[34] In the United States, surveys showed a massive shift in sentiment from the 1950s, when most Americans believed nuclear weapons served the cause of peace, to fears that Soviet and American nuclear arsenals are increasing the risk of war and eroding international security.[35]

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, most Americans approved of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and believed the United States could fight, win, and survive a nuclear war. In 1984, by contrast, most Americans think a nuclear war would be uncontrollable and suicidal.[36]

In the mid-1950s, most Americans felt it was justified to retaliate with nuclear weapons to a nonnuclear Soviet attack on western Europe. In 1984, by contrast, 77 percent of those polled say the United States should not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack on the allies and 74 percent believe nuclear weapons should never be used in a battlefield situation.[37] Most Americans seem unaware that current NATO policy threatens the first use of nuclear weapons. In one survey, 81 percent of those polled believe that it is United States policy to use nuclear weapons if, and only if, the Soviets use them first.[38]

[34] On European public opinion data, see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Summer 1983): 179–196; David Capitanchik, "Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Arms Control* 4 (September 1983): 111–133.

[35] For analyses comparing American polling data over time, see Bernard M. Kramer, S. Michael Kalick, Michael A. Milburn, "Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: 1945–1982," *Journal of Social Issues*, 39 (1983); and David Yankelovich, et al., *Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy* (New York: Public Agenda Foundation, 1984); Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Fall 1984): 33–46.

[36] Yankelovich, *Voter Options*, 18.

[37] Ibid., 19.

[38] Ibid., 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the 1950s, most Americans felt that nuclear superiority enhanced national security. In 1984, they understood that the Russians had caught up and would build to keep up, so that regaining American superiority was no longer a feasible option. More than 75 percent accept this nuclear stalemate and support a bilateral nuclear freeze as the best route to getting nuclear weapons under control, while 61 percent see no risk in a unilateral moratorium on new American systems, hoping the Soviets would follow suit.[39] Finally, in contrast to earlier surveys, most Americans now believe that acquiring extra nuclear weapons as bargaining chips for negotiations is counterproductive, serving only to generate Soviet countermeasures.[40]

The impact of all this antinuclear sentiment is hard to gauge. In the United States, the House of Representatives voted against the MX missile in 1982 and endorsed the nuclear freeze in 1983, as did the Democratic party in its 1984 election platform. But only a few legislators supported efforts to legislate a delay in INF deployments in 1983, and in 1985 both the House and the Senate approved the MX, though fewer missiles than the Reagan administration requested. NATO leaders claim to be reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, but they talk of modernizing battlefield weapons even as obsolete ones are being withdrawn. Furthermore, the restructuring of conventional forces to conform with the Follow-On-Forces-Attack concept could generate as many problems in East-West relations as it was supposed to solve within the alliance.[41]

Election results in the United States suggest that most nuclear freeze proponents vote their pocketbooks and their ambivalence about the Soviet Union, rather than their anxieties about nuclear war. In Britain and West Germany the most recent federal elections were also won by conservatives committed to free enterprise, a tougher stand on the Russians, and no delays in the INF deployments. It should be noted, however, that the main opposition parties in all these elections (the Democratic, Labour, and Social Democratic parties respectively) when in office in the late 1970s had either called for—or approved—new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe that could strike Soviet targets. Voters in the U.S., Britain, and West Germany were thus hardly offered convincing alternatives or attractive choices on the nuclear issue.

[39] Yankelovich and Doble, "The Public Mood," 46.

[40] Yankelovich, *Voter Options*, 22.

[41] For arguments advocating the exploitation of new technologies for deep strike missions for NATO conventional forces, see Report of the European Security Study [ESECS], *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). For more thoughtful analyses of the negative implications of deep strike postures for European security and stability, see Matthew A. Evangelista, "Offense or Defense: A Tale of Two Commissions," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Fall 1983): 46–69; Phil Williams and William Wallace, "Emerging Technologies and European Security," *Survival* 26 (March/April 1984): 70–78; Joel S. Witt, "Deep Strike: NATO's New Defense Concept and Its Implications for Arms Control," *Arms Control Today* 13 (November 1983); Michael Klare, "NATO's Conventional Weapons," *Technology Review* 88 (May–June 1985); Fen Osler Hampson, "Groping for Technical Panaceas: The European Conventional Balance and Nuclear Stability," *International Security* 8 (Winter 1983–84): 57–82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the antinuclear impact on the ballot box was mixed, the INF decision and subsequent protest nevertheless had a disturbing effect on alliance cohesion. Polling data suggests that antinuclear sentiment is far from synonomous with anti-NATO sentiment. Nevertheless, much of the opposition to INF was bitterly anti-American and did raise transatlantic hackles as the European left and the American isolationist right reinforced the stereotypes each had of the other. In the United States this generated a new crop of congressional resolutions calling for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and complaints that the Europeans were not pulling their weight in NATO burden sharing. In western Europe, the INF debacle—in both its Carter and Reagan phases—contributed to the decline in respect for American leadership in handling world affairs and a growing skepticism and weakened attachment to NATO among the more highly educated.[42]

NATO governments, by and large, continued to support and implement the INF decision despite growing opposition in those states designated to receive the new missiles, but they often did so with embarrassingly close margins in their legislatures.

In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt first raised the alarm about a Eurostrategic imbalance in the mid-1970s and supported the INF decision while in office. In opposition, however, Schmidt's Social Democratic party denounced INF deployment in 1983 and endorsed a No-First-Use policy for NATO in May 1984. Greece dissociated itself from the INF decision, the Netherlands and Belgium voted to delay deployment of their allotted share of cruise missiles, and Denmark voted against paying its share of the INF infrastructure costs. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher's government held firm but the Labour Party opposition—despite the James Callaghan government having approved cruise in the 1970s—condemned the INF decision in the early 1980s and vowed to remove cruise and Pershing if and when they returned to office. In the summer of 1984 the British Liberal party broke ranks with its Social Democratic party partner to condemn INF, voted against continuation of an independent British deterrent, and endorsed a No-First-Use policy for NATO.

In Canada, antinuclear groups protested the testing of American cruise missiles over Canadian territory. Premier Pierre Trudeau refused to halt cruise tests but, in his last months in office, grew increasingly impatient with the pace of East-West arms control and tried to initiate a new five power strategic forum. Once out of office, Trudeau became a more outspoken critic of NATO arms control policy, claiming the process was dominated by technicians and nuclear accountants, and urging a more serious western approach at the MBFR talks in Vienna and a more sympathetic hearing for the Soviet proposal for a No-First-Use agreement at the Stockholm CSCBM conference.[43]

[42] Jonathan Dean, "Federal Germany After the Euromissiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 39 (December 1983): 31–38, and "How to Lose Germany," *Foreign Policy* 55 (Summer 1984): 54–72.

[43] See, for example, Trudeau's speech on receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, 13 November 1984, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, in the southern hemisphere, ANZUS pact allies, Australia and New Zealand, both balked at cooperation with the United States on nuclear matters. Prime Minister Robert Hawke refused to allow U.S. aircraft to use Australian bases to monitor a test of the MX missile, and Prime Minister David Lange refused to allow nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels to dock in New Zealand ports.[44] It is noteworthy that this same group of allies is the most reluctant to participate in the Reagan administration's SDI.

Conclusion

Several policy recommendations emerge from this analysis of the alliance arms control dilemma and the requirements for extended deterrence:

European anxieties about the United States commitment to NATO are best assuaged by political rather than military measures. This is because the collective security of the NATO countries, not only in terms of reassuring the West Europeans, but also in deterring military moves by the Warsaw Pact, rests at least as much on political cohesion as on strictly military capabilities. As long as NATO relies heavily on the nuclear component of its force posture, bilateral Soviet-United States efforts to control nuclear systems are likely to trigger fears of abandonment in some Europeans, and attempts to ease these fears with nuclear hardware will inevitably trigger fear of entrapment, a new bout of anti-Americanism, and intra-alliance tensions. European calls for reassurance should, therefore, be dealt with politically. In the arms control context this will mean either improving intra-alliance consultations or bringing the allies directly into the negotiations so that they share responsibility for the outcome. The long term solution, however, is to recognize that nuclear weapons have always been divisive in alliance politics, that nuclear explosives cannot defend territory and certainly cannot defend heavily urban western Europe, and that far from enhancing NATO's deterrent capability, land based nuclear systems on the continent are more likely to provoke Soviet preemption in a crisis.

Second, NATO doctrine should recognize that nuclear weapons can only serve a deterrent function, for which balanced nuclear forces are not required. NATO should decide on the absolute level of its deterrent force and withdraw redundant systems in as orderly a manner as possible, preferably in cooperation with the Soviet Union, but recognizing that unilateral reductions need not undermine either United States or West European security. Nuclear explosives are not military weapons and should not be treated as such, either by making plans for their use in battle or by insisting that nuclear arms control agreements be balanced.

Third, more useful than a formal No-First-Use declaration would be acceleration of the current trend towards a NATO force posture that implies No-Early or Very-Unlikely Use. Nuclear battlefield systems—and eventually all land-

[44] Editorial, "Anzus Unravelling," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 February 1985; John Goshko, "Australia Deals a New Blow to Anzus Alliance," *Washington Post*, 7 February 1985; "Lange to Visit U.S.: New Zealand to Defend Nuclear Ban," *Washington Post*, 19 February 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based nuclear forces—should be removed from western Europe, while retaining the option of First-Use of centrally or sea-based U.S. strategic systems. This threat would still be a powerful deterrent to Soviet military moves in a crisis, and such a posture would be less likely to generate European fears of abandonment than a formal declaration of No-First-Use. Yet, removing provocation and vulnerable land-based systems should also ease any fear of entrapment caused by the prospect of Too-Early-Use.

Fourth, in reducing reliance on the nuclear component of the deterrent, NATO planners should not make the non-nuclear component more offensive. This is the risk inherent in the current proposal for a NATO declaration on the No-First-Use of nuclear weapons, since it is usually coupled with a call for stronger conventional forces. Proponents claim that the threat of No-First-Use has lost its former credibility since Soviet-American parity makes any nuclear use suicidal. For West Europeans still leaning on the nuclear crutch, however, No-First-Use triggers fears of abandonment in the event of a Soviet attack, Ideally, then, the shift to No-First-Use should be preceded by an MBFR agreement setting limits on Soviet manpower in eastern Europe. Pulling back both sides' armored divisions would further reduce the offensive threat to both halves of Europe and make No-First-Use still more acceptable. This kind of restructuring might be difficult to achieve by contractual limits, because the compliance obligations would be asymmetrical. Nevertheless it is the kind of mutual offsetting of asymmetries that ought to be discussed, both at MBFR in Vienna and at the CSCBM conference in Stockholm.

Fifth, any major reductions of American nuclear weapons from western Europe should be accompanied by a reaffirmation of the commitment to keep American ground troops on the continent and to participate fully in NATO's integrated military command. This is not because the European members of NATO could not make up the military shortfall to NATO if the U.S. 7th Army withdrew—obviously they could—but because the most important component of peacetime deterrence is the American commitment to the political and territorial integrity of western Europe; U.S. troops are the most visible evidence of that commitment.

Finally, political leaders should be aware that public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic is ready for bolder steps to reduce the danger of nuclear war. The most impressive arms control achievements to date—the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention—came not from initiatives from the so-called experts, but primarily from strong grassroots pressure and from political leaders willing to take bold unilateral initiatives. The current generation of western leaders should take the public pulse more carefully and move ahead with dispatch, not only to negotiate agreements with the Soviets to preclude deployment of the next generation of nuclear weapons, but also with plans to dismantle currently-deployed systems that are redundant.*

* This manuscript is a revised and updated version of a presentation to the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute for Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota in November 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age

PETER H. ARGERSINGER

The Gilded Age has been popularly linked with political corruption ever since it acquired its name, redolent of fraud and artifice, from the title of the 1873 novel by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner. Subsequent scholars have generally followed Twain's lead and, in particular, have described the elections of the Gilded Age as being characterized by fraud and corruption. The highly competitive political system of the late nineteenth century, as Samuel T. McSeveney has written, "led to repeated charges, countercharges, and denials of corruption, coercion, bribery, and fraud—allegations that have been echoed by subsequent political biographers and historians. Taken at face value, these outcries would lead one to believe that the two parties alternated in cheating their opponents out of deserved victories." McSeveney could have easily added political scientists to the list of those who repeated the contemporary allegations of fraud. Philip E. Converse, in fact, has based a theory to explain the decline in voter turnout statistics in the early twentieth century on the elimination of massive electoral fraud he assumed to be characteristic of the earlier period. Rarely, however, have scholars carefully analyzed or documented the claims of widespread election fraud, and even Converse described the accounts of such fraud as "everywhere anecdotal."[1]

[1] Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 7; Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse, *The Human Meaning of Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage, 1972), 263–337, quote on 282.

PETER H. ARGERSINGER, associate professor of history at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, is the author of *Populism and Politics* and of numerous articles on American social and political history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recently, many of the practitioners of the "new political history" have sought to minimize the existence of election fraud in the Gilded Age, at least in the non-southern states. In contrast to Converse, they have argued that the recorded high rates of voter turnout reflected the voters' genuine attachments to the political parties and the values they represented. Emphasizing such concepts as party systems and secular realignment and seeking to explain the social basis of mass political behavior, these scholars have either ignored altogether the election corruption emphasized in traditional accounts or minimized its importance as highly colored but isolated incidents of relative insignificance compared to the larger processes that capture their attention.[2] In his study of late nineteenth-century politics, for instance, Richard Jensen claims to have examined "every known major case of significant election fraud, bribery, and coercion in the Midwest for the period together with a few cases that were never publicly known." His conclusion is that midwestern elections were quiet and honest with little evidence of "massive irregularities."[3] Building on Jensen's work, Walter Dean Burnham rejects the possibility of "pervasive vote frauds and overcounts" in the rural areas of Pennsylvania and New York as well as in such midwestern states as Iowa and Wisconsin.[4] Paul Kleppner and Stephen C. Baker also discount the charges of widespread electoral corruption, pointing out that "the evidentiary base underpinning these broad claims is quite thin" and consists mostly of secondary accounts.[5]

Howard W. Allen and Kay Warren Allen have undertaken the most extensive analysis of "the published literature" on "fraudulent election practices." Their conclusion is resolute: "The evidence to demonstrate the existence of election fraud in the [contemporary] literature is not only anecdotal, it is unsystematic, impressionistic, and by and large inconclusive. Almost all contemporary allegations of vote fraud were based primarily upon sweeping, generalized, often highly emotional charges substantiated in most cases by only the most fragile evidence, if supported at all."[6] The Allens and Kleppner and Baker also signifi-

[2] Converse finds "remarkable" the extent to which "modern scholars working on nineteenth-century voting data" have ignored accounts of election fraud. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," 282. John Reynolds believes that the different attention devoted to vote fraud "stands as one salient issue distinguishing the 'new' from the 'old' political histories." John Reynolds, "'The Silent Dollar': Vote Buying in New Jersey," *New Jersey History* 98 (Fall-Winter 1980): 191–211, quote on 194.

[3] Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 35–36.

[4] Walter Dean Burnham, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's 'Change in the American Electorate,' " *American Political Science Review* 68 (September 1974): 1018.

[5] Paul Kleppner and Stephen C. Baker, "The Impact of Voter Registration Requirements on Electoral Turnout, 1900–16," paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August–3 September 1979, 38. A revised version of this paper appears in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 8 (Fall 1980): 205–26. Citations in the present essay are to the more detailed APSA version.

[6] Howard W. Allen and Kay Warren Allen, "Vote Fraud and Data Validity," in Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, eds., *Analyzing Electoral History: A Guide to the Study*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cantly clarify the issue by examining those who made the charges of election fraud and asking what Kleppner and Baker term "the *relevant* questions: Who were these people socially? What were their objectives?" Conceding that this evidence is also "fragmentary and uneven," these scholars insist that those who made these allegations came from the upper levels of society, were reacting against the conditions of urbanizing, industrializing America, with its vast immigrant population, and hoped to weaken political parties and universal suffrage. Such "Mugwumps" thus assumed the existence of what they described, believing that corruption inevitably followed from universal suffrage and democracy. Their claims were thus more "deductive" from their perception of the political system than documented from reality.[7]

The Setting and Significance of Election Fraud

The new political historians seem to have a motive of their own in attempting to discount election fraud. This concern is most evident in the linked title of the Allens' work, "Vote Fraud and Data Validity." As the Allens write, "if elections were universally fraudulent, then the results of those elections are distortions of popular attitudes and of dubious validity. If election data are invalid, then the study of mass voting behavior is an exercise in futility." Election fraud, in short, would dramatically undermine the value of a number of recent and impressive political studies based on analysis of election data. Richard Jensen agrees: if fraud and bribery determined elections, "then elaborate analysis of campaigns and voting patterns is an exercise in cynicism and futility."[8]

To some extent, this concern is something of a misperception of the problem. Persistent electoral fraud poses a more serious obstacle to the traditional political historians whose analysis of election returns is limited to the simple dichotomy of victory or defeat. Their attempts to understand popular attitudes though such election analyses can carry little weight for the late nineteenth century anyway, for the period was characterized by high levels of partisanship and electoral competitiveness, and slight shifts in voting or turnout could turn whole elections. Democratic presidential candidate Winfield Hancock carried California in 1880 by 22 votes; at the same time Republican James Garfield carried the entire nation by only 8,000 votes. The quantitative analysis characteristic of the more sophisticated recent political studies, on the other hand, is based not on a dichotomous approach but on the use of descriptive statistics to analyze numerical data in terms of central tendencies, variances, and relationships

---

of American Voting Behavior (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), 155, 167, 179. Much of the work of the Allens and Kleppner and Baker is in explicit reaction to Converse's claims of "gross and endemic fraud."

[7] Kleppner and Baker, "The Impact of Voter Registration," 42–44; Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 181–83. See also Paul Kleppner, *Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 58–60.

[8] Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 154; Jensen, *Winning of the Midwest*, 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among interval variables. And while "massive fraud" injects distortion into any analysis, the reality of election fraud in the Gilded Age was its strategic, not massive, nature. Only in those areas where relatively minor changes in the recorded popular vote would result in a different electoral outcome was there any incentive for fraudulent activity. As Senator George Edmunds remarked in 1889, "divisions of parties in several of the States have been so close that the purchase of a comparatively small number of votes could easily turn the scale . . . and it can be assumed to be an undisputed fact that such temptation has been yielded to by the active managing agents of both the great political parties."[9] Moreover, as a politician of a later period liked to note about his supportive father, Joseph P. Kennedy, he was willing to buy as many votes as necessary to win, but he was damned if he would buy a single extra one.

Second to the highly competitive nature of the political system in encouraging or permitting fraud was the structure of the election process. For most of the period there was no secret ballot. Instead voters used party tickets, printed by the different parties, containing the names of only their own candidates, and often varying widely in size and color. Distributed at the polls by partisan "hawkers" or "ticket peddlers," these party tickets made the voter's choice of party a public act and rendered voters susceptible to various forms of intimidation and influence while facilitating vote buying. Most states did not have meaningful (or even any) registration laws, making it exceedingly difficult to determine voter eligibility, and the absence even of local residence requirements in such pivotal states as Indiana made possible the election-eve "colonization" of voters. Finally, election officials were generally partisan, rather than nonpartisan or even bipartisan, and mobs of excited party workers surrounded the polls.

A third but more diffuse factor which made election fraud possible was the existence among many segments of the electorate of a political culture that apparently accepted or tolerated electoral corruption. Such a political culture, with what it implies about citizens' expectations for politics and government, also obviously calls into question the interpretation of the Gilded Age electoral universe prevalent among the new political historians. Their view holds that voting was an act that expressed deeply felt cultural and religious values that were represented and implemented by the major parties, and that the party system satisfied the electorate. But widespread election fraud suggests that many voters did not regard their parties as essential vehicles of cultural expression nor their votes as especially important in either a symbolic or instrumental sense. Such a conflict may help explain the determination of these historians to minimize the existence of electoral corruption, though few have explicitly discussed it. Paul Kleppner, however, forcefully argues against the notion of pervasive election fraud precisely on the grounds that it would have been incompatible with the political culture described by the ethnocultural historians.[10] The subject of election fraud

[9] George F. Edmunds, "Corrupt Political Methods," *Forum* 7 (June 1889): 350–51.

[10] Kleppner and Baker, "The Impact of Voter Registration," 45; also see Jensen, *Winning of the Midwest*, 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus not only represents a challenge to the methodology of the new political history in terms of raising the problem of data validity, but also raises questions of deeper significance concerning the portrayal of political culture and the party system.

It is within this setting of electoral competitiveness, partisan or weak institutional arrangements, and an "indulgent" political culture that the issue of election fraud should be carefully evaluated. And to determine the nature and meaning of election fraud the scholar should consider not only the familiar sources already examined by recent scholars but alternative sources of information heretofore little utilized. The effort that follows is more suggestive than exhaustive.

Defining the Problem

First, of course, there is the problem of defining fraud. Scholars have often been careless in their use of the word "fraud," sometimes applying it in a nonspecific fashion, as did such disappointed partisans in the Gilded Age who simply attributed their defeat to "flagrant crimes against the ballot box."[11] Such scholars as Converse have assumed, on the other hand, that election fraud always had the effect of increasing the vote polled and thereby inflating apparent turnout rates. Howard Allen and Kay Warren Allen have sensibly considered the problem by attempting to differentiate between types of fraud and evaluating each. They emphasize the serious importance of fraud that violated the voters' "rational will," such as "falsification of the vote count by election officials," voter intimidation, and "repeating" or the casting of multiple ballots by one voter. Presumably this category would also include registration fraud, ballot-box stuffing, violence at the polls, impersonation, altering ballots to invalidate them or change their meaning, and altering returns. The Allens' other major category for vote fraud includes those techniques that ostensibly did not violate the voter's "rational will" and, therefore, should not be regarded as seriously. In this classification they place "heavy-handed political campaigning," such as employers warning their workers of possible unemployment in the event of a particular election outcome, and bribery, which they describe as a voter's "willing" acceptance of something in exchange for his ballot.[12]

It was, however, precisely the latter type of "corruption" that was most frequently alleged in the late nineteenth century, and so to define it away reduces the incidence of "vote fraud" while doing nothing to disprove the existence of an illegal activity viewed as troubling at the time. There is increasing evidence, moreover, that bribery and vote-buying were widely prevalent in Gilded Age elections. Genevieve Gist, for instance, has discovered massive vote-buying in rural Ohio, with up to 90 percent of the voters in Adams County selling their votes in the 1890s. As late as 1910, nearly 1,700 voters in that county, more than a

[11] Quoted in Jensen, *Winning of the Midwest*, 34.

[12] Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 156–57.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fourth of its electorate, were convicted of vote-selling.[13] More recently, John Reynolds has estimated that in New Jersey in the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era "perhaps as much as one third of the electorate commonly accepted money for their votes." Such vote-buying was so widespread as to be virtually "socially acceptable" among some groups and openly observed. A Newark newspaper noted in 1907 that "the reproach of the purchased ballot is usually aimed at the cities and the lodging houses therein, but the evil exists to a much greater extent in many rural sections, where even well-to-do farmers expect to be paid well for the loss of time in going to the polls for themselves and their laborers." Thus, "what was most often being 'purchased,'" notes Reynolds, "was not the voter's support for a given party or candidate, only his registering that choice on election day." In that sense, vote-buying would clearly correspond to the Allens' category of not violating the voter's rational will. But it was not simply patrician Mugwumps who denounced this practice. Governor David B. Hill told the New York legislature that such money spent to get out the vote was distributed under a "transparent excuse for bribery and corruption," for its "real design or effect is to influence the man whose teams or services are nominally employed." But Reynolds insists that vote-buying in this period "flourished not because voters or politicians were more corrupt, but because it was well suited to the party system" and to the highly competitive electoral system. Reynolds believes vote-buying did promote high turnout levels but, unlike Converse, believes it performed "a genuine public service."[14]

The more serious and disruptive forms of election fraud, however, remain to be studied carefully. As Reynolds observes, the widespread acceptance of vote-buying means "more is known about bribery at the polls than [is known about] the clandestine acts of a few election officials." Other scholars agree as to the difficulty of the task. "Successful dirty politics, by definition," concludes Jensen, "is never discovered." Burnham believes it a "virtual impossibility" to specify vote fraud. And the Allens note, "The very nature of the subject matter, of course, like other illegal, immoral, or irregular activities, makes it unlikely that conclusive documentary evidence of fraud will be found. Few individuals were likely to have recorded for posterity their involvement in such acts."[15]

Part of the difficulty, however, lies in the limited nature of the historical evi-

[13] Genevieve Gist, "Progressive Reform in a Rural Community: The Adams County Vote-Fraud Case," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 48 (June 1961): 60–78.

[14] Reynolds, "Vote Buying in New Jersey," 194, 196, 201, 204, 209; Harold F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and his New York Machine* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1924), 146. These instances of rural fraud suggest the necessary modification of the still popular view equating election fraud with urban areas. Certainly other observers agreed with the Newark editor. The Cincinnati *Times-Star*, a Republican newspaper, claimed that Ohio's small towns and rural areas held fraudulent elections and that rural politicians could give "pointers" to city bosses on election fraud. The mugwumpish *Nation* agreed that the same was true for "the country districts" of New York and New England. *Nation*, 5 May 1892, 333.

[15] Reynolds, "Vote Buying in New Jersey," 194; Jensen, *Winning of the Midwest*, 35; Burnham, "Theory and Voting Research," 1017; Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 155–56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence so far examined. As Kleppner and Baker remark, analyses of nineteenth-century electoral corruption have been invariably based on such contemporary journals as *Century, Forum, The Nation,* and *North American Review.* "What we know, or think we know, of the operation of the electoral process in the nineteenth century derives largely from this corpus of contemporary materials."[16] And, together with Howard Allen and Kay Warren Allen, they have clearly demonstrated the undocumented and biased character of such literature. It should be noted, however, that that was the nature of the type of literature they were examining—undocumented essays in generalist journals directed to the literate and respectable public.[17] It need not follow that the substance was inaccurate because the style was suspect and the motive self-seeking.

New Evidence of Fraud

There is, in fact, a wide array of other types of contemporary literature alleging the existence of election fraud, the authors of which differ in almost every imaginable way from the elitist Mugwumps exposed by the Allens and Kleppner. These sources include books, correspondence, and newspapers written by members of groups prominent among the democratic elements of the electorate. Spokesmen of the frequent third parties of the time continually complained of various kinds of election fraud. In an autobiography, a Pennsylvania Greenbacker of the 1870s described the counting out of his party by local election judges who simply credited Democratic candidates with enough votes to carry the district.[18] In his autobiography, a Detroit Socialist recalled false counts and ballot box stuffing against his party and an investigation that revealed ballot box tampering in an unsuccessful effort to cheat an elected Socialist out of his seat.[19] Agrarian parties of the western states similarly attacked election officials for illegal behavior. In private correspondence, one member of the Minnesota Farmers' Alliance lamented, "The rotten Democratic returning board of Morrison County have counted me out" by one vote, returned after all judges went to bed except one who was himself a candidate. The Democratic officials, the Allianceman concluded, were a "gang of unscrupulous ballot box manipulators." Other members of agrarian third parties complained privately of "repeaters" and of "the colonizing of voters" used against their candidates.[20] In more public actions, Kansas Populists in 1893 contested eighteen legislative elections awarded to Republican candidates by the Republican-controlled State

[16] Kleppner and Baker, "The Impact of Voter Registration," 39.

[17] See, for example, William M. Armstrong, "Godkin's *Nation* as a Source of Gilded Age History: How Valuable?" *South Atlantic Quarterly* 72 (Autumn 1973): 476–93.

[18] *The Path I Trod: The Autobiography of Terence V. Powderly* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 68–71.

[19] Richard Oestreicher, "Socialism and the Knights of Labor in Detroit, 1877–1886," *Labor History* 22 (Winter 1981):11–12.

[20] R. C. Dunn to Ignatius Donnelly, 27 November 1890; C. P. Carpenter to Donnelly, 28 October 1890, Ignatius Donnelly Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Board of Canvassers. One Republican candidate had been awarded the election certificate because of the transposition of voting totals with his Populist opponent, a maneuver of the Republican county clerk that the State Board acknowledged but refused to correct. Other Republicans declared elected included ineligible postmasters and nonresidents, and the Populists challenged still others on the basis of illegal votes, bribery, and miscount of ballots. Third party newspapers regularly reported instances of election fraud. In 1878, for instance, an Indianapolis Greenback paper charged Republicans with practicing repeating, bribery, and fraudulent vote counting as flagrantly in Indiana as Democrats did in the South. An Iowa Populist newspaper in the 1890s had an all-inclusive indictment of its Republican opponents, accusing them of "fraud, intimidation, coercion, bribery, false promises, illegal voting, and ballot box stuffing."[21]

Labor organizations and representatives were even more vociferous and frequent in their complaints of various kinds of election fraud. Not surprisingly, much of the chorus was directed against intimidation of workers by their employers. The worker's political desires, the *Journal of United Labor* declared, were "smothered by the decree of his employer, who dictates what ticket he must vote." Knights of Labor leader Terence Powderly attacked, on the other hand, "the system by which votes are counted" as "so flagrantly corrupt that it is the easiest thing in the world to purchase venal election officials." Labor candidates Benjamin Butler in 1884 and Henry George in 1886 both complained that ballots cast for them in New York City were counted for their Democratic opponents.[22] One labor editor viewed the voting system in as sweeping terms as any Mugwump: "Between the bribery of the voters, the intimidation by employers, and the use of fraudulent ballots by corrupt politicians, to say nothing of the opportunities under present methods for a stuffing of the ballot by dishonest inspectors, . . . the will of the people is oftener outraged than respected."[23]

But if agrarian and labor representatives agreed with the Mugwumps as to the existence of labor fraud, their motives and concerns were different. Conceding that immigrants were often the bribed voters, one Knights of Labor editor insisted, "Yet it is not they who should be damned; but the system which makes such a state of affairs possible and the men who uphold it." In attacking that electoral system, laborites, Single Taxers, Populists, Greenbackers, Nationalists, and Socialists demanded reforms to liberate the voter and promote democracy, including the abolition of poll taxes, the adoption of women's suffrage, and the

[21] Peter H. Argersinger, *Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People's Party* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 153; Indianapolis *Daily Sun*, 9, 10, 18 October 1878; Des Moines *Farmers Tribune*, 11 November 1896.

[22] *Journal of United Labor* (Philadelphia), 8 August 1889, 10 September 1886; *Butler's Book. Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin F. Butler* (Boston: Thayer, 1892), 983–84; Charles A. Barker, *Henry George* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 474, 479, 481.

[23] *Journal of United Labor*, 14 February 1889.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishment of direct elections. Mugwumps, on the other hand, proposed not to expand but to restrict democracy, championing suffrage limitations by education, property, and nativity and the appointment, rather than the election, of public officials. While all critics sought to curtail election fraud by advocating the Australian ballot system, with its provisions for a secret ballot instead of party tickets and for public rather than partisan control of the election process, Mugwumps viewed the reform as a way to weaken the political parties that functioned to mobilize the mass electorate. Populists, Greenbackers, laborites, and related groups saw the reform as a vehicle to end intimidation of voters and increase popular influence in the political system.[24]

Finally, despite the common belief in the primacy of the Mugwump element in the spread of the Australian ballot reform, caused at least in part again by scholars relying on a restricted body of historical evidence, Greenbackers, laborites, and Single Taxers were often more influential in pressing for reform of the ballot system, however perverted those "reforms" sometimes became in practice. The first Australian ballot bill introduced in a state legislature, for instance, was written by George Walthew, a Greenbacker in the 1885 Michigan legislature, and two years later Judson Grenell, a socialist Knight of Labor legislator, revised the bill and secured its passage in the Michigan assembly. But even they had predecessors, such as Ohio Greenback legislator John Seitz. Seitz's campaign to enact a bill "to preserve the purity of elections" succeeded in 1879 when he was able to take advantage of the public outrage produced by startling revelations of fraud in Ohio's congressional elections.[25]

Thus, there were many observers besides the elitist and antidemocratic elements who complained of election fraud and mobilized to restrict it, and the literature of these other groups is readily available and should no longer be overlooked.

There are, moreover, other sources besides the secondary accounts cited by the Allens that provide ample documentation of the common existence of various kinds of election fraud. It is not necessary to rely on reformers' allegations, for legal records, official investigations, and politicians' own statements (public and private) all lend support. Whether such frauds were systemic or destructive of the validity of election statistics is perhaps difficult to determine, but their existence is certain. Their putative unimportance follows only if those reported represent most of those that occurred, a possibility already discounted above.

Howard W. Allen and Kay Warren Allen note that "rarely have politicians admitted to having committed vote fraud."[26] But given its illegal nature, it is instead surprising how many such confessions are readily available. Some examples appear in political correspondence that went astray and received great contemporary publicity. Perhaps the most notorious of these was the letter written by

[24] Ibid.; Henry George, "Money in Elections," *North American Review* 136 (1883): 201–211.

[25] L. E. Fredman, *The Australian Ballot* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), 35; Allen Myers, *Bosses and Boodle in Ohio Politics* (Cincinnati: Lyceum, 1895), 142–43.

[26] Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 192n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Republican campaign official in 1888 instructing Indiana party workers to "Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five and make him responsible that none get away and that all vote our ticket." The *New York Times* accurately called this letter "a direct incitement to criminal acts. It is an election day handbook for the official vote buyers and bribery corps of the Republicans in Indiana."[27] Other confessions are contained in correspondence that retained its private character at the time, only to be exposed by subsequent scholars. Thus, 1880 Democratic National Chairman William H. Barnum, anticipating Republican fraudulent activity, instructed his party workers "to organize some plan to keep even with them."[28] The private correspondence of Horace Congar, a member of New Jersey's Republican executive committee, reveals that party officials regarded vote buying as a standard feature of their campaign effort because of what one called "a large purchasable element among the voters." The party leaders were concerned about the prompt distribution of money to purchase such votes because "our workers *will not* make the necessary promises and arrangements unless the funds are *in hand* to meet them."[29] Republican Governor Francis Warren of Wyoming Territory enlisted employer intimidation from railroads and other large employers, writing one hotel operator, "I hope you will see your way clear to persuade all the voters at the Pacific Hotels in Wyoming to agree with us."[30] The cryptic phrasing required in such letters was also evident in the correspondence of James Garfield and W. W. Dudley to encourage John D. Rockefeller to cooperate with a Standard Oil supervisor who "would like to bring all his men into line" for the Republicans. Garfield was warned that it was "risky writing" of such plans for corporate intimidation of employees.[31]

Another type of political confession involves reminiscences or later testimony by party leaders. San Francisco boss Chris Buckley, for example, admitted that the number of votes reported from his precincts was limited "only by the modesty of the election officials." The notorious William M. Tweed himself admitted upon interrogation substantially the same for New York: "The ballots made no result; the counters made the result."[32] Such actions were sometimes so flagrant as to outrage even members of the offending party, and their anguished disclosures of that corrupt conduct constitute evidence of election fraud more persuasive than the accusations of opponents. In New Jersey in the 1890s, for in-

[27] *New York Times,* 2 November 1888.

[28] William H. Barnum to William H. English, 10 and 17 August 1880, William H. English Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Ind.

[29] Reynolds, "Vote Buying in New Jersey," 197–98.

[30] Lewis L. Gould, *Wyoming: A Political History, 1868–1896* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 102, 117–18.

[31] Herbert J. Clancy, *The Presidential Election of 1880* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1958), 194n; Robert D. Marcus, *Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 55.

[32] Alexander Callow, Jr., "San Francisco's Blind Boss," *Pacific Historical Review* 25 (August 1956): 265; M. R. Werner, *Tammany Hall* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1928), 130, 134.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stance, a number of Democratic politicians formed an association to protest their own party's use of "all sorts of trickery, bribery, deception, fraud, ballot box stuffing, false registering, perjured Election Officers, etc."[33]

At times, personal animosities led to confessions of election fraud. For instance, one small-time Baltimore politico implicated himself in bribery, repeating, intimidation, and colonization when he exposed an operation because someone else was getting the credit for his own success in arranging vote fraud. John Dugan confessed that he had taken nine hoodlums from the Baltimore jail to the nearby village of Clarksville, where he lined them up, "and we filed past the poll. Each dropped in his ballot. Then we kept going around in a circle, each of us putting a ballot in every time round, until we had polled several hundred votes. We voted until we had voted all the names on the register, and we could not do more than that, could we?"[34]

Although the postelection grumbles of the losers can be discounted, there were other ways in which political leaders revealed the existence and dimensions of election fraud. Partisan newspapers all conceded the prevalence of vote buying. As the *Watertown* (N.Y.) *Times* noted in 1888, "Both parties were into it by mutual consent, and feeling secure from this cause there has been no secrecy in it. Men openly boast of buying and voters boast of the price they were able to get." An Indiana Democratic newspaper exulted that in the struggle to buy the "floating vote," "although the Republicans had lots of 'boodle,' the Democrats got a good share of them."[35] The equanimity with which some forms of political corruption were accepted was weakened only by their cost to party treasuries. In some instances, political leaders even agreed across party lines to standardize bribery practices and prices. Actions ostensibly taken to end vote bribery were frequently more protective than destructive, indicating again the practical acceptance of such tactics despite the often outraged rhetoric. After massive election bribery was exposed in New Jersey in 1883, for example, the legislature passed a new antibribery law, the actual purpose of which was to void the indictments for bribery then pending under earlier laws. Similarly in Maryland in 1887, a score of Baltimore election judges awaiting trial for election fraud escaped prosecution when the legislature repealed the law under which they had been indicted and then reenacted it without providing for pending prosecutions.[36]

Legal Sources

Despite these subterfuges, legal records do constitute another source of information concerning election fraud. The Allens argue that if election fraud were

[33] Thomas Weldon to W. H. H. Miller, 1 May 1891, Justice Department: Letters Received, Box 258, Record Group 60, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[34] *New York Times*, 17 May 1880.

[35] Watertown (N.Y.) *Times*, quoted in ibid., 19 November 1888; Marcus, *Grand Old Party*, 145.

[36] Richard P. McCormick, *The History of Voting in New Jersey: A Study of the Development of Election Machinery, 1664–1911* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 150–51, 167; Charles J. Bonaparte, "Political Corruption in Maryland," *Forum* 13 (March 1892): 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extensive, court cases should have been cited in the literature.[37] But the absence of such citations reflects more the nature of the popular literature surveyed than the absence of election fraud. There are, however, peculiarities about the judicial decisions recorded in the *Reporter* series that serve to limit the indications of such crimes. The cases recorded include only those appealed to a higher court on a point of law rather than the more typical routine violations and convictions. Nevertheless, even this publishing practice provides suggestive hints of election tactics across a wide spectrum, as even a cursory examination of decisions reveals: Maine politicians admitted bribing voters but argued that it was not illegal; an Indiana politician admitted bribing voters and the illegality of that act but argued that the prohibitory law was unconstitutional; a St. Louis politician admitted registry fraud but argued that there was no proof that the names he copied into the registry were of real people and, therefore, no crime had been committed; New York politicians also admitted falsifying registration lists but argued that a technicality in the law's language exempted them from prosecution in a particular jurisdiction; a Vermonter charged with repeating argued that his first vote was illegal and should not have been accepted, making his second vote acceptable; Pennsylvania election officials convicted for conspiracy to defraud by making false returns argued that the state had to prove they entered into such conspiracy before becoming election officers rather than merely as they falsified the returns; an Ohio politician convicted of adding fraudulent ballots to the ballot box during the count argued that the law prohibited only election officials, not bystanders, from such behavior.[38] Even without resulting in convictions of specific culprits, other cases provided incontrovertible evidence of impersonation, ballot box tampering, ballot falsification, and other acts of election fraud as courts spelled out procedural rules for conducting elections.[39] For the still larger bulk of legal evidence of election fraud, scholars will simply have to examine the local contemporary newspapers and unpublished court records. Only that painstaking work will reveal the common arrests and convictions for ballot box stuffing, repeating, miscounting, and false registration.[40]

Other aspects of the availability of legal evidence are also relevant to understanding and examining election fraud. State courts consistently ruled that

[37] Allen and Allen, "Vote Fraud," 176.

[38] *State v. Jackson*, 73 Me. 91, 40 Am. Rep. 342 (1881); *State v. Schoonover*, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. Rep. 119 (1893); *United States v. O'Connor*, 31 Fed. Rep. 449 (1887); *New York Times*, 21 November 1888; *State v. Perkins*, 42 Vt. 399 (1869); *Commonwealth v. Shaub*, 5 Lanc. Law Rev. 121; *United States v. Fisher*, (C.C.) 8 Fed. 414 (1881).

[39] For examples, see respectively *United States v. Chamberlain*, (D.C.) 32 Fed. 777 (1887); *United States v. Hayden*, Fed. Cas. No. 15,333; *Conway v. Carpenter*, (Pa. 1881), 11 Wkly. Notes Cas. 169; *Russell v. State*, 11 Kan. 308 (1873). An example of the incompletely developed institutional structure facilitating election fraud occurred in Rhode Island when it was determined that impersonation was *not* illegal if the voter did not also vote under his own name, which would have rendered him guilty of the crime of repeating. *State v. McClarnon*, 15 R.I. 462, 8 Atl. Rep. 688 (1887).

[40] For instance, see Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, 8 October 1884, for a description of the Cincinnati election which resulted in the conviction of twenty-three men for violating election laws with sentences of up to thirteen months in prison.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ballots could not be released for use as evidence in investigations and trials of election officials charged with criminal behavior such as ballot-box stuffing. The California supreme court, for instance, conceded in 1892 that such ballots constituted "the best means of proving" frauds by election officers but noted that state legislatures invariably passed laws prohibiting their use for "the enforcement of the . . . penalties for frauds of election officers." In 1895 the Missouri supreme court ruled similarly, with a statement suggestive of the political culture in which such frauds were practiced: "The tyranny of giant corporations and concentrated wealth on the one hand, and the combinations of laborers and workingmen on the other, to say nothing of the influence of parties, make it exceedingly difficult for any save a bold and courageous man to vote an open ticket, and the courts should be exceedingly careful, therefore, in discrediting the secret ballot" by permitting its use as trial evidence.[41] Thus many potential court cases never materialized because the "best" evidence was excluded from consideration.

Finally, the relative lack of legal citations for widespread election fraud might also reflect the failure of partisan grand juries to indict or juries to convict obviously guilty officials. Such failures, in turn, indicate the tolerant attitudes that large segments of the political community held toward electoral corruption. In 1880, in Philadelphia, for instance, nearly three dozen Republican election officers were arrested for election frauds that one newspaper described as "protean in shape, from the destruction and changing of ballots to the altering of returns after the votes had been counted." But the grand jury refused to indict the officials, and the district attorney had to postpone action on political offenses until a new grand jury convened. "Clearly the remedies against frauds at the ballot box were in the hands of a political Grand Jury," one newspaper concluded. Protected by such political influence, partisan election officers "had become comparatively indifferent regarding the concealment of their methods and practices."[42] In Indianapolis in 1886 a grand jury failed to indict anyone for election frauds despite overwhelming evidence. The presiding judge was astonished and sharply censured the jury for its apparent partisan motivation. In another midwestern city, an all-Democratic jury refused to return indictments against Democratic election officals despite voluminous evidence of repeaters, colonized voters, and other fraudulent acts. Local Greenbackers charged that the grand jury was "run as a partisan machine" and "manipulated by politicians to defeat justice and shield criminals because they are Democrats." Indeed, they concluded, "the machinery of justice in this county is so securely held by the Democratic party that fraudulent voting cannot now be punished."[43] Such partisan behavior by juries should not be surprising given the recognized partisan

[41] *Ex parte Brown*, 97 Cal. 83, 31 Pac. Rep. 840 (1892); *Ex Parte Arnold*, 128 Mo. 256, 30 S.W. Rep. 768 (1895).

[42] *New York Times*, 15 April 1880.

[43] Indianapolis *Sun*, 9 July 1878; Princeton (Ind.) *Clarion*, 9 December 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nature of other governmental bodies at the time, including election officials as well as police, legislatures, and civil bureaucracies.

Official investigations by state and federal governments constitute another source of evidence for election fraud. In 1885, for instance, Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitney summarized an investigation of electoral intimidation in the government's own navy yard: "the vote of the yard was practically coerced and controlled by the foremen . . . . The men were obliged to take their ballots in a folded form from a table presided over by one or more of the foremen, hold the ballot in sight while walking to the polls, 100 feet distant, between men stationed for the purpose of preventing any change of ballots on their part, and the ballot deposited without the voter having had the opportunity to see or know its contents or to exercise any choice for whom he should cast his ballot."[44]

Though congressional investigations were often partisan themselves and must be used judiciously, they often provide indisputable proof of election fraud, as when the minority report concedes such behavior or when witnesses confessed to their own illegal activities. To a congressional committee investigating intimidation and fraud in Massachusetts, for instance, a Republican party official admitted urging employers to pressure their workers to vote for the GOP, while the Republican state chairman admitted bribing voters in Boston. In an investigation of widespread violations of election law by Republican election officials in Cincinnati in 1884, one Democratic election supervisor casually testified that Democrats regularly and severely beat with wagon spokes any blacks who attempted to vote and drove them away from the polls.[45]

Evidence taken before congressional committees hearing contested election cases sometimes demonstrated intimidation, bribery, colonization, and other fraudulent practices. Certainly the relatively small proportion of congressional elections contested on such grounds does not accurately reflect the incidence of such practices. As Speaker of the House Thomas B. Reed conceded, never was Congress more completely partisan than in determining such contests. It made little sense to go to the expense and trouble of contesting elections, regardless of the grounds, unless one's own party already controlled the chamber. Even then other factors often proved decisive. The effort made by Ignatius Donnelly to contest his defeat in an 1878 Minnesota congressional election, documented with bribery, voter intimidation, and other illegal election practices, is illustrative. The Republican defense against such charges was that such practices were followed by all parties and, therefore, not of particular relevance.[46]

Indeed, the widespread acceptance of election fraud as appropriate and om-

[44] Detroit *Free Press*, 23 April 1885.

[45] U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Inquire into Frauds in the Late Elections, *Intimidation and Fraud in Massachusetts*, Report No. 497, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., 1880, 89, 90, 105, 108; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Lot Wright, U.S. Marshal*, Report No. 2681, 48th Cong., 2d Sess., 1885, xviii-xix, 459–61, 465, 474.

[46] Thomas B. Reed, "Contested Elections," *North American Review* 151 (July 1890): 112–20; Martin Ridge, *Ignatius Donnelly: The Portrait of a Politician* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 187–95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nipresent sometimes actually militated against complaints about it. As one Indiana newspaper declared in reflecting this general attitude, "in the race for place and power, it is every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost. The man who gains a seat in Congress through a contest is looked upon as occupying a place he is not entitled to." In urging Democrats not to contest their defeats, this Democratic newspaper noted that "There was undoubtedly bulldozing and buying of votes, in a moderate and quiet way, on both sides, and means used to secure votes not in accordance with even political honesty and fair dealing," but "as elections are now conducted, we are of the opinion that . . . [the Republican candidates were] fairly elected."[47]

Perhaps of more use in evaluating the presence of election fraud, although subject to many of the same limitations, are the contested cases argued at the level of the state legislatures. Though more difficult to investigate than congressional cases, these data indicate the prevalence of various kinds of election fraud. A few examples are suggestive. The Kansas Populists contested eighteen legislative seats in 1893 on grounds of violation of election laws. An 1889 investigation by the Committee on Elections of the Rhode Island General Assembly uncovered widespread vote-buying and election corruption "almost beyond belief." In Montana in 1889 partisan actions of election officials (characterized by the *New York Times* as equivalent to those of "Southern returning boards") resulted in five contested election cases. These provided fascinating testimony explaining the monetary limits of vote-buying per voter and, ultimately, led to the organization of two legislatures and the election of four different United States senators. This type of election fraud perhaps reached its apogee in the celebrated 1891 "steal of the senate" in New York when Democrats gained control of that body by the partisan disposition of contested election cases.[48] Another legislative investigation, in New Jersey in 1890, found evidence of "extensive frauds . . . covering so many precincts and so connected in method and purpose as to demonstrate a common conspiracy." The Senate elections committee took 2,800 pages of testimony documenting false registrations, widespread repeating, colonizing, intimidation, miscounting, and illegal ballots. Ultimately, sixty-six men were sent to prison for their involvement in these practices.[49] Another form of election fraud revealed by a study of legislative sources is illustrated by the 1897 Indiana legislature's voting on partisan lines to unseat Populists who, all reports conceded, had received the majority of popular votes cast in their districts.[50]

[47] Plymouth (Ind.) *Democrat*, quoted in Princeton (Ind.) *Clarion*, 7 December 1882.

[48] William E. Parrish, "The Great Kansas Legislative Imbroglio of 1893," *Journal of the West* 7 (October 1968): 471–90; *New York Times*, 1 June 1889; James Hamilton, *From Wilderness to Statehood: A History of Montana* (Portland, Oregon: Binfords and Mort, 1957), 558–65; Arthur Wallace Dunn, *From Harrison to Harding: A Personal Narrative*, vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1922), 50–51; Matthew Hale, "How the New York Senate was Captured," *Forum* 13 (April 1892): 179–92.

[49] *Journal of the Forty-sixth Senate of the State of New Jersey* (Trenton, N.J.: Sharp Printing Co., 1890), 720–51, quote on 721; McCormick, *History of Voting in New Jersey*, 171–73.

[50] *Journal of the Indiana House of Representatives, 1897* (Indianapolis, 1897), 360–65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deflationary Fraud

Finally, while it is not the intention in this article to enter the controversy between Converse and others as to the precise level of voting fraud, it is incorrect to assume that fraud always inflated turnout statistics, as Converse believes.[51] Much substantiated election fraud involved manipulations, miscounting, or discarding of actual ballots by corrupt election officials rather than repeating or ballot-box stuffing.[52] Violence and intimidation at the polls, which caused many voters *not* to vote, was another type of "deflationary" fraud. Indeed, violence was a common characteristic of Gilded Age elections and not at all limited to the South. The United States Marshal for Philadelphia admitted in 1881 that fraudulent voting and violence were so endemic in that city that "Never an election goes by without a riot" and in some wards "scarcely an election goes by without somebody being killed." A Cincinnati newspaper reported as a quiet election one in which only eight people were killed. In many cities riots were often orchestrated to drive people away from the polls, with protection provided for those carrying the "right" party ticket. A midwest newspaper noted in 1884 that nearly everywhere in America voting was "an arduous task attended by . . . personal danger. Every peaceable man and every household dread the approach of election day."[53] Such turmoil at the polls was so characteristic that the Kansas supreme court ruled in 1887 that election violence, including fights between rival party challengers, threats of physical retaliation, and "boisterous conduct," constituted only "a slight disturbance and casual fray, such as frequently occurs at elections" and would not "vitiate an election, or justify voters in abandoning the polls."[54] One New York City election inspector reported: "I think it next to impossible for any man to go down and get a square vote at that precinct unless he had a regiment of soldiers with fixed bayonets . . . . The crowd got around me and threatened my life, so that I was advised I had better leave, and did so, as I did not want to be killed." Richard Croker, eventually to become Tammany boss, got his political start as a bully to intimidate possible Republican voters

[51] For a recent and imaginative demonstration of the existence and importance of "deflationary fraud" achieved by paying voters to stay away from the polls, see Gary W. Cox and J. Morgan Kousser, "Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (November 1981): 646–63. For another view of turnout statistics that is relevant to this controversy, see Ray M. Shortridge, "Estimating Voter Participation," in Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, *Analyzing Electoral History*, 137–52.

[52] In addition to previous citations, see particularly D. W. Lusk, *Eighty Years of Illinois: Politics and Politicians* (Springfield, Ill.: Rokker, 1889), 481; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 14 April 1880.

[53] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Alleged Frauds in the Late Elections*, Report No. 916, 46th Cong., 3d Sess., 1880, 22; Cincinnati *Enquirer*, 15 October 1884; George W. McCrary, "Our Election Laws," *North American Review* 128 (May 1879): 451; Princeton (Ind.) *Clarion*, 20 November 1884.

[54] *Tarbox v. Sughrue*, 12 Pac. Rep. 935 (1887). The court also ruled that illegal voting or fraud would not necessarily invalidate an election; there had to be sufficient demonstrated illegal ballots to change the result.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and as a repeater, voting seventeen times in one election. In 1874 he was arrested for murdering one opponent at the polls.[55]

Other forms of election fraud that reduced, rather than increased, turnout included repeated verbal challenges, sometimes "unduly prolonged by the connivance of the [election] judges," by which legal voters were "unable to reach the [voting] window and actually tender their ballots." In some cities, turnout was reduced by the partisan use of law officers to arrest voters of the opposing party to keep them from the polls. The Cincinnati police, controlled by the Democratic city administration, in 1884 made a sweep through an area of heavy black population and arbitrarily arrested 113 black males on election eve and sequestered them in a basement under the jail until the polls closed the next day, whereupon they were released without charges ever being pressed.[56] In St. Louis 1,028 deputy marshals, appointed by Republican federal officials, arrested hundreds of Democrats to prevent their voting, and then released them without charges.[57]

The combination of violence at the polls and the role of law officers suggests one last source of information on election practices virtually ignored by historians and political scientists. This involves the records of the Department of Justice generated by the implementation of the Federal Election Laws.[58] Although usually incorrectly regarded as part of Reconstruction legislation, the Federal Election Laws, passed in 1870–71 and not repealed until 1894, applied to elections in the North and represented the federal government's only effort to regulate elections until the second half of the twentieth century. These laws were passed in response to election fraud in the North and were designed to end impersonation, repeating, intimidation, and bribery in congressional elections or voting registrations. They authorized the appointment of federal supervisors of elections and of deputy marshals to assist the supervisors and maintain order.

Northern Democrats charged the Federal Election Laws with actually encouraging election fraud. As the deputies were federal appointees, they were invariably Republican. Indeed, deputies were usually chosen from lists supplied by local Republican party officials. Democrats maintained that such deputies intimidated potential Democratic voters, particularly immigrants. The number of deputies was often quite large, as in New York in 1892 when 8,000 deputies were appointed. At times such deputies served on election day as Republican party

[55] Werner, *Tammany Hall*, 150; Lothrop Stoddard, *Master of Manhattan: The Life of Richard Croker* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1931), 46, 56.

[56] George W. McCrary, *A Treatise on the American Law of Elections* (Chicago: Callaghan, 1897), 130n; Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, 15 October 1884; U.S. Congress, *Lot Wright*, xx. Those who promised to vote the Democratic ticket (at 60¢ each) were released in time to do so.

[57] U.S., *Congressional Record*, 53rd Cong., 1st Sess., vol., 25, pt. 2, p. 2046.

[58] In Record Group (RG) 60, Department of Justice, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C., these papers contain a wealth of information, but apparently only Albie Burke has used them for any published work, and that was for a quite different purpose. See Albie Burke, "Federal Regulation of Congressional Elections in Northern Cities, 1871–1894," *American Journal of Legal History* 14 (January 1970): 17–34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers, distributing Republican tickets at the polls they were supposed to police. Some marshals even aided Republican repeaters in illegal voting and impersonation. In a revealing indication of partisan emotions and election day practices, Delaware's Democratic legislature in 1881 passed a resolution authorizing the state to defend all persons indicted for assaulting U.S. marshals or voting illegally. An Ohio Democratic newspaper demonstrated the same sentiments and the common reality of election violence when it denied the legitimacy of federal deputies in elections and maintained that "They can all be kicked and cuffed about like ordinary citizens, and will be compelled to take their chances with common people on election day."[59]

Republicans, of course, countered that the Federal Election Laws limited election fraud. Court decisions based on the application of the laws demonstrated the validity of this assertion, at least in some instances. In 1880, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Baltimore judges for resisting the authority of federal supervisors who tried to stop them from stuffing the ballot box. Moreover, Republicans believed that the mere presence of federal deputies often averted possible vote fraud. The U.S. marshal in Chicago in 1882, for example, reported that his deputies "kept thousands of repeaters and illegal voters from the polls" and had to arrest only ten persons for actually violating election laws.[60] On the other hand, an 1880 congressional investigating committee concluded that the Federal Election Laws were administered in such a partisan fashion that, rather than protecting the ballot, they simply served as tools to promote Republican interests.[61] In any event, the records of the supervisors and marshals contain considerable information on election practices and election fraud that must be examined.

Conclusions

Scholars must recognize that election fraud, whatever its precise level or influence, was a common characteristic of Gilded Age elections. Arduous work remains to be done, but by consulting these new sources of information the full parameters of the subject will become clear. Obviously, allegations of voting fraud did not come solely from elitist Mugwumps or always signify an underlying determination to restrict the democratic aspects of the political system, whatever the final outcome of electoral "reform" might have been. But just as

[59] Cincinnati *Enquirer*, 21 September, 7 October 1878; A. M. Jones to Benjamin H. Brewster, 5 December 1882, Justice Department, RG 60, NA; Albie Burke, "Federal Regulation of Congressional Elections in Northern Cities, 1871–1894" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968), ii–iii, 169–71; U.S. Congress, *Alleged Frauds*, 1880, xi; *New York Times*, 28 January 1881.

[60] *Ex parte Siebold*, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Jones to Brewster, 5 December 1882, Justice Department, RG 60, NA.

[61] U.S. Congress, *Alleged Frauds*, 1880, iv, xi–xii. For other evidence of partisanship in election administration and of "riot and bloodshed" at the polls, see A. M. Jones to Charles Devens, 27 October 1880, Lot Wright to Benjamin Brewster, 25 September 1884, and Channing Richards to Benjamin Brewster, 27 October 1884, Justice Department, RG 60, NA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obviously, election fraud was rooted in the political system. The interaction among the institutional framework, the competitive partisan balance of the party system, and an indulgent political culture encouraged and made possible election fraud in the Gilded Age. Any changes in those interrelated factors would affect the incidence of election fraud.[62] And as even one Mugwump reformer in New York City noted, election abuses were more "directly attributable to the insufficiency of our election laws" than to "any inherent tendency to corruption."[63] Scholars must recognize that legal and political determinants of the actual conduct of elections often shaped electoral outcomes as much as did issues, candidates, or the social bases of mass political behavior.

[62] See, for example, Reynolds, "Vote Buying in New Jersey," 204–09. Of course the turn-of-the-century political transformation involving these factors had other important results as well. For suggestive comments with respect to matters of governance and forms of political participation, see Richard L. McCormick, *From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893–1910* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981).

[63] William Ivins, *Machine Politics and Money in Elections in New York City* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887), 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

(*Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685*)

1. Title of publication: *Political Science Quarterly.* (a) Publication number: 437260.

2. Date of filing: September 23, 1985. 3. Frequency of issue: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. (a) Number of issues published annually: four. (b) Annual subscription price: individuals, $25.00; institutions, $35.00. 4. Location of office of publication: The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. 5. Location of the general business office: same as 4. 6. Name and address of publisher: same as 4; name and address of editor: Demetrios Caraley, same as 4; name and address of managing editor: Tilly Friedman-Lichtschein, same as 4.

7. Owner: The Academy of Political Science (nonprofit corporation).

8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: none.

9. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding twelve months.

10. Extent and nature of circulation:

	Average Number of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	*Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date*
(a) Total number of copies printed	13,624	13,459
(b) Paid Circulation		
(1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales	82	–
(2) Mail subscriptions	12,527	12,606
(c) Total paid circulation	12,609	12,606
(d) Free distribution, including samples	160	66
(e) Total distribution	12,769	12,672
(f) Copies not distributed (office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing)	855	787
(g) Total	13,624	13,459

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(Signed) William V. Farr, Business Manager

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 *by Jiri Hochman. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984. 253 pp. $29.95.*

Jiri Hochman's impressive monograph has two objectives. He tries to throw new light on the content and conduct of Soviet foreign policy between the breakdown of Soviet Russia's post-Rapallo alignment with Germany after Hitler's rise to power and the Munich crisis. He also seeks to point out the falseness of the dichotomy between Russia's national or imperial interests and the Soviet Union's ideological commitment to world revolution, which is prevalent even today, by showing the extent to which there is another and more important consideration governing Soviet foreign policy—the self-interest of the ruling bureaucracy and its master or masters for the time being. It is thus not surprising that the great purges fill such an important place in Hochman's analysis of the mid-1930s, nor that he downgrades the importance to Soviet diplomacy of the brief "popular front" era in the Comintern's history after the 1935 Congress. For him the episode marked a mere temporary concession to pressures from communist parties in the West, not a shift toward a more democratic outlook consistent with a move towards cooperation with western democracies on a collective security basis.

Granted the paucity and at times unreliability of Soviet or quasi-Soviet sources and the impossibility of filling all the gaps by the use of Czech, Rumanian, and Polish, as well as German and western materials, Hochman does seem to have built up an overwhelming case for his principal contentions. It is clear that Soviet economic and military collaboration with Germany did not end with the advent of the Nazis and that the Soviet rulers always hoped to build on them again to establish good political relations irrespective of ideology. Germany was always the Russians' preferred partner, and entry into the League of Nations and the pacts with France and Czechoslovakia were only accepted when the better course seemed out of reach. To understand the position fully, Hochman admits, it would be necessary to take into account the Far Eastern dimension of the international situation for which this book finds no place.

It is also clear that Stalin had no intention of activating the Soviet Union's guarantee to Czechoslovakia at the price of conflict with Germany or even Poland. The chapter on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the problem of how Soviet forces could reach Czechoslovakia and its conclusion that the Soviet Union at no time made any attempt to solve the problem is a particularly telling one. The alternative to cooperation with Germany was not collective security but isolation. Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov's famous speeches at Geneva, which so impressed both contemporary western intellectuals and some later historians, were made at a time when he was at least partially, and perhaps fully, familiar with Soviet moves in a totally contrary direction. Nor for almost all the time did the Soviet Union even publicly distinguish between the "fascist" variety of capitalism and bourgeois democracy. As George Kennan pointed out in a hitherto unpublished memorandum written in Moscow in the spring of 1935 which figures here as an appendix: "The peculiarity of Soviet diplomacy, insofar as it affects all nations outside Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva, is that it is openly regarded in Moscow as the intercourse between enemies" (p. 176).

Historians who still believe that prejudice and blindness prevented Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier from bringing the Russians into a massive anti-Hitler combination should be enjoined to study Hochman's book. The military aspect of the purges was alone sufficient to prevent the Soviet Union from being treated as *bundnisfähig* as all their advisers properly warned them. Munich was correctly predicated on the Soviet Union's unwillingness and inability to move. It is to be hoped that Hochman will pursue his theme into the period between Munich and June 1941. It could be very rewarding.

LORD BELOFF
All Souls College, Oxford

Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship *by Robert Dahl. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1985. 113 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $8.95.*

Robert Dahl grapples with a large subject in this small book. The theme is democracy and the forces undermining it. The complexity of decisions on problems such as nuclear weapons places limits on democracy. Two routes for decision making are open: the delegation, but not alienation, of authority and Platonic guardians or a nuclear priesthood. Dahl chooses the first route as democratic, but quarrels with those who are content with existing congressional and bureaucratic means of achieving it. Why? Because citizens are abdicating their responsibility to register their "informed intentions" when they turn over their mandates to elected or appointed officials. Dahl rejects even a limited guardianship saying that the keen edge of moral understanding is blunted by too much specialized knowledge.

Dahl's remedy is the creation of a small representative sample of highly informed American groups in a *minipopulus* (his term) of a thousand people. Randomly selected by lot, such a group would serve for one year, once in a lifetime. Paid for participating, they would not meet in a single town meeting but, remaining in their communities, would interact through modern means of telecommunications. An advisory group of scholars chosen, say, by the National Academy of Sciences, would educate the minipopulus on a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

single important issue like control of nuclear weapons. The thousand "stand for" the citizenry as a whole, ranking alternative policies as advisers not law makers.

The citizens' role for philosophers like A. D. Lindsay (the British political theorist) was to know when the shoe pinches. Dahl expects far more, asking that citizens possess the knowledge and competence necessary for moral and enlightened judgments. Public policy decisions must correspond with their informed intentions. Citizens should influence those to whom authority is delegated, assuring respect for citizens' intentions rather than the guardians' "private interests." Only in this way will popular sovereignty and democracy be preserved in those areas where technical and moral judgments are most demanding.

What Dahl fails to do is to apply any kind of reality principle to his vision and proposals and to examine his own premises and his moral and instrumental judgments. In the first place, he misunderstands Plato's concept of the philosopher king from which he derives an idiosyncratic notion of guardianship. He fails to recognize that the philosopher's realm was for Plato contemplation, not ruling. Second, Dahl's preferred advisers, not surprisingly, are members of the National Academy of Science or other bodies with whom Dahl feels at home. Yet it has been precisely these bodies, dominated by quantitative scientific and social scientific members, who have offered least to hard-pressed diplomats and negotiators confronted with the intangibles of foreign policy. It is no accident that quantitatively-oriented behaviorists among social scientists have overwhelmingly predominated in the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Academy, rather than more traditional students of political philosophy and foreign policy. For Dahl it is the new elite of a newfangled social science who are to become, if not philosopher kings, the reigning educators of his select groups of a thousand charged with establishing mandates for their rulers. Thus Dahl is not averse to guardians, provided they are his kind of guardians who share his preferences in the social sciences.

An alternative vision for the future would seek to bring more Americans in touch with the best and most experienced leaders in foreign policy: former secretaries of state and presidents, arms control negotiators, or figures like George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, or Lee Hamilton. Even then, as a former presidential aide remarked, the most a beleaguered president can do sometimes is to pick his own science advisers. For years to come, presidents and congressmen seized with the nuclear problem will have to do the best they can. It seems unlikely that social scientists in the National Academy can teach political prudence or make instant experts of taxi drivers or bartenders.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
University of Virginia

The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective *by William Epstein. Cambridge, Mass., Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984. 105 pp. $20.00.*

Despite its measured language and painstaking accuracy, this is an ominous and alarming book. Epstein tells us, in effect, that efforts to halt or slow the nuclear arms race have suffered severe setbacks during the past five years; that the danger of further proliferation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of nuclear weapons is growing; and that the deteriorating international security situation bids fair to unravel the results, however limited, of a third of a century of arms control endeavors.

This book, written from the United Nations perspective, is one of three studies on preventing nuclear war sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The other two volumes deal with the perspectives of the United States and of Soviet scientists. Epstein, a UNITAR Senior Special Fellow, is the former director of the UN Disarmament Division; he has served on the Canadian delegation to six sessions of the UN General Assembly and is the chairman of the Canadian Pugwash Group.

The author has produced a lucid survey of the prodigious efforts made at the United Nations to achieve nuclear disarmament in order to prevent a nuclear war. The apparent failure of these efforts calls for a serious reappraisal of the factors that have driven major governments to proceed with stubborn determination on a path that in their view is dictated by compelling considerations of security and survival—while in the view of disarmament advocates it points to the extinction of mankind. Concern for national security, Epstein observes, has undermined the possibilities for achieving international security. On the other hand, it would seem idle to expect governments to ignore the former for the sake of the latter; disarmament will only be achieved when both concerns are met.

A major chapter of Epstein's volume deals with past efforts, both within the UN and outside it, to prevent nuclear war, including the dozens of important treaties and agreements which, while not halting or even slowing down the arms race, seemed at least to provide a measure of control over it and to clear the way to eventual measures of actual disarmament. This trend has now been reversed; technology seems to have acquired an internal dynamic and momentum of its own, and the renewed confrontational rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has weakened what political will there was to take effective action toward stopping the nuclear arms race. According to Epstein, the massive numbers of General Assembly resolutions that are repeated annually have tended to lose much of their potency. The necessary political will can now be generated only by the pressure of the public on the government in each country. This is a slim reed to lean on.

The position of the United States causes particular anxiety. The U.S. is convinced that nuclear deterrence at increasingly complex technological levels continues to be the most effective safeguard against aggression, and that a shift to conventional weapons would call for vastly larger military expenditures. In 1982, the U.S. decided not to resume trilateral negotiations on the nearly completed comprehensive test ban treaty, thus reversing a position supported by every American president from Eisenhower to Carter regarding a key element of any attempt to halt the nuclear arms race. Finally, in March 1983, President Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which, in the view of disarmament experts cited by the author, could destroy the stability of the balance of deterrence, thus increasing the risks of an outbreak of nuclear war. Here again, Epstein's cautious language ill conceals a genuine sense of alarm. It would have been helpful if he had analyzed the substantive implications of "star wars" strategy, including its impact on arms control and disarmament. If SDI materializes, there will have to be a major rethinking of approaches to the prevention of nuclear war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Epstein also speaks of the growing resentment and fear that the present situation has stirred among almost all the nonnuclear states, particularly the nonaligned ones. He might have mentioned, in this connection, that "conventional" arms races, regional disputes, and wars among some of these countries have been a factor in the deterioration of the international atmosphere that has led to the current predicament.

This book will help stimulate a new hard look, which is overdue, at the international security-arms control-disarmament conundrum. There is little doubt that mutual deterrence and strategic stability have so far helped to prevent nuclear war, and the safety provided by this method cannot be lightly discarded. On the other hand, the method is unreliable and may no longer work following the next turn of the arms race spiral. The prevention of nuclear war has to be put back on track in the context of current political and strategic realities and as part of revitalized institutions encompassing both international arms and conflict control. This will, however, be a difficult task as long as the current atmosphere of mistrust and tension continues, and as long as the nuclear powers pursue an unbridled technological arms race that leaves us, at each step, with less security and less stability than before.

GEORGE L. SHERRY
Occidental College

Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It *by Thomas M. Franck. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 334 pp. $19.95.*

As the subtitle suggests, this book offers a critical review of the record of the UN, an analysis of the organization's misuse and degeneration. Although the author neither ignores nor denies the importance of the economic and social activities of the UN and its associated agencies, he devotes virtually all his attention to the political sector, taking the settlement of disputes, the prevention of war, and the control of aggression as the central issues.

Franck presents, and builds an unassailable case for, a profoundly gloomy view—from the perspective of one devoted to western values and to the national interest of the United States—of what has happened to and has been done with the UN. His analysis, however, is remarkably well balanced. He stresses the UN's imaginative development of truce-observation and peacekeeping missions as well as the collapse of any hope of collective action to enforce world order, and the growth of the Secretary-General's potential usefulness as well as the corruption and politicization of the Secretariat. He points to the victories as well as the defeats of the United States in the organization, and to instances of evenhandedness along with manifestations of double standards in the political organs.

The author's balanced approach is evident also in his attribution of responsibility for the evils and abuses of the UN. He shows that the troubles of the United States are in considerable measure self-inflicted, not only in the sense that the U.S. set precedents for the politically biased and unprincipled behavior in which the Third World masters of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UN now indulge, but also in the sense that the U.S. unwittingly promoted the growth of the General Assembly as an instrument to be exploited by those who were to capture the organization—and that the U.S. has too often contributed to its own defeat in the Assembly by failing to take the battle seriously.

The last point indicates the nature of Franck's response to the second question contained in his subtitle. What the United States can do about its situation in the UN is to acknowledge the importance of what is done and said in that setting, to recognize that the western point of view is not invariably foredoomed to rejection, to accept the reality that the UN is "a place for politics" (p. 271), and to devote itself to vigorous participation in the political struggle. His chapter on "Playing Hard-Ball" develops this theme; it shows a basic sympathy with the Daniel Patrick Moynihan-Jeane Kirkpatrick approach to the UN, but warns about insensitivity and the neglect of the carrot of civility in favor of excessive reliance on the stick of pressure. He is not ideologically committed either to membership or to withdrawal, but argues for a pragmatic approach, concluding that "a muscular strategy of staying in" (p. 272) is preferable for the present.

A major motif of the book is the notion that Americans have had difficulty in coming to terms with the flawed reality of the UN because they originally embraced it as a "quasi-magical institution" (p. 18), thanks to its having been drastically oversold to them in 1945. It seems to this reviewer that the author overstates this point; he neglects the abundant evidence that official and unofficial advocates of American membership in the UN displayed awareness of the organization's uncertain prospects, and that the public had a healthy skepticism about its war-preventing ability. Perhaps he mistakes widespread enthusiasm for joining the UN for naive optimism about the UN's success. Franck's excellent book is necessary, not because the UN has failed to perform confidently expected miracles, but because it has disappointed the reasonable hopes of sensible people.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

National Interests and the Military Use of Space *edited by William J. Durch. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984. 286 pp. $28.00.*

The nine essays in this book constitute an informative introduction and reference work to the military uses of space, the "weaponization" of space, and relevant arms control issues.

The first chapter, by the editor and Dean A. Wilkening, presents highly capsulized, but still useful, historical and technical background to the U.S. and Soviet military space launch programs. Paul Stares briefly details the U.S. military space program. Stephen Meyer places the Soviet military space program in helpful perspective by relating it to actual Soviet military requirements. As few other analysts bother to note, Meyer points out that "The question should not be how much is the Soviet Union putting into space, but rather how much is it getting out of space?" (p. 85).

In a generally correct examination of potential antisatellite weapons and counter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measures, George F. Jelen risks confusing the reader with a technically nonsensical reference to a "heat ray" as a type of "beam weapon," while ignoring the more serious threat of the X-ray laser. The technically-minded may also be annoyed by his confusion of the atmospheric electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect with the systems-generated EMP that can affect satellites.

In a survey of naval uses of satellites, Louise Hodgden argues fairly persuasively that despite the size of the Soviet program, the U.S. Navy may be more dependent on satellites than the Soviets. In a survey of space-based weapons concepts, Dean Wilkening questions the technical feasibility of space-based beam weapons as antiballistic missile systems and identifies system survivability as the greatest obstacle to their military utility. Proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will argue, however, that he has examined an insufficient range of weapons ideas, platform survivability measures, and counter-countermeasures. This debate will not end soon.

Philip D. O'Neill, Jr. presents a thorough review of international legal developments affecting the military uses of space. Malcolm Russell's survey of Soviet legal views on military space activities is also reasonably thorough. It is useful to be reminded, contrary to the claims of many who assert that the SDI brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table, that Soviet concern—and propagandizing—about the "militarization of space" (which they hypocritically blame entirely on the U.S.) preceded President Reagan's March 1983 speech by three years or more.

The volume concludes with a well-balanced assessment by Donald Hafner of the pros and cons of seeking arms control measures for antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. He points out, for example, that ASAT arms control limitations would need to be "effective and verifiable," "politically acceptable," and must "not impair other aspects of security," and that these standards would be difficult to meet (p. 242). On the other hand, on the issue of verifiability, for example, he reminds skeptics that ". . . *future* ASAT cheating scenarios ought properly to be matched against *future* U.S. verification capabilities," and that, with or without arms control, the U.S. will need better space surveillance capabilities (p. 262).

The book is well-indexed and each chapter is generously footnoted and contains in addition a separate list of bibliographic references. Though there is some duplication among the chapters, the editor has done a good job of keeping it to a minimum, considering the diversity of authors and the overlap of their essay topics.

THOMAS H. KARAS
Office of Technology Assessment

The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms *by Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. 160 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $16.95.*

Debate on the nature of Soviet military policy often reaches polemic levels. Laird and Herspring offer an insightful, if at times unfocused, attempt to resolve some major questions. To begin their discussion, the authors present an account of the evolution of Soviet military policy from 1945-84. The most interesting part of the discussion relates to the 1971-84 period. Using Soviet statements and deployment patterns as evidence, the authors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stress a shift to substrategic options (conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and theatre nuclear weapons) in Soviet military policy. The view they ascribe to the Soviets is essentially the "stability/instability paradox"—that central deterrence makes force at lower levels more important and usable. The authors stress two kinds of substrategic options as important in motivating Soviet policy. The first is central-front contingencies—the conventional option and limited nuclear war; the second is Third World contingencies—the importance of local military balances.

Laird and Herspring proceed to review the strategic force structure of each side, ultimately to show that each can carry out assured destruction under a range of scenarios. They then focus on the Soviet approach to the conduct of nuclear war. In an interesting if controversial section of this discussion, the authors claim the Soviets are wedded to a strategy of escalation dominance. Laird and Herspring elaborate a hypothetical five-level Soviet escalation ladder.

The volume also addresses Soviet perceptions of the U.S. challenge, and stresses that the Soviets have a dynamic, fluid conception of parity that is driven largely by U.S. technological advances. Finally, the authors further elaborate the conception of parity in the context of arms control, and make the point that the dynamism inherent in the Soviet conception is often at odds with attempts to codify a static balance.

The book is useful in numerous ways. For the nonspecialist, the volume serves as a good initial source of information on a wide range of topics. The section on arms control elucidates well the reactive element in the Soviet view of parity. The section also reminds us that Soviet interests in arms control are essentially unilateral—a far cry from mutual western notions such as stability. For the more experienced reader, however, much the most interesting discussion concerns recent Soviet emphasis on substrategic options. While the authors do present an array of statements and inferences from force structure to relate an undoubtedly important trend, their unqualified adoption of the western notions of escalation dominance and of "stability/instability" is troubling. First, the traditional Soviet interest in preemption, especially in the European theatre, is not integrated into the discussion. Moreover, the claim that strategic deterrence under conditions of parity has in the Soviet view increased the significance and usability of conventional military power must be examined with caution. The conventional build-up can at least in part be explained as intended for central front contingencies and/or deterrence in the periphery. For the authors to sustain their claim, one would seek from them a comparison of Soviet behavior before and after the advent of parity, a comparison which *might* show increasingly bold post-parity behavior. In fact, one generally wishes the authors had devoted more of the book to fleshing out the nature of the shift to substrategic options.

Finally, there are two more stylistic problems with the book. It has a somewhat disjointed structure—leaving the book with somewhat the flavor of a text. The authors also have a tendency, as in the discussions of arms control and force structure, to provide excessive detail. More generally, though, Laird and Herspring present an interesting set of interpretations of recent Soviet military policy. Readers from many backgrounds will find the volume useful.

CLIFFORD KUPCHAN
Columbia University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet-Third World Relations *by Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1985. 254 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $14.95*

This is a good, useful book, yet not a very satisfying one. Previous comparable volumes on this very important subject have been few. W. Raymond Duncan's *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Roger Kanet's *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries*, and Alvin Z. Rubinstein's *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* are the principal predecessors. But these are decidedly dated, and they are collections of essays without the coherence of the Saivetz-Woodby volume.

The authors undertake to survey Soviet relations with less developed lands from the beginnings of the Soviet state to the present. In the 1920s the effort to spread revolution in the colonial world was a means of accelerating the worldwide overthrow of capitalism in accordance with Lenin's theories of imperialism. Soviet action was limited to contiguous territory, and its means were little more than propaganda and agents carrying the Comintern's message of revolution. By the 1980s, the objects of Soviet attention were sovereign states everywhere, from the South Pacific to Argentina and into the U.S. "backyard" of the Caribbean and Central America; and Soviet means of action included trade, scholarships, diplomacy, and military assistance or intervention (especially with Cuban help). Saivetz and Woodby chronicle this evolution competently and objectively.

They give a rather brief statement of Soviet perspectives on the Third World and then survey the record in detail since World War II. Chapters deal with Soviet opportunities in the Third World, obstacles to Soviet penetration, tools of involvement, motives and decision making, and trends and prospects. This is all straightforward and factual. There is not much surprising, although not everyone knows that Cuba has been supplying troops for Soviet foreign policy aims since 1963 or that Mexico has unexplained ties to Comecon. The treatment of relations with scores of countries is inevitably rather superficial, but it is generally accurate. Only a few statements seem questionable, such as that no Third World state grants any permanent military base to the Soviet Union (p. 119). One thinks of Cuba and Vietnam, unless they are not considered Third World. To state that the Soviet Union supported Argentina in the Falklands war (p. 194) is misleading; the significant fact was how little the Soviets helped Argentina.

The most interesting aspect is how Soviet policy has changed in emphasis and expectations. In the time of Khrushchev, there were visions of a host of nations following the Soviet Union on the "non-capitalist path" adopting the Soviet economic model with Soviet economic aid. Both the attractiveness of the model and the flow of Soviet aid have subsided, however. Recently the Soviets have rather looked for advantageous trade with anyone and have concentrated attentions on frankly Marxist-Leninist countries, such as Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Angola, relations with all of which are primarily military.

Soviet Third World policy has been neither very successful nor very brilliant. The Soviets have played on the resentments and mistrust of Third World nations toward the West and the latter's follies and lack of tact in dealing with sensitive developing countries. The Soviets have been unscrupulous and uninhibited in dealing with both sides—governments and supposedly revolutionary parties—even with mutually antagonistic governments, as the two Yemens. But Russians also are tactless, frequently ignorant of local languages and ways, if not racist. Most of all, they are unable to fill economic needs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of clients. Such is the incapacity that the Soviets seem reluctant to acquire more client states.

Saivetz and Woodby thus give a competent account of Soviet-Third World relations. There is very little effort to relate policies to Soviet politics or to give a better understanding, except in the most general terms, of why the Kremlin cares whether Angola is Marxist or not. Likewise, the authors fail entirely to convey the flavor of Soviet ties with client states and dependent parties, as vividly evident in the Grenada papers, for example. Soviet-Third World relations are not fully understandable in rational terms on the side of either the Soviets or those prepared to accept their patronage.

ROBERT WESSON
Stanford University
Hoover Institution

The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy *by Robert Jervis. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984. 203 pp. $19.95.*

Nuclear weapons are *weapons*, and they will be used, as weapons have always been used, to fight wars. Nuclear weapons are *nuclear*, and because of their vast destructive power they cannot be used to fight wars but only to prevent them. Ever since 1946 when these contradictory conclusions were set forth in books by William Borden and Bernard Brodie, they have stood as the poles around which strategic debate has swirled. The strategies of massive retaliation and mutual assured destruction conformed to the second conclusion; the notion that the Soviet Union can be dissuaded from major aggression only by our ability to fight, survive, and prevail in a protracted nuclear war, to the first.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the war-fighting school has been ascendant. The headline of a William Safire column reflected what appears to be at least a governmental consensus: "The New Strategic Reality: MAD Is Dead" (*New York Times*, 11 March 1985). Robert Jervis has breathed life into the corpse. Accepting "the centrality of the nuclear revolution" (p. 41), he exposes the folly of attempts to escape from its implications whether by missile defenses, by total nuclear disarmament, or by adopting a policy of no-first use and reliance on conventional weapons. With impeccable logic and a keen eye for the crucial issues, he shows how the habit of treating nuclear weapons as though they were weapons for the fighting, rather than for the deterring, of wars has made the countervailing strategy incoherent and inconsistent, indeed silly. Especially in the past decade, many have averred that deterrence—dissuasion of the Soviet Union from attacking for fear of retaliation—will not work if the Soviet Union does not subscribe to a similar strategy. In contrast, Jervis points out that our problems derive not from the Soviet Union's strategy but from the vulnerability of American cities. The nuclear revolution produced this result, which will last as long as easily deliverable nuclear warheads exist. The Soviet Union's strategy does not affect this possibility, nor does ours. Neither devising clever American military strategies nor reestablishing American numerical superiority can make a difference. In one way, and only in one way, can we preserve American cities, and that is by persuading the Soviet Union not to attack them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America may be able to deter a direct Russian attack, but with the loss of numerical superiority does American deterrence still extend to allies? The author persuasively argues that deterrence covers interests that are manifestly vital wherever they may be and, within wide limits, whatever the ratio of weaponry. By odd reasoning, Helmut Schmidt and others convinced themselves that in order to couple West Europe more tightly to American strategic forces, we should place intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe. In ten terse pages, Jervis explains why measures intended to tighten coupling make the decoupling of America from its western allies easier to accomplish. Russian leaders say that if we strike with European missiles, they will strike back directly at us. That is a sensible statement to make, but it would be foolish of them to do as they promise. In the event, both the United States and the Soviet Union would have the strongest reasons to limit damage to themselves by confining targets to Europe.

Jervis has understood the meaning of the nuclear revolution. Recent American strategy has reverted to conventional military thinking. As the author shows, this is the route to folly, if not to disaster, in a nuclear world. Although nuclear weapons sharpen conflict, they also promote cooperation. In a nuclear world our fate is the fate of the adversary, and the adversary's fate is ours.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
University of California, Berkeley

European Security and France *by François de Rose. Translated by Richard Nice. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1984. 143 pp. $19.95.*

Strategic theory in the Atlantic Alliance has always involved two sorts of options: deterrence, in which the enemy would not attack at all because the resulting cost would prove too devastating; and defense, in which an attack would be repelled in the event that deterrence failed. Ever since the United States elected to retain conventional forces in Europe at the end of World War II despite its nuclear monopoly, the alliance has opted for a combination of the two. The mix has undergone several incarnations over the years, each with its ominous-sounding name, its even more ominous assumption of rational behavior in the ultimate international crisis, and its own price tag. In light of the substantial military build-up by the Soviet Union since the 1970s, the Atlantic Alliance has found its current mix (itself a mix of two mixes, "flexible response" and "mutually assured destruction") outmoded and inadequate.

It is ironic that so impassioned an appeal for a united Atlantic response should come from a Frenchman, since if French forces were added to the calculations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantages would be dramatically reduced. But de Rose, a distinguished career diplomat who served as French ambassador to NATO from 1970 through 1975, does not advocate a French return to the NATO fold. The possibility, he writes, "is no more conceivable than its opposite, namely that France should suggest that the others should leave it" (p. 21). Instead, he argues for a strong cooperative role for France in a general expansion of the Atlantic conventional forces. This build-up would enable the alliance to resist (and thus deter) a Warsaw Pact

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attack without a first use of nuclear weapons. Lest the Soviets consider a first use in the event that a conventional thrust failed, de Rose advocates a policy he calls "inflexible response"—that is, should the Soviets use atomic weapons against any Atlantic Alliance forces, the West's full nuclear arsenal would be unleashed against the Soviet Union and its allies. France would closely associate itself with these policies through explicit (though presumably secret) agreements with NATO on the conditions under which French forces would enter the fray. In effect, de Rose merges the policies of deterrence and defense by extending deterrence theory to conventional weapons and by linking both conventional and nuclear weapons to a single defense structure.

While there is much to be said from a theoretical standpoint for such a fusion, a number of practical implications exist that one wishes were discussed more here and in defense literature generally. Whatever their ghastly properties, nuclear and not conventional weapons have kept the peace in Europe for the last forty years. To make conventional weapons the principal element of deterrence is simply to substitute the old terror for the new. If the "nuclear threshold" is raised, the "war threshold" would be lowered, as the destructive risks of war would escalate far more gradually. Moreover, atomic weapons have kept the peace relatively cheaply. The United States has financed its conventional build-up (and Reaganite economic policies) only through massive and potentially disastrous deficits whose effects are felt throughout the world economy. Considering the economic policies that prevail in the other major allied countries, it is not clear that the Western Europeans could finance a parallel expansion without shaking the foundations of the welfare state. Without a consideration of what his prescriptions would mean outside the realm of strategic theory, de Rose's call for Atlantic unity risks sounding like an ecumenical declaration against sin.

Nonetheless, de Rose's identification of the need for greater coherence in alliance doctrine can scarcely be faulted, and he argues his case with clear logic. Equally thoughtful efforts should be devoted to elaborating other options.

LEONARD V. SMITH
Columbia University

The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in the Soviet Empire, From Yalta to Solidarity *by Michael Charlton. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985. 192 pp. $14.95.*

This excellent volume provides insight and illumination to anyone interested in the nature of the Soviet system and empire and in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It serves to remind us of the origin and nature of the relationship and of our continuing inability to comprehend the reasons for it. The errors leaders such as Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt made in judging the Soviet system and its goals and in criticizing those who advocated resistance to Soviet advances remain with us today. Indeed, Charlton cites a quotation by Averell Harriman in 1944, after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Katyn massacre, and the Warsaw uprising that he and others like him make in 1985 about other peoples and governments. Harriman denounced the Polish government in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

London "as predominantly a group of aristocrats looking to the Americans and British to restore the position and landed properties and the feudalistic systems of the period before and after the last war [the First World War]" (p. 18). How true, but how irrelevant to the larger issues!

Charlton is an Australian journalist and now a BBC international affairs specialist. His volume is an imaginative one, based on recorded interviews with American, British, and Polish statesmen and their advisers between 1943 and 1947, with men from these same countries as well as Hungary and Czechoslovakia in later years, and with eminent western scholars and observers, such as Norman Davies, Michael Koser, and Richard Pipes. Charlton informed those he interviewed in advance of his interests and published the interviews as recorded. The questions and the explanatory comments he weaves into the narrative reveal that he is well-informed and understands the critical issues. This book and the equally impressive interviews that George Urban of Radio Free Europe has published in volumes such as *Communist Reformation* (London, 1959) reveal that oral history produced by well-informed men and women (most newsmen are poorly informed) can be immensely valuable.

Charlton in this volume shows that the Soviets produced the Soviet-western conflict by refusing to "permit the small birds to sing" because of their insistence upon complete control of eastern Europe. In Charlton's view, correct I think, this has created a situation in East Europe that will inevitably produce revolts and will perhaps lead one day to a dreadful international crisis.

I found the volume fascinating because of the candor of those interviewed and of the new information some provided: Stanislaw Swaniewicz's description of his being trucked to the Katyn Forest (Poland) in 1940 but escaping death because the KGB learned at the last moment that he possessed information useful to them about the Nazi economy; General Bela Király's account of preparations to invade Yugoslavia after Stalin ousted Tito and of the Soviet invasion of Budapest in 1956; and University of Texas Professor Edward Taborsky's description of Edward Benes's craven posturing to the Soviets from 1943 through 1948 are particularly illuminating.

Charlton concentrates on the period from 1943 through 1956, devoting only one-third of the volume to the last twenty years. Alas, but understandably, he was not able to interview any Soviet participants in these events, although he did interview some Hungarians in Hungary.

ROBERT F. BYRNES
Indiana University

The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy *by Walker Connor. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984. 614 pp. Cloth, $47.50; paper, $14.50.*

Marx, Engels, and Lenin all came to recognize the appeals of national self-determination, as Walker Connor reminds us in one of the many detailed passages in this large and comprehensive analysis of Marxist rule and movements. Marxists harnessed nationalism to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their cause. Then they found that nationalism would not obligingly vaporize in the crucible of class revolution and socialist construction. Connor pays special attention to the Soviet Union as the "prototype" multinational Marxist-Leninist state, along with China, Vietnam, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and briefer references to the other Marxist-Leninist countries (even squeaking in a long footnote on Nicaragua and the Sandinistas' conflict with the Miskito Indians on the Atlantic coast).

Marxist rulers have responded to nationalism's persistence in their countries with a mixture of initial coercion, assimilationism, and territorial gerrymandering, as well as efforts, not too successful, at a favorable demographic policy. Generally, they moved faster, harder, and granted national minorities less autonomy than Lenin recommended. There was, though, a lot of leeway for such a departure from Lenin's formulas for coping with nationalism. For Leninism itself was fraught with contradictions, as Connor brings out, between autonomy and centralism, flowering and merging of nationalities, economic equality and economic rationality, culture national in form and culture socialist in content, dominant nationalism and subordinate nationalisms.

This book is quite a tour de force of documentation (152 pages of footnotes) and thoroughness of theoretical analysis, for which it can justifiably be called a definitive and invaluable source of grand comparative communist scope. When it comes to strategies, the book is less complete, despite its great length. Yes, Lenin and Stalin emphasized cultural (linguistic and educational) aspirations of nationalities over economic ones. Walker tells us enough about economic policies to show that they turned out to be issues of greater importance than anticipated. But Connor does not tell us enough for a balanced and complete understanding of this important subject. It is basically correct, but not enough, to select sources emphasizing "economic discrepancies" between less developed Soviet republics, as in Central Asia, and more developed republics of European areas of the Soviet Union.

If this were the whole story, then we would not read signs of resentment within European Russia at some real privileges of Muslim areas and their major nationalities. These privileges include family allowances favoring large families, preferential budgetary allocations, and preferential investments in agriculture. Connor cites a book on law and demographic processes and a joint article by the late Galina Litvinova and Boris Urlanis as opposing preferential investments in a region like Central Asia to employ surplus populations there. But he does not convey the extent to which these authors attack privileges already in place, outside of the sphere of industrial development in which indeed Central Asia lags behind most other parts of the USSR. This paucity on economics is particularly noticeable in the light of the detailed and valuable data on migration and demographic change.

Connor touches lightly, but generally deftly, on the subject of supposedly internationalist parties that go nationalist. But in the limited space he devotes to this theme, Connor asserts almost in passing that Ho in Vietnam and Tito in Yugloslavia were not nationalists. Yet he supports that surprising, though possibly correct, assertion only with reference to some abstruse criteria of what makes a nationalist and to the "egocentrism" of Ho and Tito.

Perhaps the second edition of the this book should be re-edited to make room for more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on economics, more care about interstate relations regarding leaders' motivations, some heed to a comparison of Marxist with non-Marxist strategies of multinational rule, and to the rich existing comparative literature on nationalism and political development. Meanwhile, all who read Connor will find it a valuable reference, whether they be students of communism alone or they embrace wider perspectives.

PETER H. JUVILER
Barnard College, Columbia University

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement *by Roger B. Porter. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984. 160 pp. $27.95.*

This book provides a lucid, almost meeting-by-meeting, memo-by-memo account of the 1975 negotiations leading up to the first long-term trade agreement (LTA) in grain with the Soviet Union. The grain agreements grew out of the crisis atmosphere surrounding the unexpected and enormous (by 1972–75 standards) Soviet grain purchases that began in 1972. Written by a Kennedy School professor, then and now on the White House staff, the book provides a fascinating picture of White House staff work and crisis management.

White House efforts were focused on limiting 1975 grain sales to whatever amount was found to be necessary to avoid a possible one percent increase in the 1975 inflation rate. The Soviet desperation for grain after their very bad 1973 and 1974 harvests was to be used as a lever to obtain a LTA and as many other political and economic concessions as possible. The LTA was to prevent future price surprises by stabilizing Soviet grain purchases within preagreed ranges. Compared to these inflation management and foreign policy objectives, specifically agricultural interests were presumed to be narrow and minor.

Nevertheless, the negotiation required agricultural market judgments: how large would the new U.S. crop be and how much could be sold without increasing prices? Almost no one on the crisis management team had any familiarity with such issues. They also had little confidence in the Agriculture Department and considered farmer interventions and those of their political representations inappropriately "political." Thus, the White House team turned to academics, Washington consultants, and the labor union movement for analysis and advice on a negotiation that would determine farm income for years to come. The team later found incomprehensible and almost ungrateful the farm sector's fury at being excluded from the process.

Hardly anyone involved in the negotiation apparently considered that competing exporters might be willing to sell substantial amounts of grain to the Soviets, reducing U.S. leverage, or that such unprecedented U.S. interference in the grain export market would have long-term consequences.

The administration embargoed U.S. grain sales from August to November, 1975 (harvest season for many competing exporters) to be absolutely sure of total U.S. supplies and potential price effects while they negotiated with the Soviets. The author aptly describes inexperienced negotiators, aware that the grain shortage might be a one year phenome-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

non, trying desperately to extract publicly embarassing short-run concessions from Soviet officials who bitterly defended their national "pride." To protect that pride, the Soviets took draconian steps to reduce domestic consumption and used the U.S. delay to buy all available stocks from U.S. competitors. As hard currency cash buyers offering good prices, the Soviets were everyone else's priority customer. By the time the U.S. was ready to sell, the Soviets needed far less from the U.S. market. Few concessions, other than the LTA itself, were achieved. So much for leverage in a complicated world.

The episode, the final stage in a process that began with the U.S. soybean embargo in 1973, demonstrated to a surprised world that the U.S. was not a reliable agricultural supplier. It would hold its customers hostage to their food needs. The main long-term consequence was to encourage major buyers to diversify their sources of supply, creating opportunities for new exporters to challenge U.S. domination of world grain trading even as American farmers expanded their production to serve what they saw as a captive American market. The U.S. had a few years of euphoria, but the end of the U.S. grain export boom was actually foretold the day it began. The Soviets are now the principal buyers in a grain buyers' market, courted as princes by competing western exporters. They are said to be very business-like buyers.

The LTAs were in fact excellent solutions to a difficult policy problem. But, as this book shows, the weaknesses of the crisis management process itself, its very narrowness and intensity and presumption that all things are controllable, can often create more difficult problems than it solves.

BARBARA INSEL
Council on Foreign Relations

Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations *edited by William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1985. 221 pp. $22.50.*

Unlike the weather, lots of people do something about military matters in Africa, but nobody talks about it. This book is, therefore, a welcome source of new information on aspects of external sources of military supplies and conflicts in Africa and the internal behavior of the African military. It is a book with chunks of data and insight rather than a closely integrated analysis, but that is probably imposed by the fact that the scope of the book spans an internal and external subject. The concluding chapter, by Foltz, does pull together a number of themes and fill in holes in the previous analysis.

The book begins with a discussion by Foltz, a noted Africanist at Yale, of the components of great-power interest in Africa over the centuries. The chapter is an excellent treatment of a subject that has long needed analysis: what are the various roles or positions that Africa has occupied in global politics, and what determines the choice of role? Foltz finds a volatile set of elements, which at the current moment add up to a low level of great-power interest in Africa. Louis George Sarris, an intelligence analyst in the State Department, confirms this view in the Soviet perspective. In a chapter filled with information, he documents the Soviets' interest in military relations with Africa but also their very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uneven record as a result. George E. Moose, now U.S. Ambassador to Benin, writes about French military relations with Africa, where there is a much higher level of interest. Although there is a good understanding of both the importance and limits of French military concerns in Africa, the descriptions of military intervention are more journalistic (Are not all states' descriptions of their policy "self-serving"? (p. 68)). Also, the chapter never goes inside French policy to see whether the interventions of the late 1970s were a product of René Journiac, Giscard d'Estaing's African affairs adviser, or of African events, rather than of constant French doctrine. Walter L. Barrows, an intelligence analyst for the Defense Department, then examines Black African military capabilities. He shows the weakness and uselessness of African armies, underscores the need for political solutions in current conflicts, but warns against the armies' rising role and capabilities. Robert S. Jaster, a knowledgeable civilian analyst of African affairs, then examines South African military capabilities, showing the rising role of the military here too and its limitations in the current mounting crisis. Although the chapter ends with a projection of unchanged South African policy against internal and external challenges, it would have been good to see the question of unexpected changes addressed, a much more challenging test of analysis than simply constancy predictions. Bienen, a noted Africanist at Princeton, has contributed a reediting of his 1980 article in *International Security* to show that African military regimes do not act differently in domestic or foreign policy than African civilian regimes. The only exception that he identifies concerns their conduct of domestic politics (p. 156), but unfortunately this insightful emendation to the nul hypothesis is never pursued. The concluding chapter, by Foltz, is particularly good in its analysis of the history and reasoning behind an African peacekeeping force and its policy recommendations. Its emphasizes the wisdom of keeping military supplies under control and avoiding bipolarization of African conflicts and relations. The conclusion reaffirms the general themes of not romanticizing the African military and of warning against the looming dangers of the military's expansion.

There are some holes: there is not very much on actual military operations, or on the military as governors (on which there is little literature), or on the military as coupsters (on which there is a lot of literature). Most curiously of all, there is almost nothing on any of that literature, sparse as it may be, so that anyone wanting to know more than what this book offers will have to find a reference librarian. Indeed, there are not even any sources given in most cases. There is an appendix listing military coups by date and by country. The book is one of three sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Project and came out of a Council study group in 1980.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa *by Philip H. Frankel. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985. 215 pp. $44.50.*

Few states in the contemporary world are more transparently sustained by naked force than South Africa. The unique apparatus of racial domination, whereby a small white

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minority (16 percent) assures the perpetuation of its rule over the black majority has attracted a flood of analysis; how remarkable, then, that the spinal column, the South African Defence Force (SADF) has virtually escaped scholarly attention until Philip Frankel picked up his pen. Only one other significant study exists, an excellent 1983 book by Kenneth Grundy—*Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (University of California Press).

Happily, the quality of Frankel's effort measures up to the importance of the topic. This timely and valuable monograph provides a comprehensive, authoritative, and persuasive treatment of the South African security forces. It traces their historical lineages and institutional development, the rise of their ideological doctrine, and the implications of the growing militarization of the South African garrison state.

Research within South Africa on such a topic naturally encounters substantial barriers in the proclivity to secretiveness of security establishments, not to mention the intimidating array of repressive legislation on the South African books. Frankel does not make clear how much access he had to interview sources: some, apparently, but probably not much. However, he has been thorough in his exploitation of official papers, military journals, newspapers, regimental histories, and memoirs that cumulatively constitute a surprisingly fecund body of material.

The SADF, Frankel argues, fuses two quite distinct military traditions: the British, linked to the imperial ancestry of SADF, Commonwealth membership until 1961, and the important experiences of overseas deployment with Allied forces during both world wars; and the "kommando" heritage of the Afrikaner community, oriented toward frontier irregular warfare carried out by armed civilians. Until the 1948 watershed, with the beginning of Nationalist Party rule, the British legacy was overwhelmingly dominant. The kommando tradition has become increasingly important since that time, reflecting both the steady spillover of Afrikaner political dominance into the SADF, and the reorientation of the military doctrine from conventional "defense" to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare carried into neighboring states. The British heritage remains strongest in the navy and air force, both relatively weak components of the security apparatus.

In a particularly engrossing chapter, Frankel dissects the new "total strategy" doctrines that gained ascendancy in the 1970s. Based on the conviction that South Africa faces "total onslaught" from communist states and much of Afro-Asia, total strategy (whose prime source is French General André Beaufre) supplied a comprehensive theory of counter-revolutionary action, integrating military, political, and foreign policy measures. Total strategy assumes a long-term cold war with the forces of racial liberation, to be met not in conventional, fixed battles between regular armies, but in continuous, often indirect struggle.

The adoption of total strategy necessarily alters the boundaries between civil and military spheres. The SADF voice is indispensable in the political and foreign policy realms, as well as strictly military ones, if its mission is to be performed. A cooptive stance is needed with respect to the excluded racial communities: not to dismantle racial domination, but to weaken its adversaries. Frankel makes a persuasive case that those who see the SADF as the midwife of fundamental change in South Africa, or likely usurpers of power to carry out their designs, fundamentally misread the perspectives, orientations,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and goals of the South African military. This slim volume provides chilling but indispensable reading for all those concerned with prospects for change in South Africa.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Presidents, Politics, and Policy *by Erwin C. Hargrove and Michael Nelson.* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 288 pp. $25.00.

Scholars and reformers are prone to seek "characterizations of the presidency that are true for all times" (p. 8), for all incumbents, in all political situations. Instead, argue Vanderbilt University scholars Hargrove and Nelson, we should aim at "contextual understanding," which allows evaluations of presidents and their administrations within their historical settings. More specifically, there are "recurring cycles of electoral politics and governmental policy making" which tend to produce, in rough sequence, presidencies of *preparation*, *achievement*, and *consolidation* (p. 9). Each type requires "skills in different combination," and specific chief executives should be judged accordingly. "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy were 'successful' presidents in that each fulfilled the requirements exacted of presidents of achievement, consolidation, and preparation, respectively" (p. 91).

This appealing book develops its thesis through detailed examination of twentieth-century presidents, focusing especially on how each led—strategy, tactics, presentation of self, authority—and how each handled policy formulation and policy implementation. Interspersed with this central analysis, however, are chapters only tangentially related—on Constitutional origins, for example. Since the analysis everywhere is of high quality, this eclecticism adds breadth and insight. A clinical examination of twentieth-century presidential selection, for example, leads to an assertion counter to conventional scholarly wisdom about "the minimal and, in some ways, beneficial effects the post-1968 [nomination process] reforms have had on presidential skill" (p. 163).

A cost of breadth is gaps in or application of the central thesis. There is little or no linking of presidential selection to policy-political cycles. A treatment of executive-congressional relations devoted mainly to other concerns leaves the reader wondering why "presidencies of preparation" should have "high dependence" on Congress (p. 214), given the assertion later in the same chapter that "serious congressional consideration" of their priority goals "is still some time away" (p. 228). But in general, this book does what a first-rate volume should do: it provokes the reader to reflect on its questions and seek further insights from them.

Do the cycles for different policy areas converge? Hargrove and Nelson find "striking similarities between twentieth-century American foreign policy and the domestic cycle." In particular, they note the "coincidence of achievement presidencies and war" through Wilson, Roosevelt, and Johnson (p. 79). The correlation would seem to break down with Richard Nixon, arguably a domestic consolidator, but clearly a foreign policy achiever. But this anomaly, in tension with the Hargrove-Nelson thesis, yields an insight drawn

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from their framework: Nixon's lack of a foreign policy "preparer" may help explain why his "détente" policy proved so fragile domestically.

Is a president's type a function of his own goals and conceptions or of his historical context, viewed retrospectively? Apparently the latter: Jimmy Carter unwittingly "prepared the way for Reagan" (p. 82) even as he "attempted to be a president of achievement" (p. 117) and was singularly lacking in "the rhetorical and other presentational skills" required to bring issues to the top of the national agenda (p. 228). Ironically, achievers Roosevelt and Reagan demonstrated such skills in abundance. In any case, such reflections are testimony to the intellectual stimulus the book has offered this reviewer.

I. M. DESTLER
Institute for International Economics

Congress and National Energy Policy *by James Everett Katz. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1984. 287 pp. $29.95.*

The author of this book has a variety of ambitious goals. He wants to detail the course of energy policy at the national level from the 1970s through the early 1980s. In so doing he also wants to explain and assess policy outcomes in the immediate context of particular struggles. However, his goals are not limited to these objectives. What he also desires to do is to apply macroanalytical approaches that identify fundamental contextual forces and constraints so that he may explain and assess the sequence of microevents in a deeper and more comprehensive manner. The first portion of the book is thus devoted to a history of major energy policy battles from Nixon through the early Reagan years and the second to developing the "implications" of the history.

On the surface, the author's goals and research strategy appear reasonable and practical, albeit ambitious. In truth, the kind of comprehensive and in-depth analysis the author seeks to achieve exceeds the grasp of the analytical tools he applies, and this difficulty is compounded by deficiencies in exposition and argument on the part of the author.

The first section of the book succeeds in tracing the basic character of legislative struggles over policy and executive organization with respect to energy during the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the author's feel for the variety of forces involved is always extensive and at times insightful. Nonetheless, this section is marred by a number of vexing deficiencies. First, the explication of the course of events is at times difficult to follow and the charts supplied too often perplex rather than enlighten. This is particularly true of chapter four on the Ford administration. Second, the author brings a potpourri of explanatory factors to bear in each phase of the story without much recognition of their contradictions, adequate analysis of their relative importance, or attention to apparent shifts in importance at varying points in time. Third, normative assessments of the proper character of energy decision making or the proper content of energy policy in one chapter are contradicted or undermined by the analysis in other chapters.

The second section of the book breaks down into chapters that deal with the substance of energy policy and chapters that deal with congressional structures, processes, re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sources, and environmental conditions. The author demonstrates that he has a good knowledge of organization theory and an ability to operate at sophisticated levels of analysis. Nonetheless, this section fails in terms of the macroambitions of the author.

In the chapters that deal with substantive matters of energy policy, a theory of elite control is advanced to explain policy outcomes in a comprehensive fashion. Yet, this theory contradicts the pluralist, interest-group conflict explanations frequently emphasized in the first section, and it is not directly or clearly supported by the evidence and analysis displayed in the first section. The organizationally-oriented chapters have a different set of problems. Here the author has to provide a new information base, integrate and interpret it in terms of a new theoretical framework, and make this more general information and theory relevant to energy policy decision making. As might be expected, the author is strongest when dealing with the general propositions of organization theory and weakest in making his discussion specifically relevant to energy policy making. More particularly, the analysis of congressional roles and structures is somewhat forced and linkage conclusions often involve great leaps from meager evidence. Finally, the thrust of the organizational analysis undercuts the author's ostensible preference in the first section for comprehensive planning and policy making.

In sum, then, this book has its virtues. It does present a history of energy policy in the 1970s and the chapters on organization theory and information use are worth reading. But it is a difficult and frustrating book to read and its parts certainly do not cohere.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

Congressman Sam Rayburn *by Anthony Champagne. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1984. 228 pp. $19.95.*

An excellent analysis within the limits of the genre (former House Speaker Carl Albert believes it will become a "classic" [p. xii]), this book fills a gap in the Sam Rayburn literature by focusing on his political career in the district ("home style") and on the interrelationships between the two political worlds of Texas and Washington, D.C. Relying on sixty-two interviews, personal papers in the Sam Rayburn Library, oral histories, and other sources, the book is a welcome addition to political science studies (upon which it draws and occasionally critiques) of the legislator-constituency connection. It is also an interesting review of Rayburn's role in Texas politics.

Divided into six somewhat overlapping chapters (the district, the Rayburn style, the Rayburn organization, the campaigns, Rayburn in Bonham and Washington, and conclusion), the book provides answers to the how and why of Rayburn's long and successful political career, which spanned almost fifty years in the U.S. House of Representatives (1913-1961), seventeen of them as U.S. Speaker, an office he held longer than any other person.

Rayburn's staying power owed a great deal to the characteristics of his fourth district in northeast Texas, which he crafted in 1911 while speaker of the Texas House of Representatives. Small in population and area, compact, and relatively homogeneous

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with little in-migration, the rural-small town district was changed only once (in the 1930s) by the addition of two small, similar counties, despite fears of redistricting particularly during the 1950s (when Rayburn opposed powerful Texas Governor Allan Shivers, leader of Democrats for Eisenhower). Electoral success was not inevitable, however. In 72 percent of the Democratic primary elections (Rayburn never faced a Republican opponent), he was opposed; and in six of these, the margin of victory was relatively small, ranging from 23 percent in the first race to 55 percent.

Rayburn's style ("how he attempted to relate to his constituents" [p. 21]) was a key to his political longevity. Aside from his legendary integrity, which was a tremendous political resource, Rayburn, who spent virtually all his non-congressional session days in the district, was extraordinarily accessible and helpful to his constituents—individually and collectively. The federal projects Rayburn brought to the district were numerous and many, highly visible. Moreover, favoring a modest life style much like his neighbors, Rayburn identified with his constituents, and they with him. "We all felt like he was one of us" (p. 21), one constituent remarked. Rayburn's political success was also promoted by a remarkably effective grassroots political organization of loyal friends, neighbors, and family members, all volunteers, who worked informally with little money and minimal media effort. Some members of the old Rayburn network are still politically influential in the area.

The author describes how Rayburn resolved inevitable conflicts between his policy-oriented role as congressional and loyalist national Democratic party leader and the right-wing, anti-New Deal conservative forces in Texas. In addition to "mechanisms" used by other members of Congress (for example, converting constituents' trust into policy leeway), Rayburn benefited from an unusual reciprocal power flow: his "secure political base in the district" enabled him to acquire the seniority essential to national power, which in turn enabled him to maintain power in Texas. He influenced the oil depletion allowance so dear to the hearts of Texas oil men. Nonetheless, on one occasion, the 1948 primary, district pressures forced Rayburn to oppose publicly civil rights proposals of his old friend, President Harry Truman. Moreover, conflicts between Texas and national politics contributed to the thwarting of Rayburn's ambitions for higher office.

The author appropriately places the Rayburn era in historical perspective. Yet, the book is a reminder that in the American federal system the roots of congressional power lie in local districts and states. When properly interpreted, Rayburn's advice "to take care of your constituency" remains valid.

JANICE C. MAY
University of Texas at Austin

Party Organization in American Politics *by Cornelius P. Cotter et al. New York, Praeger, 1984. 203 pp. $31.95.*

This book will undoubtedly be the major report of an ambitious study of American state parties that its four authors undertook some years ago. Since its existence and progress

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been heralded by a number of convention papers and journal articles, specialists will already know a good deal about it.

And make no mistake—it is a book for specialists. The analysis is data-driven and monographic, always carefully and fully set in the scholarly literature. (Those "settings," in fact, are a stimulating by-product of the analysis.) There are few people or events in these pages, and no juicy anecdotes or picaresque politicians lighten its pages. It is a book of serious hypothesizing and dense, though lucid, prose. Indeed, it is one of those very rare books that is probably too short [sic] for its subject and data.

The strengths of the study are impressive. It is, first of all, genuinely comprehensive and comparative. To the best of my knowledge, it is the discipline's first attempt to survey all the state party organizations, as well as thousands of local party organizations within them. It was a monumental undertaking, one not likely to be repeated soon. Second, the analysis is always careful, thoughtful, subtle, and insightful. There are no exaggerated claims or hyped r's here. One never is in any doubt about the intelligences at work.

The weaknesses are, even more than usual, closely related to the strengths. They center primarily on the kinds of data such studies must inevitably employ. The data are the product of interviews with chairs and directors of a sample of fifty-four state parties, of mailed questionnaires to officials of the other forty-six and to some 560 former state chairs, and of other questionnaires sent to leaders of thousands of local party units. The authors seem also to have collected aggregate electoral data. The mind boggles at the number of observations all of the responses add up to. Yet one cannot avoid wondering about respondent bias (how willing are party officials to confess the shortcomings of their organizations?) and about the various understandings the various respondents may have had about the same question.

The scope and nature of the project have, of course, ruled out extensive observation, surveys of voters, on-site data collection, broader interviewing, and more detailed data sets. By their very accomplishments, the authors point out how badly we also need complementary studies in depth of smaller numbers of organizations. Any enterprising scholar (graduate student?) of parties could build a design for that kind of study from the concerns and analysis here.

The substance of the book is both descriptive and analytical. The former involves a careful mapping of the contours and strength (capacity for strength?) of party organization, including an attempt to identify interorganizational relationships and changes in the organizations over recent decades. The analysis relates party organizations to their environments, to their electoral success, and to their office holders. There is, finally, a wonderfully suggestive chapter on changing roles and changing patterns of organization over the past generation.

Reservations about data aside, we have here a portrait of American party organization becoming increasingly institutionalized and bureaucratized, seemingly more and more insulated from and independent of changes in the party and in politics. That path of adaptation has been a puzzling one, and no one interested in political parties will be able to resist doing some hypothesizing of his or her own. My own hunch is that we see here the development of a kind of political party that functions primarily as an ideological auxiliary to our electoral politics. Ties of loyalty to the party as party are replaced by the bonds of ideology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, I should report, more in sorrow than in anger, that in the book "data" appears many times as both a singular and a plural noun. If there is some editorial rule that makes the distinction, some logic that makes it all consistent, it has eluded my syntactical savvy. Say it isn't so, guys.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Reconstructing American Law *by Bruce A. Ackerman, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1984. 118 pp. Cloth, $16.00; paper, $6.95.*

At one level, this book can be interpreted as a call to public officials, more specifically to lawyers, to be more thoughtful in their analysis of public policy. Unlike post-New Deal realist lawyers whose focus has remained on the idiosyncrasies of individual cases, Ackerman advocates that lawyers be educated in the latest techniques for storing and manipulating facts so that they will be able to understand the root causes of contemporary political problems as well as the consequences of contending solutions. In addition, lawyers need a sound grasp of a public philosophy that will capture the essence of post-New Deal liberal activism. This will enable them to understand the causes of a particular problem and weigh the possible consequences of its solution against the principles of a carefully articulated public philosophy.

At another level, there is an uneasy tension in the book between Ackerman's reliance on the people and his assumption that through the articulation of a philosophically-grounded public policy, lawyers will lead the way toward an accommodation of laissez faire policy and collectivism. Ackerman sees little need to probe the roots of constitutional theory in arriving at this public philosophy. He seems to anticipate that it will somehow come from the people themselves and will have little relationship to our constitutional and institutional foundations.

In this reconstruction of American law in which lawyers are to lead the way, the ordinary lawsuit becomes the occasion for reexamining broad issues of public policy and articulating a public philosophy. Thus, Ackerman combines a reliance on the people with an implied short-circuiting of the legislative process through which the lawsuit becomes an occasion for reexamining the entire basis of American law, including the law of the Constitution. In this process, Ackerman ironically compromises two other principles. He changes a republican or a representative form of government to one of government by law suit. He also obscures the necessity for statesmanship in a republican government to lead the representative body toward a vision of the public good, but with the provision that the public must give its consent to effecting that vision.

One must admire Ackerman for eschewing the view that we are bound by either a dogmatic vision of laissez faire economics or of collectivism. One may criticize the book for accepting uncritically the assumption that the Constitution was penned as simply a laissez faire document. But Ackerman properly reminds us that liberal democracy should aim toward a view of justice that transcends both the radical right and the radical left through

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a sober understanding that despite its virtues, the free market is not simply an end in itself but a means to the higher end of justice.

Ackerman's assumption that injustice is the product of a system of laws that insufficiently comprehends facts or inadequately articulates an underlying public philosophy is much more problematic. His expectation that improved laws can eradicate injustice (which he understands as poverty, racism, sexism, and military insanity) rests on the assumption that the cause of injustice lies in the laws, not in the human condition. This expectation is a utopian one far from that middle ground he advocates and short-circuits the moderating qualities of separation of powers and the representative system of government, which were founded on a deep suspicion of such utopian quests. Ackerman makes little attempt to understand the underlying theory of the Constitution or to reconcile that theory with New Deal reform. Such an examination is essential before he rejects the public actions of the last fifty years as bereft of a public philosophy.

LANE V. SUNDERLAND
Knox College

The Reagan Record *edited by John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984. 415 pp. Cloth, $28.00; paper, $12.95.*

The Reagan presidency introduced the most comprehensive and fundamental reassessment of the federal government's role in American national life witnessed during the past half century. Almost no aspect of public affairs was spared the searching review and frequent redirection of policy initiated by the conservatively-oriented administration. In their carefully edited book, the second in a series of reports prepared at the Urban Institute, Palmer and Sawhill describe and analyze the early impact of the "Reagan revolution" in domestic policy and suggest what its legacy might be in the years ahead.

Early chapters of the book focus seriatim on governance, the economy, the budget, natural resources, and the environment. Special attention is given to social policy, family incomes, and business policy. Throughout the book the author of each chapter provides an objective assessment of the Reagan policy and its early impact on the public interest. Each topic is treated objectively with a serious effort to avoid a biased perspective on new policy initiatives.

Nonetheless, the authors' preferences for alternative policy choices slip through the otherwise straightforward presentation of the Reagan record. For example, in their chapter on the economy, Isabel Sawhill and Charles Stone acknowledge the sharp reduction in the rate of inflation during the Reagan years, but they call attention to the $654 billion loss of output and the high rate of unemployment associated with the attainment of price stability. By their estimate, each American household lost $3300, on the average, during the 1981–82 recession that was exacerbated by Reagan administration policies. The authors suggest three alternative policy choices that would have achieved the same goal at a much lower cost.

Similarly, the real meaning of the administration's social policy goals is illuminated in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lee Bawden's and John Palmer's chapter on the welfare state. The new administration came to power with the assumption that the federal government has little responsibility for the social and economic well being of individuals, even those unfortunate enough to be unemployed or otherwise unable to earn their way. To the extent that there is any public responsibility for such conditions, the most efficient means for discharging it is through state and local governments and through the private sector, as stated frequently by the President and his principal advisers.

The federal budget is the most visible guide to the meaning of the "appropriate scope of public responsibility" of government. In their review of the budget, Bawden and Palmer skillfully show how, under the Reagan presidency, the rate of growth in income support programs was cut in half, while the actual dollar expenditures for human resource programs, such as job training and education, were similarly reduced. Of course, the President wanted to cut social programs far more than Congress let him. But he was successful in redefining the terms of reference for the debate over social policy from "what does it do to help the poor" to "how much must be cut." The new frame of reference for budget discussions continued in earnest in the President's fiscal 1986 budget message, in which the most drastic trimming of social spending, including middle-class entitlement programs, was recommended.

Although the book contains a wealth of information on a wide range of domestic policy issues, it has several shortcomings. The most serious, perhaps, is that there is no assessment of federal policy on education, surely one of the major issues of domestic policy. Also missing is an adequate assessment of the role of Congress in acquiescing to the Reagan administration's policy agenda. It is well to remember that the major policy edict on the budget, the annual budget resolution, is the sole responsibility of Congress, and does not require the presidential signature to become law. Much of the success of President Reagan in redirecting the focus of domestic policy was achieved through his ability to gain the cooperation of elected officials at the east end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Still, anyone interested in the shift in national priorities and the redirection of domestic affairs since 1981 must read *The Reagan Record*. It is a valuable book, full of useful insight into the content and character of public policies likely to influence national affairs for many years to come.

BERNARD E. ANDERSON
Princeton University

Social Welfare Spending: Accounting for Changes from 1950 to 1978 *by Robert J. Lampman. New York, Academic Press, 1984. 232 pp. $29.50.*

In the midst of the shrill debate over safety nets and wars on poverty and what goes into making great societies, Robert J. Lampman has published a thoughtful book that students of any theoretical bent can read with profit. His analysis relies on two devices. One is double-entry social accounting. The other is a measure that he calls "secondary consumer income" (SCI). SCI includes not only the Social Security Administration's familiar

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"state and federal social welfare expenditures," but also private insurance, philanthropy, and interfamily transfers (stopping short of transfers within nuclear families). SCI includes, in short, all "income which comes to the recipient as a gift or without a reciprocal exchange of goods or services" and which constitutes a benefit for selected families (that is, excluding such things as national defense) enhancing consumption rather than production (pp. 10–11). Lampman adds up the net effects of changes in SCI flows over the period 1950 to 1978.

The six chapters in the book sequentially take on: an introduction and overview; methods of social accounting as applied by Lampman to his SCI measure; identification of the donors and recipients of SCI; an analysis of accrued benefits from 1950–78; a parallel analysis of costs; and (in a single chapter) a projection of the findings into the future and a brief comparison of SCI flows in the United States with those of other countries. An appendix lays out the data and procedures for the social accounting. As always, Lampman's prose is clear, and his tone is judicious.

Lampman is covering a great deal of ground in only 173 pages of text, but the very sweep of the book is one of its main virtues. Lampman enables the reader to see the social welfare system whole and over time as does no other book I have encountered. Lampman is candid about the measurement problems (how can anyone know how much was really spent on interfamily transfers in the 1950s?), but he does not try to pin hard-and-fast conclusions on the numbers.

For all his judiciousness, Lampman was, after all, an important player in the earliest planning on the War on Poverty and has been a scholarly advocate for an expansive social welfare system ever since, and it shows. He tries hard to represent, or at least mention, gloomier views of the effects of changes in SCI flows, but his heart isn't in it. The "cost analysis" chapter (pp. 108–46) is especially deficient in this regard. The costs he considers are those arising from overhead expenses of SCI programs, reductions in labor supply, reductions in productivity, and reallocations of resources, all of which are treated in terms of their effects on the gross national product—effectively ignoring arguments that the central costs of the social welfare reforms are noneconomic. F. A. Hayek, Milton Friedman et al., are mentioned in chapter 1 as authors of "adversarial writings" about social welfare policy (p. 13), but thereafter conservative and libertarian scholars are almost entirely missing from the "Guide to Reading" that concludes each chapter.

But Lampman did not set out to present every side of the debate over social welfare policy, let alone resolve it. "I am not trying to tell you *what to think*," he writes, "but *rather how to think*, about social policy questions" (p. 8). He presents a valuable framework for doing so. He just needs to tell readers, especially students who are new to the subject, a bit more about some radically different ways of specifying his model.

CHARLES MURRAY
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Reassessing the Political Spectrum *by William S. Maddox and Stuart A. Lilie. Washington, D.C., Cato Institute, 1984. 203 pp. $18.00.*

On the basis of survey data, mostly from Michigan's Center for Political Studies but also from the National Opinion Research Center, Maddox and Lilie argue that American voters are more ideologically complex creatures than the simple conservative-liberal division assumes. They postulate sorting along two scales, those of economics and personal liberties. Conservatives oppose government intervention into the economy, but favor school prayer, censorship of pornography, and continued illegalization of marijuana. Liberals support federal intervention in favor of the poor, minorities, and other vulnerable groups, but prefer greater personal freedom and minimal government interference with individual life styles. Populists combine liberal attitudes on economic issues and conservative preferences for government reinforcement of traditional morality. Libertarians are utterly consistent: they endorse free markets and free individual choice in everything from now-controlled substances to sexual association.

In American presidential politics, the authors predict that liberals will continue to vote for Democrats and conservatives for Republicans, but that the populist vote is up for grabs. Although their analysis is careful, Maddox and Lilie are flogging a dead horse. Carter in 1976 won as a populist, and Mondale lost in 1984 despite a futile attempt to shed economic liberalism and trumpet patriotic themes presumably appealing to conservatives and populists. Moreover, the authors' four categories scarcely do justice to the subtlety of the issues. On the political left, younger radicals tend to be nearly as suspicious of big government as libertarians. Are the Catholic bishops populists because they oppose abortion but favor job guarantees, income redistribution, and mild planning? Is the long list of industries seeking tax favors, subsidies, quotas, and tariff protection to be classified as liberal allies? What about the neoliberals? And so on. The American political universe, as the authors occasionally recognize, is far more complex than their four-way classification can elucidate.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
City University of New York

Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, Political, and Organizational Perspectives *by Ruth Hoogland DeHoog. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1984. 186 pp. Cloth, $29.50; paper $12.95.*

"Privatization" is now one of the hottest topics in the welfare state literature. ("Fiscal crisis" is the other.) As a number of authors have shown, it is hardly a new topic, the major mixed economies representing, in effect, different mixes of statutory, market, private nonprofit, and household-primary group service delivery. Perhaps the most interesting questions deal with the relationships among these elements and the consequences of such relationships.

DeHoog here offers an exploration of an important component of one such cluster of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relationships: governmental contracting out with the private sector. She employs two case studies (TITLE XX, the social service title of the Social Security Act, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program), acknowledged to be currently outdated, to illustrate patterns of contracting and to lend reality to the conceptual and theoretical analysis. The results will not surprise any public administration professionals or scholars acquainted with imperfect markets, mutual cooperation of public officials and contractors, or of organizational realities. One finds very little in the cases that resembles the abstract market models used to justify a slowdown of government growth or governmental contracting out with the private sector in the name of less cost for the best quality of service.

Of course the two case studies, both carried out in Michigan, are not representative of anything and, in fact, are not necessarily in themselves very deep. Nonetheless, they serve to illustrate the thesis that DeHoog derives from her review of the literature in economics, organization theory, politics and implementation in the first place. She reviews the literature, arrives at conclusions, presents the cases and shows how they somehow elaborate the conclusions, and then sums up. The somewhat repetitive story tells us that clearly, in the real world, decision makers often satisfice; they also make deals to increase the numbers of clients or to enrich the service range—even if inefficiently—and they seldom can bargain, monitor, watchdog, select, or choose, despite much public rhetoric to the contrary.

Where does this leave the issue? Privatization in general and contracting out in particular may sometimes be justified for reasons other than efficiency, quality, or keeping government small. It may sometimes even be found to achieve quite well what the theory says it should. In any case, one should guard against sleight of hand, recognize it when it appears, and be clear as to what public goals really are important. Once we face all of our goals and rank them with regard to particular public policies, and once we get to understand context somewhat better, there may even eventually be a basis for more sophisticated differential policy.

ALFRED J. KAHN
Columbia University

Political Women: Current Roles in State and Local Government *edited by Janet A. Flammang. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1984. 320 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

This collection of thirteen essays is the "first book on women with an exclusively state and local focus" (p. 7). This is a wise choice because these are the very arenas where we are most likely to find large numbers of women, and researchers, therefore, are in an advantageous position to make generalizable observations. Moreover, many of the policies and issues that vitally affect women are increasingly falling within the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the state and local governments.

Women's role in policy formation, and their success in gaining and holding onto office are two of the major topics; the third is their patterns of political activism. A common

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theme running through several essays is "that women see themselves connected to politics in ways that most political scientists have not appreciated" (p. 12). This leads several authors to urge that we redefine and expand our notion of the political well beyond the customary definitions. Marianne Githens, for example, stresses the necessity to do away with the artificial distinctions between the public and the private. Citing Congresswoman Barbara A. Mikulski, she reminds us "that for women the political is private insofar as women are finely attuned to the effects of political action on individuals . . . " (p. 62).

The thirteen essays, however, are of variable quality with respect to methodology; success or failure to relate one's own materials to the relevant literature (not necessarily restricted to women); attempts at concept—let alone theory—building. Some of the contributions are essentially anecdotal accounts of the authors' or affiliated groups' actions on behalf of causes or issues or are overviews of policies on women's issues and related questions. (Anne Wurr, Denise Antolini, Ellen Boneparth, Emily Stoper).

The theoretically most suggestive chapters are those by Diane L. Fowlkes and Martha A. Ackelsberg. The latter's essay, building on the work of Sheldon S. Wolin, Ira Katznelson, and others, offers a tightly reasoned critique of the prevailing, artificial separation of the economic and the political. It is to be regretted that Fowlkes omitted cited findings from her own work in progress that could have lent empirical evidence for her exposition. Fowlkes's study of ambitious and nonambitious Atlanta activists leads her to conclude that the two groups differ from each other in their conception of the political. Although her sample is small, she was able to use her findings to develop a conceptual framework for studying political women. Her chapter thus makes both an empirical and a theoretical contribution.

Beverly B. Cook's chapter offers a very interesting historical overview of women's entry into the court system. Her subsequent analyses of the role (generally negative) played by the prestigious law schools offers valuable insights into the attitudinal and structural barriers confronting women. Githens's well done literature review on women and state politics alerts us to the measurement problems confronting the field and asserts that "a serious rethinking of a number of assumptions current in political science" is urgently needed (p. 57).

Some of these assumptions, indeed, are being reexamined in the volume. Edmond Constantini and Julie Davis Bell, for example, in a study of California party leaders challenge the assumption that women's political motivations for entering politics differ greatly from men's. Janet Clark et al. found little evidence that there exists widespread hostility to female candidates running for office.

Carole Mueller and David B. Hill focus on female legislators' behavior inside the chambers; Mueller notes that the formation of women's caucuses depends on the number of female legislators present, whereas Hill assesses their capacity to function as cue givers to male colleagues.

The volume offers a variety of fare for readers interested in women's expanding role at the state and local level. The book would have benefitted from a concluding chapter, seeking to synthesize and reconcile the rather disparate offerings. The task of rethinking our analytical categories thus remains to be tackled.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present *by Jacqueline Jones. New York, Basic Books, 1985. 432 pp. $25.95.*

It has become widely understood that while black women in the United States have shared some important elements of the experiences of black men and of white women, theirs has ultimately been a unique history. But not before Jacqueline Jones's *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow* have the patterns of race, class, and gender discrimination that have structured the lives of black women and families and the adaptations of black women to a society that has consistently relegated them to the lowest rungs of economic and social status been so thoroughly documented and analyzed with such sensitivity and subtlety. This is a book of outstanding scholarship that is at the same time eloquent and deeply moving.

The book has a big sweep. Its backdrop is the structural conditions that have inhibited the advancement of black women, men, and families from slavery to the present in urban and rural settings, North and South. The strength of the analysis is its focus on the effects of these structural factors on the intimate details of everyday life. Black women have had to balance two, often conflicting, spheres of work. Forced, first by slavery and then by the insufficient wages paid to black men, to work long hours outside the home, black women have also been largely responsible for the care of home and children. Because of racist and sexist patterns of hiring, only a few, low-paying employment opportunities have been open to black women. Until the late 1960s, domestic work was almost the only job for which black women were deemed "suitable." Any choices that remained have been heavily influenced by the needs of the women's families. The work outside the home necessary for economic survival drained their energies for the task of child rearing, even while the care of home and family limited black women's already highly circumscribed opportunity to earn wages outside the home.

This history, then, is about the different strategies developed by black women to juggle the demands of wage earning and child rearing in an economic environment that discriminated against them both as blacks and as women. The home environment, despite all the strategies of community solidarity employed to make life bearable (such as the formation of extended families and the support provided by black churches), insisted on inflexible gender roles that placed the domestic burden squarely on women.

Jones could make more of this last issue. She does point out that black women's work outside the home has been valued by the black community; the black woman has never been seen as less feminine for working at wage labor. Jones also analyzes the structural causes in different times and places for black male unemployment or underemployment, which in turn has made black women's wages essential. What she does not address is the question of why, then, haven't black men assumed more responsibility for child rearing and household work and thus eased the double burden on black women? Have black men bought into the values of the dominant white patriarchy, or do they have a patriarchal tradition of their own?

Jones notes that most black feminists today agree that race, rather than gender, is the primary source of their oppression. Jones aims for an analysis that demonstrates the interplay of race, sex, and class, rather than the primacy of any one, and she meets with considerable success. But in her desire not to blame the victims, she shies away from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

asking about the extent to which sexism within the black family plays a role in the continuing oppression of black women.

LESLIE J. CALMAN
Barnard College, Columbia University

Straight Stuff: The Reporters, the White House and the Truth *by James Deakin. New York, William Morrow, 1984. 378 pp. $17.95.*

James Deakin makes a valiant effort to defend White House reporters against charges that they have a hidden agenda motivated by their personal political attachments and ideas. He brings to his case a solid and respected reputation as a veteran of a quarter century covering presidents for the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* and as an author and commentator on the broader Washington political scene.

Straight Stuff deserves attention as a well-argued unemotional description of how the process of newsmaking takes place, but it is unlikely to end the perpetual and heated debate on the subject. Deakin shares his observations of the best and worst practitioners of White House communications by and for Presidents Eisenhower through Reagan. His discussion of the relations of reporters to their news organizations and White House officials suggests that the government side usually does appear, except for unavoidable accidents or for failure to understand what the media want.

Deakin is a good analyst, historian, and storyteller, all of which makes *Straight Stuff* one of the better books written by those who have observed or served presidents. If he does not present a sweeping philosophical view as George Reedy did in *The Twilight of the Presidency,* he provides a more detached analysis of how several presidents viewed their relations with the public through the filter of the media. But the main focus of this book is the author's effort to reach those who have not made up their minds that news organizations are out to undermine presidents either because news organizations profit from the sensational story of the demise of a president or because reporters and editors seek to insinuate views that could never find acceptance in honest public debate.

It is unlikely, however, that Deakin's opponents will find any need to moderate their stance. After all, a majority of reporters seem to have accepted the charge of liberal bias. According to Steven Hess, who conducted the most complete survey ever taken of Washington reporters, a majority of respondents said that although they were not liberals, they thought that most other journalists were. In addition, there are the claims of those who served at the top. The reader of memoirs by a president's advisers and friends does not have to turn many pages to find examples of how the press distorted the president's person and policies and eroded his potential success. Former presidents don't need much prodding to discuss this point. All would echo John Kennedy's answer to a press conference query about how he thought the press was doing: "reading more and enjoying it less."

MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN
Towson State University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation *by Raymond Wolters, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1984. 346 pp. $24.95.*

This work examines desegregation in the five school districts involved in the landmark decision of *Brown v. Board of Education*. Although Wolters avows as his central purpose simply "to write an interesting account" of "how things have worked out" (pp. 273, 3), he finds the moral of the story too compelling to leave unstated: arrogant and disingenuous judges have combined with "progressive" educators to leave the public schools in shambles.

The districts, not surprisingly, reveal different variations on this theme. In the rural southern districts of Prince Edward County, Virginia, and Clarendon County, South Carolina, there was immediate, violent, and "massive" resistance by whites to the *Brown* decision. Prince Edward County closed its public schools, and its white population joined almost en masse in an extraordinary volunteer effort to establish the Prince Edward Academy. Clarendon County kept its public schools open, but also kept them segregated through a fraudulently operated "freedom of choice" scheme. In the second decade following the original *Brown* decision, as the courts shifted their requirements from a bona fide freedom of choice to a racial balance, in the end only 1 percent of the whites in Clarendon's School District No. 1 remained in the public schools.

In the more urban districts of Topeka, Kansas, Washington, D.C., and Wilmington, Delaware, by contrast, the *Brown* decision was met with "massive compliance" (p. 12). Largely through assignments of students to their nearest schools, Washington desegregated its schools by 1954, Topeka by 1955, and Wilmington by 1956. In part, no doubt, because of the desegregation, significant numbers of whites did leave the public schools in Washington and Wilmington; in the former, the percent of white students in the schools dropped from 39 percent in 1954 to 6 percent in 1968 and 3.5 percent in 1981, while in the latter city it changed from 93 percent in 1957 to 52 percent in 1968 to 9.6 percent in 1977 (pp. 16, 196). In Topeka, on the other hand, with an accessible predominantly white middle class section of the city and neighborhood schools, there was little white flight.

Yet despite these variations, it is the central theme that stands out. Wolters concludes, with the possible exception of Topeka, that "integration has been a failure" (p. 273). Not without reason, he characterizes the federal judges involved as "naive," "disingenuous," "arrogant," and their opinions as brimming with "sophistry" (pp. 97, 289, 63, 155). For this he has reason. In New Castle County, Delaware, for instance, a three-judge District Court ordered an integration scheme that involved 60 percent of all public school children in the state of Delaware, collapsed eleven school districts into one, and replaced the elected school boards with one appointed by the court—all of this in spite of the court's admission that the school districts had been free of all purposeful segregation since their designation twenty years earlier. In Prince Edward County, eliding questions of democratic control and legislative prerogative, courts claimed authority to compel local officials to levy taxes for the operation of the public schools the district had voted to close. And in Washington, Judge Skelly Wright allowed his spectacular capacity for righteous indignation to inflate into judicial "findings of fact" the once faddish sociological speculation as to the beneficial effect of white middle-class culture on the academic per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formance of the black underclass, and consequently imposed a massive integration scheme on a district that had been free of purposeful state segregation since 1954.

But, as Wolters skillfully develops, while courts built on the beneficence of middle-class values, radical and "progressive" educators were busy tearing them apart. Discipline, an emphasis on basic education, recognition of merit and achievement, and the pursuit of excellence all yielded to "relevance," sensitivity, autonomy, self-esteem, consciousness raising, and "values clarification." Where school officials continued to emphasize excellence, they were usually accused of elitism and racism.

Well publicized charges that this book is itself "racist" are pure poppycock. Nonetheless, the ethical bearings of this work are slippery, constructed it seems from some species of historicism. Segregation is denounced as "anachronistic," not simply wrong (pp. 7, 273). Further, the work suffers from imprecision. Both the meaning of "*Brown*" and its "burden" are left unclear, so that we cannot be certain what Wolters means when he speaks of *Brown's* "failure." Nor is it clear what he understands the Constitution to mean when he criticizes the judges for their misinterpretations. At one point he cynically affirms the notion that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is" (p. 3) without recognizing that with this statement, he abandons all ground for criticizing the court's interpretation. More frequently, he identifies the Constitution with the specific intentions of its framers without considering the fact that their intentions were frequently ambiguous or that they wished its skeletal clauses to be fleshed out by future interpreters (not all of whom, we should emphasize, need to be judges). With decisions as fantastic as Skelly Wright's, and public schools in such disarray as these, perhaps Wolters regarded concerns such as mine to be mere quibbles. Yet if we are to draw lessons from the experience of *Brown*, rather than simply to shake our heads in dismay, such questions are pressing. Especially troubling is Wolters' suggestion that *Brown*, requiring desegregation, and *Green v. New Kent County*, candidly understood to require integration, lie equally distant from the true meaning of the Constitution (p. 275).

If we understand *Brown* in the modest, though noble sense that individual rights cannot be based on race, then we should be slow to announce its failure, for one of the most striking things that emerges from this study is what a slim opportunity this simple principle was given. And it is hard to deny that in between massive resistance on one side and judicial overreaching coupled with guilt-inspired progressive "reforms" on the other, *Brown*, through judicial prodding, did chart a course for human dignity.

STANLEY C. BRUBAKER
Colgate University

Sectionalism in American Political Development, 1880-1980 *by Richard Franklin Bensel. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. 494 pp. $35.00.*

Richard Bensel's important study of sectional cleavages in American politics between 1880 and 1980 argues that "sectional competition—grounded in a geographical division of labor between the economically advanced northern core and the underdeveloped

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

southern and western periphery—has been and remains the dominant influence on the American political system" (p. xix).

The analysis Bensel presents in support of this argument includes many acute insights. Some are methodological. In particular, this study does *not* control for party when testing for regional divisions in congressional roll call voting because, as Bensel notes, such a procedure would wash out the effects of sectionalism in those eras when the cleavage between the major parties was sectionally based.

Other insights are substantive. The chapter on the late nineteenth century presents a fascinating analysis of the way in which the system of Civil War pensions and protective tariffs enacted by the Republicans bound together the western and northeastern wings of the GOP at the expense of the South. Bensel's analysis of the 1945-1976 period demonstrates the extent to which the ideology of liberalism has functioned as a cover for the interests of Democrats in the northeast, and of how that ideology has changed as those interests have changed. And he presents a very subtle analysis of the relationship between changing regional divisions within the Democratic party since the New Deal era and changes in the congressional committee system.

Questions can be raised, however, about some of the major premises of Bensel's analysis and some of the major conclusions he draws from it. The model Bensel presents at the outset of his study has only two actors—the industrial core and the underdeveloped periphery. In the book's historical chapters, however, one finds a more complex pattern of shifting coalitions and cleavages among the dominant political forces in three regions—the Northeast, the South, and the West. During much of the period Bensel studies, the South and West may have occupied similar positions in international commodity markets, but there were major differences in their political behavior because those two regions differed along two other dimensions. One was the structure of their "domestic" social and political systems—the character of their land-tenure arrangements, labor markets, race relations, and so forth. The other involved the bargains (such as the tariff-plus-pension arrangement Bensel analyzes) that regional political leaders were able to strike with politicians from other sections. Bensel is too honest and careful a scholar to ignore these factors in his historical chapters, but his general theory does not take account of them.

In addition, Bensel often discusses regions as unitary actors with homogenous—and unambiguous—interests. However, there almost always are struggles for political control within regions among various contenders for leadership with differing views of how the interests of the region's voters can best be advanced—be they Redeemers versus Readjusters in the post-Reconstruction South, Progressives versus Standpatters in the early twentieth-century West, or advocates of protectionist versus free-market solutions to the problems of the present-day Northeast. Bensel discusses some of these internal divisions in his substantive chapters, but again they do not enter into his general theory.

In other words, the phenomenon of sectionalism in American politics has involved shifting patterns of cleavage, alignment, and dominance that are not adequately captured by the notion of a single and unchanging conflict between core and periphery over the past century or more. The character, sources, and significance of these shifting patterns remain to be fully explored.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To say that a book raises as many questions as it answers, of course, is scarcely a criticism. By raising these questions and providing some preliminary answers to them, Richard Bensel makes an important contribution to our understanding of American political development.

MARTIN SHEFTER
Cornell University

A City in The Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics *by Amy Bridges. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984. 210 pp. $29.95.*

Urban political machines—the boss, and their nemesis, the reformer—have generally been viewed as by-products of immigration, the withdrawal of patrician elites from their traditional positions of political leadership in nineteenth-century cities, and the increased demand placed upon municipal services by rapid population growth. But the early roots of machine politics and its connection to party formation and political ideology have remained largely obscure. In her study of politics in antebellum New York City, Amy Bridges not only tackles these problems with insight and subtlety; she also presents an elaborate reinterpretation of nineteenth-century urban democracy to encompass, in her ethno-cultural and class analysis, the emergence of an urban working class as a political force.

Bridges argues that urban politics was the result of both the international force of industrial capitalism and the distinctively American phenomenon of universal male suffrage that flowered during the Jacksonian era. In the face of the "proletarianization of the labor force," artisans held on to an ideology of "moral economy," which believed in the interdependence of economic pursuits between merchant and mechanic aided by government, at the same time that the wealthy came to accept laissez faire. The breakdown of the second party system led to a polarization between Democrats, who styled themselves as the "champions" of the working classes; nativists, who trumpeted traditional artisan values outside of traditional party organizations; and reformers, who represented the patrician resistance to expanded suffrage. As wealthy elites withdrew or were displaced from office holding, their traditional roles in communal organizations and charity were filled by professional politicians, whose major concern was not lower-class deference, but votes. Resourceful bosses, such as Fernando Wood, a three-term mayor first elected in 1854, used the resources of city government to fund popular "workerist" reforms designed to win working-class loyalty. As wealthy taxpayers began to feel their declining political status in the form of higher tax payments, they tried to regain power through reform campaigns against "corrupt" machines. Unsuccessful at the ballot box, patrician reformers finally entered into an accommodation with the working-class oriented politicians which, as local party organization improved, gave rise to the familiar client-based political machine of the late nineteenth century. Thus, Bridges views machines as an institution of political accommodation in the face of ethnic and class polarization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Borrowing from the new social and labor history, Bridges is able to provide a strong and generally convincing case on the social functions of machine politics, its relationship to state and federal party organizations, the importance of artisan ideology, and the interrelationship between class and ethnicity in urban politics. But like much of the scholarship that follows in the footsteps of the British social historian E. P. Thompson, the analysis of working-class culture often reads more into fragmentary sources than they reasonably contain. It is unclear whether the coherent artisanal ideology which Bridges describes—defending the rights of working men against "moneyed capital"—can be generalized to broad segments of the electorate, as she contends, or to an articulate elite of crafts leadership. The analysis of the effects of ethnicity, class, and religion upon voting in various wards (chapter 4) comes perilously close to the ecological fallacy of assuming individual behavior from aggregate data. In many points throughout the book, Bridges is hampered by the paucity of sources on electoral behavior to fully support the elaborate theoretical constructs. Still, her care, subtlety, and graceful writing style make this book a convincing statement on the relationship between political culture and class in early urban politics. Bridges's work must be ranked as one of the most exciting recent contributions to the political history of the American city.

KENNETH A. SCHERZER
Whitman College

The Uncertain Balance: Governmental Regulators in the Political Process *by Glenn Davis and Gary D. Helfand. Wayne, N.J., Avery Publishing Group, 1985. 200 pp. Paper, $9.95.*

This short book on federal regulatory practices and policy is designed for beginning students with no background in social science and little previous knowledge of how administrative agencies operate. Although the authors sometimes express their own opinions or attempt a compressed evaluation of a program, the book is basically a text, not an original piece of scholarship. However, while it provides much basic background material and contains useful references to the literature, it presents a seriously misleading view of the current state of regulatory analysis.

The authors are at their best when laying out the basic history and structure of an agency. They do this for the Antitrust Divison of the Justice Department, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The presentations are brief but clear descriptions of a wide spectrum of agencies. The book falters, however, when the authors attempt analysis. In an effort to present a balanced view, Davis and Helfand divide the world of policy analysts into "regulationists" and "deregulationists." Regulationists may criticize the behavior of particular agencies, but they favor regulation, including policies to manage the economy as a whole. Deregulationists want to dismantle most regulatory programs with a few exceptions such as safety controls on nuclear power plants and on air

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

travel. This dichotomy fails to account either for the large number of economists who favor the deregulation of airlines, banking, and trucks but favor environmental regulation, or for those who want vigorous antitrust enforcement and high levels of required information disclosure but oppose occupational health and safety regulation.

The authors' false dichotomy is made possible, in part, by a failure to explicate economic arguments correctly. Their discussions are a mixture of cogent observations and partial misstatements so that readers with no background in economics will not be able to obtain a clear understanding of how economists approach regulatory issues. One problem is a failure to distinguish between general support for a planned and managed economy and arguments for the regulation of particular aspects of economic activity such as natural monopolies or externalities. Another is their discussion of cost-benefit analysis which, while it isolates important difficulties, fails to explicate the technique with sufficient detail to permit the student to understand what a competent analysis entails.

The conceptual approach apparently favored by the authors is something called the "biological model" (pp. 18–19, 114, 157). The strength of this point of view is its emphasis on development and change. Its weakness is its metaphorical character. The approach is not a theory but an extended figure of speech. For example, in discussing the SEC, they state that "The sale of securities is analogous to the channeling of energy in the body, capital representing the impetus for action. This energy, capital, is used to optimal effect when it serves to generate more energy, or, in terms of capital, profits that allow for expansion" (p. 157).

In short, this book contains a considerable amount of useful background information for the beginning student, but it cannot be relied upon to provide a workable analytic framework.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Columbia University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

The Almanac of American Politics 1986: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors: Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts *by Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. Washington, D.C., National Journal, 1985. 1,593 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $28.95.*

Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services *by Raymond G. Rocca and John J. Dziak. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1985. 203 pp. Paper, $16.00.*

China and the Soviet Union 1949–84 *compiled by Peter Jones and Siân Kevill. New York, Facts on File, 1985. 203 pp. $22.95.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congressional Staff Directory 1985 *edited by Charles B. Brownson. Mt. Vernon, Va., Congressional Staff Directory Ltd., 1985. 1,201 pp. $40.00.*

Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy *by Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1985. 753 pp. $45.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954: China and Japan, vol. XIV (in two parts) *edited by John P. Glennon et al. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 1,845 pp. n.p.*

Government Research Directory: A Guide to More Than 2,300 U.S. Government Research and Development Centers, Institutes, Laboratories, Bureaus, Test Facilities, Experiment Stations, etc. *edited by Kay Gill and Susan E. Tufts. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1985. 675 pp. $325.00.*

The Marx-Engels Register: A Complete Bibliography of Marx and Engels' Individual Writings, vol. II. of the Marx-Engels Cyclopedia *by Hal Draper. New York, Schocken Books, 1985. 271 pp. $25.00.*

Official Congressional Directory 1985–1986, 99th Congress *compiled under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 1,196 pp. Paper, $13.00.*

Outstanding International Press Reporting: Pulitzer Prize Winning Articles in Foreign Correspondence, vol. 2, 1946–1962 *edited by Heinz-Dietrich Fischer. New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1985. 304 pp. $39.95.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 50: The Complete Press Conferences, 1913–1919 *edited by Robert C. Hilderbrand. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 826 pp. $52.50.*

Pocket Guide to the World *by Bernard Stonehouse. New York, Facts on File, 1985. 496 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $9.95.*

Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Documents *edited by Carl-Christoph Schweitzer et al. Dover, N.H., Berg Publishers, 1984. 444 pp. Paper, $13.50.*

A Reference Guide to United States Department of State Special Files *by Gerald K. Haines. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 393 pp. $49.95.*

Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights *by Ludmilla Alexeyeva. Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1985. 521 pp. $35.00.*

State Government: CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities 1985–86 *edited by Thad L. Beyle. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985. 218 pp. Paper, $8.95.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States in East Asia: A Historical Bibliography. *Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1985. 298 pp. $30.00.*

World Development Report 1985 *compiled by the World Bank. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 243 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $9.95.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 100
1985

Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Managing Editor
TILLY FRIEDMAN-LICHTSCHEIN

Manuscript Editor
JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

COPYRIGHT © 1985 by The Academy of Political Science.
All rights reserved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Henry J. Abraham
University of Virginia

Walter Dean Burnham
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Inis L. Claude, Jr.
University of Virginia

Lewis A. Coser
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Robert A. Divine
University of Texas at Austin

Jorge I. Domínguez
Harvard University

Lewis J. Edinger
Columbia University

Doris A. Graber
University of Illinois at Chicago

Charles V. Hamilton
Columbia University

Hugh Heclo
Harvard University

Robert L. Jervis
Columbia University

Joyce K. Kallgren
University of California, Davis

Ira Katznelson
New School for Social Research

Lawrence Krause
The Brookings Institution

Everett Carll Ladd
University of Connecticut

Walter LaFeber
Cornell University

Michael Mandelbaum
The Lehrman Institute

Alpheus T. Mason
Princeton University

John R. Petrocik
University of Califoria Los Angeles

Nelson W. Polsby
University of California, Berkeley

William B. Quandt
The Brookings Institution

Robert D. Reischauer
The Urban Institute

Joseph Rothschild
Columbia University

Virginia Sapiro
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
City University of New York

George L. Sherry
United Nations

Roberta S. Sigel
Rutgers University

Leonard Silk
The New York Times

M. Crawford Young
University of Wisconsin-Madison

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Grayson Kirk
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Alfred C. Neal
Vice President and Treasurer

Leland M. Goodrich
Secretary

C. Lowell Harriss
Executive Director

Courtney C. Brown

John V. Connorton, Jr.

Gerald L. Curtis

Eli S. Jacobs

Frank J. Macchiarola

Robert MacCrate

Thomas M. Macioce

George B. Munroe

Norma Pace

Edward L. Palmer

Russell A. Phillips, Jr.

Mary G. Roebling

George T. Scharffenberger

Franz Schneider

Stephen Stamas

Harold A. Stevens

John R. Stevenson

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885. Manuscripts must be submitted in triplicate and accompanied by an abstract of between 100 and 200 words specifying the article's major theme or conclusions. Correspondence concerning advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-7885.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index To Volume 100

Articles

ANDERSON, WILLIAM D. and KERNEK, STERLING J.	How "Realistic" is Reagan's Diplomacy?	389
ARGERSINGER, PETER H.	New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age	669
ART, ROBERT J.	Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight	227
CHEHABI, H. E.	Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the Falkland Islands	215
CHUBB, JOHN E.	Excessive Regulation: The Case of Federal Aid to Education	287
FORSYTHE, DAVID P.	The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945–1985	249
GARFINKLE, ADAM M.	U.S. Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis: Correcting the Record	117
GARTHOFF, RAYMOND L.	American-Soviet Relations in Perspective	541
GRANT, ROBERT	French Defense Policy and European Security	411
HILTON, STANLEY E.	The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy	27
HUDSON, WILLIAM E.	The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S. Industrial Policy	461
JACOBSON, GARY C.	Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans and Democrats in 1982	603
LADD, EVERETT CARLL	On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election	1
LEVITAN, SAR A.	How the Welfare System Promotes Economic Security	447
LOWI, THEODORE J.	Presidential Power: Restoring the Balance	185
MILKIS, SIDNEY M.	Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics	479
MURRAY, CHARLES	Have the Poor Been "Losing Ground"?	427
NATHAN, RICHARD P. and DOOLITTLE, FRED C.	Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away	53
PETERSON, PAUL E.	The New Politics of Deficits	575
POWELL, ROBERT	The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence	75

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RAFAEL, GIDEON	Divergence and Convergence of American-Soviet Interests in the Middle East: An Israeli Viewpoint	561
RUBNER, MICHAEL	The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada	627
SAUNDERS, RICHARD M.	Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency	97
SHARP, JANE M. O.	Arms Control and Alliance Commitments	649
THEOHARIS, ATHAN	The FBI and the American Legion Contact Program, 1940–1966	271
VERBA, SIDNEY and ORREN, GARY R.	The Meaning of Equality in America	369

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Reviewed

Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law — Lane V. Sunderland — 712

Adams, Secrets of the Tax Revolt — Ira Sharkansky — 333

Alba, Italian-Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity — Francis A. J. Ianni — 335

Anson, Exile: The Unquiet Oblivion of Richard Nixon — Richard M. Pious — 340

Arlinghaus, ed., African Security Issues — Martin Staniland — 364

Arterton, News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns — Michael W. Traugott — 337

Ascher, Politics of Redistribution in Latin America — Jeffrey A. Frieden — 150

Backer, Winds of History: German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay — James F. Tent — 345

Baker, Race, Ethnicity and Power: A Comparative Study — D. Garth Taylor — 344

Bakhash, Iran and the Islamic Revolution — Richard W. Bulliet — 505

Banfield, Visual Arts and the Public Interest — Kevin V. Mulcahy — 171

Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age — Michael Parenti — 328

Bell, Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics — Clifton McCleskey — 536

Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880–1980 — Martin Shefter — 722

Borthwick and **Spence,** eds., British Politics in Perspective — Anthony King — 520

Box, Power, Crime, and Mystification — Ann Jones — 340

Bridges, Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics — Kenneth A. Scherzer — 724

Browning et al., Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics — Charles P. Henry — 530

Calder, The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–24 — Joseph S. Tulchin — 349

Champagne, Congressman Sam Rayburn — Janice C. May — 709

Charlton, Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to Solidarity — Robert F. Byrnes — 700

Cohen, The Pakistan Army — Barry Rubin — 354

Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy — Peter H. Juviler — 701

Cotter et al., Party Organization in American Politics — Frank J. Sorauf — 710

Czudnowski, ed, Political Elites and Social Change — Cynthia Fuchs Epstein — 174

Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapons — Kenneth W. Thompson — 690

Davis and **Helfand,** Governmental Regulators in the Political Process — Susan Rose-Ackerman — 725

de Rose, European Security and France — Leonard V. Smith — 699

Deakin, Reporters, the White House, and the Truth — Michael B. Grossman — 720

DeHoog, Contracting Out for Human Services — Alfred J. Kahn — 716

Dougherty, The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons — Theodore M. Hesburgh — 317

Durch, ed., National Interests and the Military Use of Space — Thomas H. Karas — 694

Eads and **Fix,** Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma — Eugene Bardach — 161

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Epstein, J. M., The Soviet Air Threat to Europe	CYNTHIA ROBERTS	319
Epstein, W., Prevention of Nuclear War: A UN Perspective	GEORGE L. SHERRY	691
Flammang, ed., Political Women: Current Roles in Government	ROBERTA S. SIGEL	717
Foltz and **Bienen,** eds., Arms and the African	I. WILIAM ZARTMAN	704
Franck, What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do	INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.	693
Frankel, Civil-Military Relations in South Africa	CRAWFORD YOUNG	705
Galnoor, Communication and Politics in Israel	JOEL S. MIGDAL	361
Garay, Congressional Television: A Legislative History	CHARLES M. TIDMARCH	172
Gardner, The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–23	JOHN N. HAZARD	346
Gellman, Contending with Kennan	THOMAS G. PATERSON	140
Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente	NEAL MACFARLANE	320
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. VI	THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK	519
Goldenberg and **Traugott,** Campaigning for Congress	HARVEY L. SCHANTZ	154
Goodman, ed., Groups and Politics in the PRC	MARTIN KING WHYTE	355
Hamilton and **Biggart,** Governor Reagan, Governor Brown	GERALD BENJAMIN	163
Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s	LUCIEN W. PYE	322
Hargrove and **Nelson,** Presidents, Politics, and Policy	I. M. DESTLER	707
Harrington, The New American Poverty	BLANCHE BERNSTEIN	139
Heckscher, The Welfare State and Beyond: Scandinavia	JOHN LOGUE	341
Heikal, Assassination of Sadat	JOHN P. ENTELIS	145
Helms, Iraq	PHEBE MARR	363
Hess, The Government/Press Connection	DORIS A. GRABER	515
Hochman, Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–38	LORD BELOFF	689
Hochschild, Commercialization of Human Feeling	MARTHA T. MEDNICK	176
Holli and **Green,** eds., Making of the Mayor: Chicago 1983	AMY BRIDGES	166
Holsti and **Rosenau,** American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam	ROBERT A. DIVINE	313
Ippolito, Politics of Federal Credit Programs	ELSIE M. WATTERS	533
Jervis, Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy	KENNETH N. WALTZ	698
Johnson, J. T., Can Modern War Be Just?	GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY	314
Johnson, K. A., Women, the Family and Peasant Revolution in China	RHODA WEIDENBAUM	358
Jones, Black Women from Slavery to the Present	LESLIE J. CALMAN	719
Judge, ed., Politics of Parliamentary Reform	LEON D. EPSTEIN	159
Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s	LOUIS RENÉ BERES	318
Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy	JOSEPH COOPER	708

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kelley, Interpreting Elections	D. Roderick Kiewiet	153
Ketcham, First American Presidency, 1789–1829	Richard Alan Ryerson	347
Kettl, Regulation of American Federalism	Timothy J. Conlan	169
Kindleberger, Multinational Excursions	Gustav F. Papanek	521
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies	Evelyn Brodkin	165
Laird and **Herspring,** Soviet Union and Strategic Arms	Clifford Kupchan	695
Lampman, Social Welfare Spending	Charles Murray	714
Leinen, Black Police, White Society	Pamela D. Delaney	162
Levitan and **Johnson,** Beyond the Safety Net	Isabel V. Sawhill	330
MacLean, ed., Security Gamble	Robert Jervis	316
Maddox and **Lilie,** Beyond Liberal and Conservative	Robert Lekachman	716
Malbin, ed., Money and Politics in the U.S.: Elections in the 1980s	Richard Rubin	326
McClosky and **Brill,** Dimensions of Tolerance: Civil Liberties	Shanto Iyengar	512
McCoy, Presidency of Harry S. Truman	Alonzo L. Hamby	510
Mendelsohn, Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars	Joseph Rothschild	151
Meyer, Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation	Leonard S. Spector	143
Miller, ed., Public Sector Performance	James W. Fesler	170
Moore, Privacy: Studies in Cultural and Social History	Lewis A. Coser	336
Morgan, Labour in Power: 1945–51	Jorgen Rasmussen	179
Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression	John A. Davis	531
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America Report	Robert S. Leiken	146
Nelson, B. J., Making an Issue of Child Abuse	Louise Armstrong	331
Newfarmer, ed., New U.S. Policies for Latin America	Robert S. Leiken	146
Olson, Clients and Lawyers: Rights of Disabled Persons	Julia Spring	334
Page, Peron: A Biography	Frederick C. Turner	148
Palmer and **Sawhill,** Reagan Record	Bernard E. Anderson	713
Pelling, Labour Governments, 1945–51	Jorgen Rasmussen	179
Perman, Southern Politics, 1869–79	J. Morgan Kousser	350
Porter, U.S.–U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement	Barbara Insel	703
Pyle and **Pious,** The President, Congress, and the Constitution	Louis Fisher	511
Ricci, Tragedy of Political Science	Dwight Waldo	535
Rockman, The Presidency and the American System	Stephen J. Wayne	325
Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America	John R. Petrocik	158
Rothenberg, The Neoliberals	Harvard Sitkoff	532
Sabato, PAC Power	David Adamany	508
Saivetz and **Woodby,** Soviet-Third World Relations	Robert Wesson	697

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schoultz, Argentine Electoral Behavior — FREDERICK C. TURNER — 148

Segal and **Tow,** Chinese Defence Policy — STEVEN I. LEVINE — 523

Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe — PHILIP W. DYER — 142

Silverstein, Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and Judicial Decision Making — D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR. — 157

Smith, ed., Civil Service in Europe and Canada: Lessons for the U.S. — JOEL D. ABERBACH — 528

Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography — ROBERT A. DIVINE — 506

Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China — RHODA WEIDENBAUM — 358

Staniszkis, Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution — JANE L. CURRY — 351

Stohl and **Lopez,** eds., The State as Terrorist — THOMAS M. CALLAGHY — 527

Strum, Louis D. Brandeis — HENRY J. ABRAHAM — 155

Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China — JOEL GLASSMAN — 524

Terrill, Biography of Madame Mao Zedong — EMILY HONIG — 357

Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission — GEORGE L. SHERRY — 514

Tirman, Militarization of High Technology — HARVEY PICKER — 516

Twentieth Century Fund, What Price PACs? — DAVID ADAMANY — 508

Useem, Large Corporations and Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. — CHARLES NOBLE — 167

Vig and **Kraft,** eds., Environmental Policy in the 1980s — LAURA M. LAKE — 338

Walker, et al., eds., Responses to Poverty: Lessons From Europe — JOEL HANDLER — 343

Watts, ed., Biopolitics and Gender — ANNE N. COSTAIN — 175

Weintraub, Free Trade between Mexico and the U.S.? — CATHRYN THORUP — 518

West, Leadership and Coalition-Building in 1980 — JOHN H. KESSEL — 324

Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan — LEE L. BEAN — 353

Wolters, Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation — STANLEY C. BRUBAKER — 721

Woolsey, ed., Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics — JAMES G. BLIGHT — 526

Wyllie, British Military Intervention since 1956 — HEDLEY BULL — 178

Yudof, Politics, Law, and Government Expression in America — CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE — 329

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

For the best in scholarly studies . . .

SUPREME COURT STATECRAFT

The Rule of Law AND Men

WALLACE MENDELSON

"Professor Mendelson has once again demonstrated why he has so long been among the leading interpreters and connoisseurs of our constitutional constellation and the judicial role within it. He not only writes with insight and no-nonsense analytical power, he does so elegantly and with commendable economy of words."—Henry J. Abraham, James Hart Professor, University of Virginia

Incisive and perceptive, this collection of essays examines the unique American blend of law and judicial discretion in Supreme Court history. Wallace Mendelson explores basic constitutional dilemmas in chapters on the judge's art, freedom of expression, the Fourteenth Amendment catchall, judicial review, jurimetrics, and future legal trends. *(ISBN 0-8138-1047-7, cloth, 352 pp., $21.95 plus $1.50 per book for post./handl.)*

DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY

A Public Policy Perspective

Edited by CARL F. PINKELE and WILLIAM C. LOUTHAN

The presence of discretionary opportunities in the law implementation system is a significant public policy issue. In this important new book, editors Pinkele and Louthan focus upon the complex questions discretion presents within a democratic society. **Discretion, Justice, and Democracy** delineates the realities and complexities of discretionary behavior and stimulates a new response to its role in a democratic society. *(ISBN 0-8138-0466-3, cloth, 136 pp., $16.95 plus $1.50 per book for post./handl.)*

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Dept. SCD1, 2121 South State Avenue, Ames, IA 50010

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Supplements and Core Texts

Pick One from "Column A"

Why Nations Go to War

Fourth Edition

JOHN G. STOESSINGER, Trinity University

A clear, insightful analysis of twentieth-century warfare that focuses on such critically important questions as whether or not wars are inevitable, the roles of personalities, and how the threshold is crossed from peace to war. The book has been brought up to date for this edition to include the latest developments in the Middle East and Gorbachev's rise to power.

Paperbound. 221 pages. Just Published

Public Opinion

COALITIONS, ELITES, AND MASSES

Second Edition

HARRY HOLLOWAY, The University of Oklahoma
with JOHN GEORGE, Central State University, Oklahoma

A lively but balanced and nonpolemical analysis of public opinion and political behavior in the United States today that presents mass apathy—not the domination of an elite class—as the fundamental threat to American democracy. The Second Edition incorporates the latest scholarship and provides revised or expanded coverage of pluralism, the media, ethnic politics, and individual opinion formation.

Paperbound. 304 pages. Just Published

Inventing Reality

THE POLITICS OF THE MASS MEDIA

MICHAEL PARENTI

A critique of the political role of the media. Parenti attacks the widely held view that the media are controlled by liberals; examines how and why the media distort and manipulate the news; and shows how the media channel public awareness in directions that are supportive of the existing politico-economic system at home and abroad.

Paperbound. 240 pages (probable). Publication: January 1986

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from St. Martin's Press. . .

and One from "Column B"!

American Democracy

LEWIS LIPSITZ, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

A major new textbook that provides a comprehensive, mainstream, but unusually stimulating introduction to American government and politics. It covers all the standard topics of the course—the foundations, institutions, and policies of contemporary American political life—but goes beyond this coverage to reveal the shortcomings and successes, the constraints and prospects of our system. The organizing concept of the text—the question of "how democratic are we?"—helps students distinguish between the democratic ideal and actual practice. Includes more than 80 boxed inserts that provide a comparative, cross-national perspective; illustrated with more than 200 photographs and more than 50 maps, charts, and graphs.
660 pages (probable). Publication: February 1986
Accompanied by an *Instructor's Manual, Study Guide,* and *Test Item File* (available in either bound book format or on floppy disk)

American Public Policy

AN INTRODUCTION
Second Edition

CLARKE E. COCHRAN, Texas Tech University
LAWRENCE E. MAYER, Texas Tech University
T. R. CARR, University of Arkansas
N. JOSEPH CAYER, Arizona State University

A comprehensive, balanced introduction to the major substantive policy issues in American politics today—the economy, energy, the environment, intergovernmental relations, crime, poverty, health care, education, social equality, First Amendment freedoms, and foreign and defense policy. The text combines historical and descriptive material with debate over the issues and alternative solutions, giving students all the information they need to make intelligent decisions on the issues on their own. Brought fully up to date for this edition, the text includes two new chapters—the chapter on intergovernmental policy, and a concluding chapter that summarizes emerging trends and themes.
464 pages (probable). Publication: January 1986

To request an examination copy of any of these texts, please write us on your college letterhead specifying your course title, present text, and approximate enrollment. Send your request to:

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

Department JR • New York, N. Y. 10010

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HARVARD

makes a big issue out of

Political Science

Saudi Arabia
The Ceaseless Quest for Security
Nadav Safran

"Nadav Safran's detailed and well-reasoned study . . . deserves a warm welcome . . . He has produced what is surely the most comprehensive, informative and reliable account of Saudi foreign policy yet written."
–New York Times Book Review

Belknap $25.00

Handbook of Legislative Research
Edited by Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell

Gathered in this volume are surveys by leading scholars in the field of legislative studies, each providing an inventory of an important subfield, an extensive bibliography, and a systematic assessment of what has been accomplished and what directions future research must take.

$32.50

Political Murder
From Tyrannicide to Terrorism
Franklin L. Ford

Franklin Ford's unprecedented inquiry into assassination traverses civilizations, cultures, religions, and modes of social behavior to locate the common threads of this often mysterious and always shocking phenomenon.

$29.50

Takings
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
Richard A. Epstein

Epstein uses recent developments in law and economics and the theory of collective choice to find in the eminent domain clause a theory of political obligation that he claims is superior to any of its modern rivals.

$25.00

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science: The Basics

The Party Goes On
The Persistence of Two-Party Politics in the United States
XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR.

Two seasoned political professionals describe and analyze the dramatic and totally unexpected rebirth of political parties in the last ten years and consider the impact of the new professional party on the nation's future political life. "A reasoned and important work from two exceptional talents. . . .Essential reading for students of the political process." —WILLIAM E. BROCK, III, Secretary of Labor

$17.95

The Rise of the Trading State
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World
RICHARD ROSECRANCE

The rise of the trading state and what it means for peace in the nuclear age is here set forth in a tough-minded yet optimistic analysis by a distinguished Cornell scholar and former State Department analyst. "An excellent blend of theory and history that identifies trends which offer opportunities for constructing a more peaceful international system." —ALEXANDER I. GEORGE

$19.95

Schooling for All
Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal
IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR

Schooling for All is a different, badly needed voice in the current debate over the crisis of public education. The authors argue that too much time is spend decrying the decline of standards and too little time lamenting the death of the American dream of public education. "A provocative contribution to the current debates on public education . . . Controversial must reading."—SEAN WILENTZ, Princeton University

$18.95

Political Crisis/ Fiscal Crisis
The Collapse and Revival of New York City
MARTIN SHEFTER

Here is the definitive account of New York's 1975 fiscal crisis, showing that such crises are the traditional way for American cities to bring about needed political change. "The best book on New York City government since Sayre and Kaufman's 1960 classic, *Governing New York City*. . . . Transcends New York and provides us with fresh insights into the place of the city in the . . . national and world economies."—THEODORE LOWI, Cornell University

$21.95

The Rise of Modern Judicial Review
From Constitutional to Judge-Made Law
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE

A Constitutional scholar at Marquette University shows how modern Supreme Courts have transformed judicial review from a power to enforce the Constitution into a power to adapt it to new ends and what this momentous change means for Constitutional government.

$23.95

A World of Secrets
The Uses and Limits of Intelligence
WALTER LAQUEUR

A Twentieth Century Fund Book

A world renowned scholar provides the first systematic and authoritative evaluation of this country's intelligence gathering machinery—how it has been used, misused, and on occasion, ignored, and what can be done to improve its usefulness to policy-makers. "A vital contribution not only to a better understanding of history but also to a more effective intelligence and counterintelligence dedicated to the protection of democracy."—ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

$21.95

Basic Books, Inc.
10 East 53rd St., New York, NY 10022
Call toll-free (800)-638-3030

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LSU Press

Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics
Kenneth W. Thompson

In *Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics*, Kenneth Thompson seeks to restore history to its proper place in international relations by presenting, from a political scientist's point of view, an extensive analytic study of the work of the historian Arnold J. Toynbee.

$27.50

Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion
A New View of American Imperialism
Richard H. Collin

Richard Collin tempers the legends of big-stick diplomacy and the Rough Riders by focusing on Theodore Roosevelt as an aristocrat and a gentleman. He argues that the expansion of the Roosevelt era was a cultural expansion, the product of America's coming of age under the guidance of a new type of president.

$25.00

Foreign Policy in the Early Republic
The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power
Daniel G. Lang

Daniel Lang examines developments in the science of international law and politics in the early American republic and their influence on the nation's founders as they made and debated foreign policy in the first few decades of the country's existence.

$20.00

Redneck Liberal
Theodore G. Bilbo and the New Deal
Chester M. Morgan

Theodore Bilbo is remembered almost exclusively as the Archangel of White Supremacy. Yet, in *Redneck Liberal*, Chester Morgan demonstrates that in his first Senate term this flamboyant Mississippi politician also threw his strong support behind virtually every New Deal social and economic program. Illustrated

$27.50

Human Rights
Fact or Fancy?
Henry B. Veatch

In a major contribution to the ongoing debate about human rights and the foundation of ethics, law, and politics, Henry Veatch finds the basis for human rights in natural law.

$30.00

Louisiana State University Press
Baton Rouge 70893

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHY AN M.P.A. AT COLUMBIA?

Columbia's Graduate Program in Public Policy and Administration offers:

* **COLUMBIA'S TRADITION OF EXCELLENCE**
* **100% SUCCESSFUL RECORD IN JOB PLACEMENT**
* **DUAL SKILLS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLICY ANALYSIS**
* **A STIMULATING AND EXCITING LOCATION (NEW YORK CITY)**
* **POLICY CONCENTRATIONS & COURSES OFFERED IN COLUMBIA'S OTHER PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS**
* **ACCESS TO ONE OF THE RICHEST LIBRARIES IN THE WORLD**
* **ACCESS TO THREE SEPARATE COMPUTER SYSTEMS**

For further information, write to:

Steven Cohen, Coordinator
Graduate Program in Public Policy and Administration
School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Room 1420
New York, New York 10027

Or call: (212) 280-2167

☐ Please send me further information about Columbia's M.P.A. program
☐ Please send me an application and information about the Program

Name _____
Street _____
City, State _____
Zip Code _____
Phone # _____
Undergrad Inst _____ _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NICARAGUA: An Inside Look

WHO ARE THE SANDINISTAS? How did they come to power? How are they reshaping Nicaraguan life? What positions have Christians taken toward the revolution, and where have these positions led?

Humberto Belli, a native Nicaraguan, lawyer and sociologist, is eminently qualified to take on these controversial questions. An active member of the Sandinista front until 1975, he was later editorial page editor of the independent newspaper *La Prensa*.

In **Breaking Faith**, Belli's analysis begins with a small band of Marxist guerrillas whose stormy history he traces through the civil war that brought them to power. Next, he considers the course of the Sandinista government and its impact on democratic freedoms and religious liberty in Nicaragua. Finally, Belli discusses the role of Christians in the revolutionary process and the striking consequences of a Marxist-Christian alliance.



288 pages
index/chronology
paper $8.95

"**Breaking Faith** is a powerful, judicious and meticulously documented study...of the regime in Nicaragua. It is an exceptionally informative and comprehensive book, probably the definitive work on the Sandinistas."

Paul Hollander
author, Political Pilgrims

"The reasoning is clear, the documentation is ample, the conclusion is compelling. North Americans simply must attend to Humberto Belli's argument."

Richard John Neuhaus
Director, Center on Religion & Society

Breaking Faith

by Humberto Belli

One copy; $8.95: Five or more copies; $7.50 each

Please include $1 for postage and handling on orders less than $10. Payment must be included with your order. Payable in U.S. funds only.

Name _____

Address _____ Apt. _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

THE PUEBLA INSTITUTE
P.O. Box 520, Garden City, MI 48135

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prepare your students for active participation in American government



America's Democracy
THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY
Third Edition

Fred R. Harris, The University of New Mexico

With expanded resource program

America's Democracy is totally updated and accompanied by a new integrated support program, including Instructor's Manual, Study Guide, Test Item File, Videotapes, and Computer Simulation. Also new to this edition are interviews with Robert and Elizabeth Dole, Potter Stewart, Charles William Maynes, Bill Moyers, and Fred Harris. Practical "How to..." mini-manuals, special "Viewpoint" boxes, and Harris' own fascinating insights bring students close to the issues, institutions, and policies central to American government. **Available Now.** *©1986, 752 pages, illustrated, hardbound.*

New for Texas politics

Public Policy in Texas
Second Edition

Wendell M. Bedichek
Neal Tannahill

Available January 1986

Recently published

American Government
Policy and Politics
Tannahill / Bedichek

Unfinished Democracy
The American Political System
Second Edition
Rodgers / Harrington

Problems of the Presidency
A Text with Readings
Hinckley

Public Administration
The Work of Government
Barton / Chappell

For further information write
Meredith Hellestrae, Department SA–PSQ, 1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

Scott, Foresman and Company

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KENTUCKY

OPEC: The Failing Giant

MOHAMMED E. AHRARI. A great glut of oil, dropping prices, the threat of insolvency, a divided membership—these developments in the early weeks of 1985 underline the cogency of Mohammed Ahrari's historical study of the OPEC oil cartel and his argument that economic forces, not politics, will ultimately determine OPEC's actions and its fate in the world arena. 288 pages $25.00

America Overcommitted
United States National Interests in the 1980s

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN. An examination of foreign policy priorities of the United States as it enters the latter half of the 1980s and its future role as a superpower in the 21st century. "A worthwhile contribution to the ongoing debate over the proper role of the U.S. in the contemporary world"—*Choice*. 256 pages $23.00 cloth, $10.00 paper

The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy

JACK E. HOLMES, with a foreword by Frank L. Klingberg. A pioneering account of the overwhelming impact of public moods on American foreign policy. Well-written and convincing with a balanced and fair point of view. 256 pages $24.00

A Season of Inquiry
The Senate Intelligence Investigation

LOCH K. JOHNSON. "A valuable contribution not only to an understanding of that very important committee but of the Senate itself. The author chronicles the committee's flaws and problems but on balance gives it high marks"—*Foreign Affairs*. 328 pages $31.00

The Life of the Parties
Activists in Presidential Politics

RONALD B. RAPOPORT, ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, and JOHN McGLENNON, Editors. Based on a survey of more than 17,000 delegates to state presidential nominating conventions, this pathbreaking book examines the characteristics, motivations, and beliefs of a broad group of party activists in the presidential nominating process. 256 pages $24.00

Judicial Conflict & Consensus
Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts

SHELDON GOLDMAN and CHARLES M. LAMB, Editors. These essays by major scholars of judicial behavior explore the frequency, intensity, and causes of conflict and consensus among judges on American appellate courts. These studies provide new insights into judges' attitudes, values, and role perceptions. 320 pages $30.00

Origins of American Political Parties, 1789-1803

JOHN F. HOADLEY. Hoadley argues convincingly that discernible coalitions existed as early as 1789 and that substantial parties emerged within the first decade after the creation of the new government. 256 pages $24.00

The Future of American-Israeli Relations
A Parting of the Ways?

JAMES LEE RAY. "Ray attributes the success of pro-Israeli elements in American politics to not only Jewish activist lobbyists but also the common religious roots of Jewish and Christian Americans. . . . A well written and powerful statement"—*Library Journal*. 160 pages $16.00

Inquiries and major credit card orders, phone toll free 1-800-638-3030 (in Maryland and Canada call 301-824-7300). Send mail orders to University Press of Kentucky, P.O. Box 1660, Hagerstown, MD 21741.

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



If you are part of today's world...

Paragon House presents these new and important books that everyone will be talking about. You'll want to make them part of your winter reading.

Women in Soviet Prisons
by Helene Celmina Hardcover $17.95

Evasions: *The American Way of Military Service*
by Philip Gold Hardcover $17.95

The Nuclear Connection:
A Reassessment of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation
(A Washington Institute Book)
Edited by Alvin Weinberg, Marcelo Alonso and Jack Barkenbus
Hardcover $27.95 Paperback $19.95

Natural Classicism:
Essays in Literature and Science
by Frederick Turner Hardcover $18.95

...for the first time in English
Stories of Life and Death
by Nobel Prize Winner Juan Ramón Jiménez
Newly translated by Antonio de Nicolás
Hardcover $18.95 Paperback $9.95

...and in a new English translation
Platero and I
by Nobel Prize Winner Juan Ramón Jiménez
Translation by Antonio de Nicolás
Paperback $9.95

Write for our complete catalog

Paragon House
PUBLISHERS
2 Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, NY 10017

Send your order to us and we will pay shipping and handling.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

". . . a prime scholarly achievement. There is nothing else anywhere near as good in the English language. As an academic who has spent several years trying to get students to read books, let me say the Mandel work is both scholarly and readable—with pleasure, realism and understanding." —Art Davis
Professor of Sociology, University of Alberta

"Afro-Americans and other U.S. national minorities have much to learn from the experiences of Soviet minorities. Mandel's fine social study focuses sharply on the comparative problems of ethnicity, culture and social transformation. An excellent and well-written book."
—Professor Manning Marable, Director, Africana and Hispanic Studies, Colgate University

384 pp., Maps, 70 Photos, Notes, Index
20.00 (cloth) 10.00 (paperback)



SOVIET BUT NOT RUSSIAN

The 'Other' Peoples of the Soviet Union

William M. Mandel

Essential to the understanding of the USSR of today, this comprehensive and objective, yet very readable, account of the non-Russian half of the Soviet peoples brings out the realities we need to know. America's senior Soviet expert brings us not only the histories of these peoples: the Jews, Ukrainians, Baltic peoples, Armenians, Near Eastern and Central Asian Soviet peoples, but also scores of personal interviews where we learn how they live, work and manage their lives.

Mr. Mandel's writings are grounded on 10 visits to the Soviet Union, beginning with a year's residence at Moscow University, 1931-32, and travel in all 15 ethnic republics, many more than once. He was the United Press expert on Russia during W.W. II, a Hoover Institute fellow at Stanford University, and has taught at U. C. Berkeley and other Universities. He has broadcast a weekly program on the Soviet Union over the Pacifica radio network for the past 28 years.

R
Ramparts Press

To: **Ramparts Press**, Box 50128, Palo Alto, California 94303.
Dear Ramparts: Enclosed is $_____ (add 1.20 postage). Please send my copy of **Soviet But Not Russian** to:
Name _____
Address _____
City_____State_____Zip_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Citizenship without Consent

Illegal Aliens in the American Polity
Peter H. Schuck and
Rogers M. Smith

Should children born in the United States to illegal aliens be granted automatic citizenship? Schuck and Smith argue that they should not — that America's liberal democracy is based on the notion of political membership by consent. Integrating the historical, political, legal, and policy aspects of birthright citizenship for the first time, this controversial book is certain to provoke lively debate over the issue of immigration in America.
$22.50 cloth; $6.95 paper
A Yale Fastback

Forecasting Political Events

The Future of Hong Kong
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka

What will happen to Hong Kong when Great Britain transfers sovereignty and administrative authority to China in 1997? Bueno, Newman, and Rabushka forecast political events in Hong Kong by applying an innovative formal interest group theory of politics that both explains the process by which policy decisions are made and predicts the specific resolution of concrete issues. $22.50

Yale University Press
Dept. 4J
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

Now available in paperback

Political Innovation in America

The Politics of Policy Initiation
Nelson W. Polsby

A pathbreaking look at the process of political innovation, with examples drawn from foreign and domestic policy, from the Peace Corps to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

"Fascinating reading. . . . Will excite other readers to speculate on the significance of [Polsby's] work for broader issues." —Don K. Price, *The New Republic*

"Superbly concise and informative." —William Schneider, *The New York Times Book Review* $7.95

The Making of America's Soviet Policy

edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

This "timely and important book" (Brent Scowcroft) is the first to examine seriously how the United States creates and manages its Soviet policy.

"No work in recent years has come closer to identifying the roots of the difficulties we create for ourselves in dealing with the Russians, or to specifying what we ought to do about them." —John Lewis Gaddis, *Washington Post Book World* $12.95
A Council on Foreign Relations Book

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To: The Academy of Political Science
2852 Broadway
New York, NY 10025-7885

From: _____

_____
Address

_____
City State Zip Code

☐ New member

☐ Transfer to life membership ($300)

☐ Gift membership to _____

_____
Address

_____
City State Zip Code

☐ Contribution

Check for $_____

Certificate for ____ shares of _____

REGULAR MEMBERSHIP

☐ One year	$25.00
☐ Three years	58.00
☐ Student enrolled at _____ (institution)	16.00

SPECIAL MEMBERSHIP

Annual

☐ Contributing	$35
☐ Sustaining	45
☐ Supporting	55
☐ Patron	100 or more

Life

☐ No further dues	$300

LIBRARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

☐ One year	$35

Foreign postage, $6 additional a year

☐ Payment enclosed

☐ Charge my

☐ American Express ☐ Master Card ☐ Visa

_____
Inter Bank No. (Required only for MasterCard)

_____
Charge Card No. Expiration Date

_____
Signature

Special members receive a certificate suitable for framing

Contributions are tax deductible

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Control of Federal Spending

Edited by C. Lowell Harriss
1985 / 188 pp. / $8.95

The Soviet Union in the 1980s

Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann
1984 / 244 pp. / $8.95

The President's War Powers: From the Federalists to Reagan

Edited by Demetrios Caraley
1984 / 204 pp. / $7.95

National Security and Nuclear Strategy

Edited by Robert H. Connery and Demetrios Caraley
1983 / 186 pp. / $7.95

The Crisis in Higher Education

Edited by Joseph Froomkin
1983 / 177 pp. / $7.95

The Property Tax and Local Finance

Edited by C. Lowell Harriss
1983 / 242 pp. / $9.95

The Communications Revolution in Politics

Edited by Gerald Benjamin
1982 / 205 pp. / $6.95

Food Policy and Farm Programs

Edited by Don F. Hadwiger and Ross B. Talbot
1982 / 254 pp. / $6.95

20% discount to Academy members
Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NY 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Grayson Kirk
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Alfred C. Neal
Vice President and Treasurer

Leland M. Goodrich
Secretary

C. Lowell Harriss
Executive Director

Courtney C. Brown
John V. Connorton, Jr.
Gerald L. Curtis
Eli S. Jacobs
Frank J. Macchiarola
Robert MacCrate
Thomas M. Macioce
George B. Munroe
Norma Pace

Edward L. Palmer
Russell A. Phillips, Jr.
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Franz Schneider
Stephen Stamas
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson

HONORARY MEMBERS

George W. Ball
Claude T. Bissell
Arthur F. Burns
Roberto de O. Campos
Jorge Castañeda
Barber B. Conable, Jr.
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Luther Gulick
W. Averell Harriman
Lord Harris of High Cross

Oveta Culp Hobby
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
W. Earle McLaughlin
Charles Malik
Michael J. Mansfield
Paul Martin
Saburo Okita
N. A. Palkhivala

Galo Plaza
Gordon Robertson
Lord Roll of Ipsden, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Carlos P. Romulo
Dean Rusk
S. M. Sikri
Margaret Chase Smith
Robert Stanfield
The Earl of Stockton
James E. Webb

The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, promotes objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting divergent views of these problems. It does not make policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, issued twice a year. Members receive both publications.

Regular membership: one year, $25.00; three years, $58.00; student, $16.00 a year. Special membership: contributing, $35; sustaining, $45; supporting, $55; patron, $100 or more; life, $300. Foreign postage is $6 additional per year. *Contributions are tax deductible.*

Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10025-7885 / (212) 866-6752

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED